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Executive Summary 
Creating a viable judiciary and strengthening its democratic functions have been main 
concerns of both national governments and donors over the last two decades. This report 
charts the efforts that have gone into judicial reform, both those of the international donor 
community and, more particularly, those of Norwegian aid agencies. A common purpose of 
these various efforts has been to make national legal systems function in a more efficient and 
fair manner. Norwegian assistance to judicial reform is of relatively new date, but of 
increasing magnitude and importance. The report places the Norwegian experience in a 
broader context by assessing how various international donors – multilateral, governmental, 
and non-governmental – have operated in this field. At the international level, the report 
identifies what parts of the judiciary have been targeted for reform and reasons why these 
sectors have been chosen; what channels have been used to distribute the assistance; and 
lessons learned so far. Experiences from Latin America and Africa are highlighted as these 
are cons idered particularly relevant for how Norway has chosen to organise its judicial reform 
assistance. The report subsequently assesses the history, channels, geographical orientation, 
types, and financial magnitude of the Norwegian aid to the justice sector. The case studies of 
Norwegian assistance to Guatemala and Ethiopia open up for more in-depth reflections on 
what works and what does not work when external donors set out to help governments reform 
their judiciaries. 
 
Main findings: 
· Donor assistance to jud icial reform in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa differ on 
three main dimensions: (1) International assistance to Latin America started a decade 
earlier than the assistance to Africa, and has been of much greater magnitude. (2) 
Multinational donors and regional banks have been key funders of judicial reform in 
Latin America, whereas assistance to Africa has principally been channelled through 
governmental donors. (3) Latin American jurists have been dynamic promoters of 
reform in their own region, whereas judicial reform efforts in Africa seem primarily to 
be donor-driven. 
· Norway entered the judicial reform scene only in the mid-1990s. Aid from Norad and 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to legal and judicial development tripled 
between 1999 and 2003. Nevertheless, Norway remains a minor player on the judicial 
reform donor scene in comparative terms. In absolute terms, the share of the 
Norwegian foreign aid budget devoted to judicial reform is also small: only one 
percent in the peak year of 2003. 
· The geographical focus of Norwegian judicial reform assistance has been on Africa 
and Europe, and its thematic focus on legal training and access to justice. 
· Norwegian motivations for getting involved in judicial reform efforts can be identified 
at three levels. One motivation arose from a wish to advance Norway’s police reform 
assistance, as it was realised that an effective police force requires a well- functioning 
judiciary as well. Another motive stemmed from Norway’s development cooperation 
work, where a weak legal system was seen as an obstacle to increasingly important 
aims such as human rights, good governance, democratic accountability, and the fight 
against corruption. Thirdly, the wish to support judicial reform was linked to the 
emerging peacebuilding agenda of Norway's foreign policy, as it was realised that 
post-war countries need strong legal systems - both to deal with the violent past, and 
to prevent armed conflict from recurring. 
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· Two important findings may be drawn from the judicial reform experiences of 
Guatemala and Ethiopia: (1) The aid strategy chosen by Norway is influenced by the 
historical background to the Norwegian judicial reform engagement. (2) Even though 
there are certain advantages and disadvantages connected to using the inter-
governmental, government-to-government, or non-government channels; the viability 
and usefulness of each channel must be considered in the given country context. What 
works well on one country does not necessarily work well in another. 
 
Recommendations: 
Since judicial reform is a very complex area, involving a multitude of institutions and actors, 
it is difficult to ensure efficient and effective reform. Yet, some precautions may be taken: 
· For individual judicial reform projects to be viable, attention must be paid to all stages 
of the reform process: (1) At the design stage, proper diagnostics, appropriate project 
design, getting on board relevant stakeholders, and fitting the individual project into a 
larger reform context are crucial. (2) At the implementation stage, success depends on 
proper coordination of efforts and the comprehensiveness of the reform. (3) At the 
evaluation stage, relevant indicators must be developed to assess the project; there 
must be sufficient financial resources, and one must aim for transparency when 
disseminating the results.  
· Donor coordination is essential to successful judicial reform in order to avoid 
duplication of efforts, but also to make sure that all relevant part of the legal chain are 
targeted during reform so as to avoid unintended side effects of particular reform 
efforts. However, care has to be taken to ensure local ownership. 
· Before getting involved in new projects, it is therefore essential that donors know what 
other donors in the field are doing, and that lessons – positive as well as negative – 
from own as well as others’ current and historical experiences are built on. 
 
The report concludes that we need to know more about what has already been done in the area 
of judicial reform before we go further. To facilitate useful evaluations, it is important to 
improve our understanding of what judicial reform is and should be, and to develop 
appropriate indicators. Such indicators should cover relevant aspects of the legal process, such 
as access to the legal system; the responsiveness of legal institutions; the institutional capacity 
to transform legal claims to judgements; and the authority of legal decisions. Political will to 
implement judicial reform by offering political, financial and administrative support is a 
crucial factor. Donor initiated reform efforts without internal political backing are seldom 
sustainable. Evaluating performance in the field of justice requires a broad approach. 
Successful judicial reform requires that both short-term strategies and long-term commitments 
have the ‘overall reform strategy’ in mind. Comprehensiveness and coordination – in thinking 
as well as in action – are essential if judicial reformers are to contribute to the building of the 
rule of law. 
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Introduction 
Judicial reform represents a relatively new terrain for Norwegian development assistance. 
Few attempts have been made to chart the efforts going into this area or to systematise 
experiences gained in different regions and by the various agencies involved. This report aims 
to fill in some of this gap. By combining analytical perspectives and empirically based 
insights, we hope to provide tools for critical reflection and a better basis for future 
policymaking in the field. We do not purport to present a complete mapping of the terrain – 
that would require a full-scale evalua tion, which is far beyond the scope of this project. 
However, by drawing on experiences emerging from international and Norwegian judicial 
reform projects and processes, as well as the growing theoretical literature in this field,1 we do 
discern patterns with a broader significance.  
 
The first part of the report outlines a theoretical framework for analysing judicial reform, 
placing it within the broader context of the justice sector, peacebuilding and democratisation 
efforts. To provide the empirical context for understanding the Norwegian efforts in this field, 
the second part of the report systematises major international developments in the area of 
judicial reform assistance, as well as findings from the academic literature. In part three, focus 
is on Norwegian aid to judicial reform within the broader justice sector. In addition to 
presenting the major patterns across this field – as to what is done, by whom, and where – 
more in depth reflections are enabled by the two case studies of Guatemala and Ethiopia.  
Part I. Understanding Judicial Reform: A Theoretical 
Framework 
Judicial reform is a complex field involving a multitude of actors, institutions and objectives. 
To facilitate systematic reflection, deliberation and development of policy, we start this report 
by constructing a theoretical framework. First, we clarify the concept of judicial reform, 
indicating how it relates to other concepts such as justice reform, rule of law reform, security 
sector reform, reforms to advance human rights, democracy, and good governance and post-
conflict reconstruction. 
1.1 What is judicial reform?  
Judicial reform (also termed legal sector reform)2 refers to efforts to improve the functioning 
of a country’s legal system, both in terms of fairness and efficiency. 3 The legal system 
                                                 
1 There is an emerging body of literature focussing directly on aid to judicial reform: Alford et al. (2004); Banks, 
Green, and United States. Supreme Court (2001); Biebesheimer and Mejía (2000); Dakolias (1996); Dakolias 
and Thachuk (2000); Domingo and Sieder (2001); Hammergren (1998); Linarelli and Herzog (2000); Van 
Puymbroeck (2001). Relevant insights can also be gleaned from the literature on democratisation and 
institutional change: Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Burnell (2000); Carothers (2004); Carothers and Ottaway 
(2000); Gyimah-Boadi (2004); Schedler (1999); and from the literature on law and society: Buscaglia, Ratliff, 
and Cooter (1997); Ely (1980); Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar (2004); Habermas (1996); Hutchinson (1989);  
Rosenfeld and Arato (1998). 
2 The two concepts will be used interchangeably. Judicial reform is the commonly used term, and the definition 
varies somewhat between authors. For a clarification of how these concepts relate to Norwegian development 
aid, see section 3, note 45. 
3 Improvement may also be understood as a shift bringing the operation of the legal system closer to international 
best practice, partly defined in terms of human rights and rule of law norms. It should, however, be noted that 
there are few uniform standards. Developed legal systems diverge on central dimensions, and what constitutes 
improvement may be contested on the basis of justice and fairness (which is relative to the conception of justice 
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encompasses the legal framework – that is, the constitution, statutes, regulations, customary 
law and international legal obligations – as well as the institutions that interact to form the 
judicial process, giving effect to the legal norms. These include most centrally the courts, the 
judicial administration, public prosecutors and defenders. The term as used here also includes 
alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms (ADR), tribunals and ombudsman institutions – 
which in many cases play an important role in providing access to justice, easing the load on 
the ‘core’ legal institutions.  
 
In addition, the legal system has a penumbra of institutions that are central for the operation 
of the legal process; providing legal education and training, legal aid, legal advice, 
information and rights advocacy. These may be public or non-governmental, and often a 
range of institutions are involved, including law schools, law societies, bar associations, legal 
aid NGOs, and human rights organisations.  
 
 
Figure 1: Judicial Reform and the Justice Sector 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how judicial reform forms part of a broader category of rule of law reform 
or justice reform, which in addition to the institutions discussed above encompasses the police 
and penal institutions. This, in turn, is part of an even larger complex of security sector 
reform, including military and intelligence institutions. Many of the reforms that fall into 
                                                                                                                                                        
in a society) as well as efficiency. We refer here to a country’s legal system, but judicial reform may also take 
place at other levels, involving only a minor geographical or functional area, or at a regional or international 
level, involving several states.  
Justice sector reform 
- police 
- penal institutions 
 
Security sector reform 
- military institutions 
- intelligence 
 
 
Judicial reform 
 
- law reform 
- access to justice programmes 
- court reform 
- justice admin. Reform 
- reform of legal education 
- strengthening legal community 
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these categories are, for purposes of development assistance also defined as support for good 
governance, human rights assistance, democracy assistance, support for economic reform 
and/or aid to post-conflict reconstruction. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship. 
 
Figure 2: Aid to Judicial Reform as Development Assistance 
 
 
 
 
To add to the complexity, aid to judicial or legal sector reform is in itself a composite 
category, subsuming a range of different interventions. Some interventions could fit into more 
than one category, but fo r analytical purposes it is useful to distinguish between: law reform; 
court reform; reform of judicial administration; support for the legal community; reform of 
legal education and training; and access to justice programmes. As we will see when we 
return to each of these shortly, the various forms of judicial reform are interlinked, but speak 
to different parts of the judicial process. 
Aid to post-conflict 
reconstruction 
 
Aid to  
judicial reform 
Assistance to 
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Human rights 
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good governance 
Democracy 
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Before going into detail on specific interventions, it is useful to look at what it is that 
motivates judicial reform efforts, on the part of domestic reformers and international donors. 
1.2 What motivates judicial reform? 
As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, judicial reform is a policy area that can be characterised as an 
intersection between several partly overlapping categories. This reflects the fact that – for 
domestic reformers as well as donors – judicial reforms are motivated by a host of different 
aims and objectives. Four predominant motivations can be identified:  
 
(1) To facilitate economic development. A key argument in the judicial reform debate is 
that a well- functioning legal system is a precondition for economic development.4 
Effective tax collection, which is crucial to a functioning economy, depends on an 
adequate legal framework and institutions able secure it. Endemic corruption is a main 
obstacle against economic development in many societies, and the legal system is a 
key to corruption control. Likewise, a legal framework providing predictability and 
stability, security for property and contracts is assumed to be crucial to secure foreign 
(and local) investments. While there are doubts as to whether and under what 
condition this presumption holds,5 it is clear that the courts’ regulatory and facilitating 
function in the economic domain has been the main reason motivating judicial reform, 
and particularly the considerable involvement by the World Bank and, increasingly, 
the regional development banks. 
 
(2) To protect human rights and provide access to justice for all members of society. This 
concern lies at the heart of international legal norms and carries a strong normative 
force. Again, this is a universal concern, but particularly urgent in societies emerging 
from a repressive regime or a civil war. In a post-conflict situation this is both a 
question of securing rights in the present and future, and about finding ways to deal 
with the human rights abuses of the past.6  
 
(3) To secure law and order, ensure protection against crime and provide security for 
citizens. This includes protection against crimes of corruption and embezzlement. 
Besides being an important good in itself, this is crucial for the legitimacy of a regime 
and for social and political stability. Law and order requires a functioning legal 
system. Without this the government cannot secure the safety of its citizens and an 
orderly framework for social cooperation, which is the ultimate justification of the 
coercive authority of the state.7 Functional legal institutions facilitate the exercise of 
political power, implementation of policy, and compliance with laws and regulations. 
To secure law and order is a central concern in all societies, but is particularly urgent 
and challenging in a post-conflict situation. From the perspective of the international 
community, financing of reforms to secure law and order is motivated not only by a 
concern for the recipient society. Organised crime and violence are important ‘export 
industries’ thriving in states where law and order is weak. In this perspective aid to 
                                                 
4 Proponents of the argument include Buscaglia, Ratliff, and Cooter (1997); Domingo and Sieder (2001); 
Dezalay and Garth (2002); Knack (2003); Munshi and Abraham (2004); Murrell (2001). 
5 There is little research supporting this, and some contradicting it. See Carothers (2003). 
6 See for example Kritz (1995); McAdams (1997); Skaar, Gloppen, and Suhrke (2005) (forthcoming); Teitel 
(2000). 
7 This is a central premise in social contract theory from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to John Rawls. See for 
example Lessnoff (1990). 
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legal sector reform can be seen as a response to domestic problems in the donor 
country, conceived as effects of drug trafficking, money laundering, organised crime 
and, increasingly, international terrorism. 
 
(4) To secure democratic accountability, good governance and the integrity of the 
political process. In modern constitutional democracies power is divided between 
different state institutions, in order to facilitate control between them and thus prevent 
abuse of power. The judiciary is a main actor in this ‘internal control’ or horizontal 
accountability relationship within the state, tasked with keeping power-holders 
accountable, sanctioning actions violating laws and mandates, and thus preventing 
mismanagement and abuse of political power. The perceived failure of electoral 
institutions to secure accountable leadership (by providing vertical accountability 
relations between the electorate and their representatives) has left hope pinned on 
institutions providing horizontal checks and balances. This is an important reason why 
judicial reform is currently a priority in societies seeking to democratise their political 
system, and among donors seeking to buttress democratic reforms. Beyond 
contributing to the accountability of politically elected leaders, the legal system and 
the judiciary have important consequences for the state of governance in a society. 
Governance here refers to how a country's resources - public and private - are 
managed. It includes the capability and functioning of the public sector as well as the 
institutional framework for the private sector. Adequate and independent legal 
institutions are a key to good governance, both in order to provide a regulative 
framework - not only for the bureaucratic structures of the state, but also for public 
and private institutions at all levels - and in order to sanction violations and promote 
compliance.8  
1.3 Which problems have been addressed, and how? 
The nature of the problems plaguing the legal sector varies between and within countries, but 
there are some typical problem complexes.  
 
A major problem in most countries is poor accessibility. That it is difficult for people to make 
use of the legal institutions to address their concerns is a complex challenge. Barriers 
preventing access to the justice system differ between as well as within societies, as do the  
resources available for overcoming these obstacles. Among the most common problems are 
practical barriers: such as lack of knowledge about rights, remedies and possibilities for 
action, physical distance from legal institutions, unaffordable court fees, bureaucratic 
procedures, strict criteria regarding standing, long backlogs and delays, and costly/scarce 
legal assistance. In many societies, psychological and motivational barriers are even more 
important. Vast social distance between the judges and ordinary people, differences in 
language, norms and social background may prevent people from bringing cases to court. 
Whether these barriers are overcome depend on factors such as: legal literacy programmes 
and human rights education; availability of legal aid, legal advice and pro-bono litigation; and 
                                                 
8 There are different definitions of Good Governance. United Nation Development Programme defines Good 
Governance as “the exercis e of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at 
all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate 
their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences”. 
<http://magnet.undp.org/policy/chapter1.htm>) See also The African Development Bank web site (< 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Governance/gov200.asp?p=policies>). Both visited 13.12.2004. 
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the resources in the population for associating, and for articulating and mobilising around 
rights claims. 
 
When cases reach the legal system, there are often problems caused by a lack of 
responsiveness and capability. This may stem from professional incompetence or lack of 
legal resources, but in many cases marginalised groups are disadvantaged because the judges 
– and the law itself – lack sensitivity towards their problems and predicaments. Similarly, 
judges trained under authoritarian rule often have little knowledge of human rights and other 
legal norms underpinning a democratic society.  
 
Lack of judicial independence and autonomy is a widespread concern. In many countries, the 
judiciary used to be the extended arm of the executive. Continued direct and indirect political 
influence over judicial decisions is a common phenomenon; jeopardising hopes that the courts 
will perform an effective accountability function vis-à-vis the executive. This is often 
combined with a lack of internal independence in the legal system, where the top judicial 
administration exerts strong discipline over the lower rank. Lack of independence from strong 
interests in society is also common. The courts lean towards the interests of the political and 
social elite, business etc., due to corruption, loyalty – or a mere commonality of views based 
on similarities in culture and social background. 
 
In some cases the root cause of many problems seems to be shortage of resources and/or 
inefficient use of the resources available. Poor infrastructure (few and seriously dilapidated 
courts buildings, lack of telephones, typewriters, computers, pens and paper), shortage of 
trained staff, insufficient access to basic legal materials (including the laws to be upheld) 
represent serious obstacles to properly functioning courts. Resource problems are particularly 
pronounced in African countries and in the lower judiciary. 
 
Finally, lack of legitimacy is often a huge problem. Poor court performance, irrelevance and 
perceived complicity in past repression are common complaints. Weak legitimacy stems in 
part from the problems discussed above: Lack of resources, incompetence and poor 
accessibility causes poor performance, which in turn decreases the legitimacy of the courts 
with ordinary people as well as with the government. Lack of social legitimacy in turn 
contributes to performance problems. It makes it easier for the government to starve the 
courts of resources, and to discipline or ignore independent-minded judges. Discrepancies 
between the formal legal norms of the courts and ordinary people’s sense of justice also 
weaken of the courts’ legitimacy.  
 
These are the main problems that judicial reform efforts have been trying to overcome. Efforts 
have been made through various types of interventions, referred to earlier as: 
(1) Law reform, 
(2) Court reform, 
(3) Judicial administration reform, 
(4) Legal community support, 
(5) Reform of legal education and training, and 
(6) Access to justice programmes. 
 
We will now briefly present each of the categories, starting ‘from the inside out’ with efforts 
to reform the law itself, moving on to assistance aimed at strengthening the courts that 
embody the laws; the administration of those courts; the community of lawyers within and 
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beyond the courts; the education and training of such lawyers; and finally, the general public 
and efforts to enhance their access to the judiciary.  
 
1. Law reform focuses on the development of the legal framework in response to the 
needs of the particular society, and in accordance with international standards. This 
includes international human rights norms, as well as best practice in various areas of 
law, often starting with commercial law and criminal codes. Law reform influences 
the mandate and competence of the courts and is thus is a key to judicial independence 
and effectiveness and the functioning of the legal system in general. Law reform 
(including constitutional reform) may strengthen judicial independence by expanding 
the courts’ legal mandate, and remove ouster clauses and limitations on the 
jurisdiction of the courts, thus increasing the courts’ potential for contributing to a 
well- functioning democracy. Aid to law reform includes funding for law commissions 
and deployment of technical legal experts to assist in drafting or for purposes of 
training in legislative drafting.9  
 
2. Court reform is directed towards improving the courts’ efficiency, capacity, integrity 
and responsiveness. This diverse category of reform efforts includes reform of court 
structures, judicial hierarchies and – often excessively bureaucratic and complicated – 
court procedures. This is important for access to the courts, for efficiency, professional 
discipline as well as for judicial independence. Court reform also includes 
improvements in court level administration (case flow management, circuit routines), 
and infrastructure (buildings, office equipment, transport etc.), which may enhance the 
practical functioning of the courts. It also includes competence building for judicial 
personnel, and improved access to jurisprudential resources (court libraries, 
dissemination of case law and other legal materials).  
 
3. Reform of judicial administration seeks to improve the efficiency of the legal process 
as a whole and increase the independence and authority of the judiciary. This includes 
reform of the budget process. Budgetary autonomy for the judiciary and secure 
funding (for instance a guaranteed share of the budget, and allocation and reporting 
procedures de-linking the judiciary from the executive) reduces the possibilities for 
‘starving’ and punishing the judiciary. Other measures include strengthening of public 
prosecutors and defenders, legal aid, and procedures for implementing judgments. 
Reform of the procedures for appointing judges, and of the rules regarding the length 
and terms of tenure, disciplining, transfer and impeachment procedures, are seen as 
crucial to improve judicial independence. Executive influence over the judiciary has 
been sought reduced by involving other bodies, such as judicial councils or judicial 
service commissions in appointment and disciplining of judges and administration of 
the courts. Fixed non-renewable terms or life tenure for judges, and public criteria for 
selection of candidates to judicial office, are other measures aimed at reducing 
politically motivated appointments. Reasonable conditions of tenure (decent 
remuneration and security for wages and benefits) are regarded as important to reduce 
the scope for corruption; while selection criteria taking account of gender, ethnic and 
social backgrounds might broaden the composition and hence reduce the social bias of 
                                                 
9 The parliamentary legislative process is a central aspect of law reform, and efforts to strengthen this may as 
such also be seen as part of judicial/legal sector reform. While acknowledging the interconnectedness of these 
processes, reasons of clarity and focus advice against including parliamentary reform as part of judicial reform. 
Both do, however, form part of the broader category of ‘democracy assistance’ (see Figure 1). And of course, the 
legislature may, and should, be a central agent in driving judicial reform. 
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the bench. The aim of these reform measures has been to strengthen the judiciary and 
insulate it from illegitimate influence. However, the need to guard the judges against 
undue influence must be balanced against the possibility for ‘guarding the guardians’ 
and avoid a situation where no possibility exists for checking a reactionary judiciary 
that systematically frustrates the policies of the elected government. 
  
4. Strengthening of the legal community. A vital legal community (law societies, bar 
associations, advocacy groups) is important for the quality of the legal process and 
necessary to establish professional norms and standards, which matter for judicial 
accountability. Donors have supported organisational structures, professional forums, 
seminars and training, and the publication and distribution of law reports. Systematic 
reporting and distribution of significant judgments provide model legal arguments as 
well as incentives for professionalism within the judiciary. Establishment of 
professional domestic as well as regional forums fosters a competent legal profession 
by providing opportunities for learning and by making the reputation of courts and 
judges matter. 
 
5. Reform of legal education and training aims to develop curricula and training methods 
capable of producing legal practitioners that are more professionally apt (for example 
in specialised areas) and/or more sensitive to the concerns and values of society, 
including those of marginalised social groups (this may include awareness of 
democratic and human rights norms, gender sensitisation, and training in equality 
jurisprudence). Continued training of judges and magistrates, including lay justices 
and assessors, may also be included here. 
 
6. Access to justice programmes, finally, focus on removing barriers – legal, economic, 
practical and/or psychological – that prevent certain social groups from accessing the 
courts. Focus for these reforms have been on public legal aid as well as civil society 
legal advice institutions, and on legal literacy programmes increasing awareness of 
legal rights and how to claim them. Access to justice programmes also aim at 
providing lower-threshold alternatives to court action, including alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR), ombudsman institutions, and lay/local/traditional courts and 
tribunals. The courts’ responsiveness to the concerns of marginalised groups in society 
may – particularly in countries with plural legal norms (traditional law and ‘received’ 
colonial law) – be improved through initiatives to integrate and harmonise diverse 
legal norms. As indicated above, training also plays an important role here.  
 
In the following, we provide an overview of internationa l support to judicial reform to see 
how different international actors have attempted to contribute to improvements in the six 
areas of judicial reform. We first give a broad overview of the main global trends in the field 
assistance to judicial reform, fo llowed by a section focusing more specifically on aid to 
judicial reform in Latin America and Africa – before going on to the analysis of Norwegian 
assistance to judicial reform in part III.  
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Part II.  International Aid to Judicial Reform 
Large sums have been spent on strengthening legal systems through judicial reform over the 
last couple of decades. Assistance to the judiciary has been a major component of both 
multilateral and bilateral aid programmes since the beginning of the 1990s.10 In fact, judicial 
reform is said to be ‘at the cutting edge of international efforts to promote development of a 
democracy abroad’11 and has, for all practical purposes, become ‘big business. Who are the 
main actors on the scene? Why and when did they get involved? Who have they been working 
with? What kind of assistance have they given? And what have been the effects? 
 
In this part we (i) map out the broad lines of the history of international support for judicial 
reform; (ii) give a snapshot of judicial reform efforts in Latin America and Africa; and, (iii) 
draw attention to some of the lessons learned from the recent decades of judicial reform. The 
main point is to provide a backdrop to the ensuing discussion of Norwegian aid to judicial 
reform to see how this fits into a larger context, and to identify lessons from international 
assistance that may be relevant to Norwegian support in this area.  
2.1 International aid to judicial reform: A brief historical account 
Though judicial reform has been given increasingly more scholarly attention over the last 15 
years or so, it is important to note that the issue of judicial reform itself is not new. Countries 
have constantly revised and adjusted their legal systems throughout history. Yet, the large-
scale involvement of international organisations or bilateral donors in promoting judicial 
reform is a relatively recent phenomenon. The types of international, governmental, and non-
governmental organisations that have engaged in judicial reform have varied across time and 
across regions. Time-wise, it is often convenient to divide international assistance to judicial 
reform into two main periods: from the 1960s to the 1970s, and from the 1990s to the present. 
In between was a period of almost 20 years when little judicial reform took place at all, and 
when international donors were virtually absent from the scene.  
 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), together with the Ford 
Foundation and other smaller, non-governmental American donors; were among the first aid 
agencies that entered the judicial reform scene. They did so in the 1960s as part of the ‘law 
and development movement’, whose ambition was to reform laws and legal systems of 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The guiding assumption of the movement was 
that the legal system was an instrument to reform society, and the main motivation was to 
contribute to economic development. By educating the bench and bar in developing countries, 
it was argued, reform efforts would be advanced. At the turn of the 1980s, the movement 
focused specifically on protecting human rights in Latin America It was in this period, 
however, that the movement was abandoned. Four factors help explaining its fall:  
 
1. The lack of a consistent theory explaining the impact of law on development, meaning 
that practitioners had difficulties in prioritising reforms or predict the effects of 
various measures; 
2. Too little participation by the lawyers and others in the target country who would 
either have to carry out the reforms or who would be affected by them;  
                                                 
10 See, for example, Faundez (1997). 
11 Carothers (2003: 5). 
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3. An exclusive focus on the formal legal system to the exclusion of customary law and 
the other informal ways to settle disputes and maintain justice; and, finally  
4. A lack of cultural sensitivity, as the American legal system was exported to foreign 
countries without taking the local legal culture and environment into account.12  
 
After the first wave of judicial reform in the 1960s, two decades followed when little judicial 
reform took place. Many countries were governed by authoritarian regimes, and the Cold War 
deadlock made external reform initiatives difficult to realise. At the end of the 1980s, 
however, a new wave of judicial reform started. The renewed interest in building and 
fortifying state institutions coincided with the parallel processes of political democratisation 
and economic liberalisation, which started in Southern Europe in the 1970s, spread to Latin 
America in the 1980s and further to Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia in the 1990s. A key 
challenge faced by new, democratically elected governments after long periods of either 
authoritarianism (as in much of South America, Eastern Europe, and Asia) or civil war (as in 
many Central American and African countries) was to re-establish the rule of law, and secure 
democratic stability. Both domestic governments and external donors have increasingly 
emphasised the rule of law as a central component of democratisation, good governance, and 
economic development. Moreover, since the judiciary often has been the weakest of the three 
branches of government in many developing countries, this institution has been given 
particular attention.  
 
In this second wave of aid to judicial reform, a greater number of donors have been involved 
than in the first. The pioneer from the 1960s, USAID, renewed its efforts to promote and 
assist in judicial reform, and other agencies followed suit. The main multilateral donors are:  
 
· the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),  
· the World Bank (WB),  
· the regional development banks, including 
- the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),  
- the Asian Development Bank (ADB),  
- the African Development Bank (AfDB), and  
- the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and  
· the European Union/Commission (EU/EC). 
 
Each of these multilateral organisations has had particular motivations for getting involved in 
judicial reform; they have tended to cooperate with different kinds of partners; and they have 
supported different areas of judicial reform. 13  
 
There is also a large range of governmental organisations and NGOs involved in judicial 
reform. Among the most important ones we find, in addition to USAID, the UK’s Department 
for International Development (DFID), and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ).14 The table below gives a rough overview of the donor organisations, their 
geographical region of operation, their type of financing schemes, and the main judicial 
reform areas that they have supported (following the categories of judicial reform detailed in 
                                                 
12 For an outline of the law and development movement see  
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/ldmovement.htm  
13 For an overview of free-standing law and justice projects of international donor institutions as of 2004, see 
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/donortable.htm. 
14 For an overview of bilateral donor agencies and NGOs involved in judicial reform agencies and their 
publications, see www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/otherdocs.htm 
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Part I of this report). Note that we have not detailed the financial scope of judicial reform for 
each donor, since this type of information simply is not available. 
 
Table 2.1: Major International Donors in Judicial Reform 
 
Region of operation Donor 
NA 
& 
ME 
LA 
& C 
EE 
& 
CA 
SA 
& 
EA 
SSA 
Financing 
scheme 
Type of support 
UNDP X X X X X Grants Access to justice, court reform, justice 
administration reform 
 
 
WB X X X X ? Loans and 
grants 
Access to justice, court reform, justice 
administration reform, legal education reform, 
law reform (?), strengthening of legal 
community  
IDB  X    Loans and 
grants 
Court reform, justice administration reform, 
legal education reform, law reform, 
strengthening of legal community 
ADB    X  Loans and 
grants 
Court reform, justice administration reform, 
legal education reform 
AfDB X    X Loans and 
grants 
Court reform, justice administration reform, 
reform of legal education 
EBRD   X   Loans Law reform 
EU/EC  X X X X Grants Access to justice, court reform, justice 
administration reform, legal education reform, 
law reform, strengthening of legal community 
USAID  X X X X Grants Access to justice, court reform, justice 
administration reform, legal education reform, 
law reform, strengthening of legal community 
DFID 
 
X X X X X Grants Access to justice, court reform, justice 
administration reform, strengthening of legal 
community 
 
GTZ  X X X X Grants Access to justice, court reform, justice 
administration reform, legal education reform, 
law reform, strengthening of legal community 
 
Sources: Free-Standing Law and Justice Projects of International Donor Institutions at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/donortable.htm (accessed 10.09.04). Various web sites for each of 
the donors listed in the table. 
Notes: NA & ME: North Africa and Middle East; LA & C: Latin America and the Caribbean; EE & CA: Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia; SA & EA: South and East Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
In addition to the major donors listed in the table, there is also a plethora of other 
governmental and non-governmental bodies offering assistance to various types of judicial 
reform in different regions of the world. While it is beyond the scope of this report to provide 
a detailed overview of all these actors, the above introduction should offer some pointers as to 
where the weight in international assistance to judicial reform lies.  
2.2 Aid to judicial reform in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa  
Beølow, we sketch the main efforts to promote the rule of law in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa. We address the following questions: What has motivated judicial reform 
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efforts in these two regions?  Who have been the principal international donors? Which 
problems have been addressed, and what has been achieved? 
 
Note, however, that because Latin American experiences have been given most systematic 
attention in the literature15 our data on this continent are more complete than those on 
Africa.16  
2.2.1 Latin America 
All Latin American countries, without exception, have undertaken partial or complete 
overhauls of their judicial systems over the past 15 years. Nevertheless, there is great 
variation in the ways in which judicial reform has been initiated, the areas to which assistance 
has been directed, the ways in which it has been funded and implemented.  
 
Motivations for judicial reform 
As mentioned above, assistance to Latin America in the 1960s – principally through the 
USAID and the Ford Foundation – was primarily motivated by the wish of the US to promote 
economic development in the region. The US’ geographical proximity to Latin America and 
its political and economic interests there largely explain why USAID was, and still is, heavily 
involved in judicial reform in the region.  
 
The renewed international interest in judicial reform in the 1990s was closely linked to the 
process of economic liberalisation, pushed mainly by the World Bank (WB), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). An efficient and 
transparent judiciary has been considered a must to enhance economic development and 
encourage foreign investment and trade. This helps explaining why the World Bank and the 
IDB have been two of the main donors involved in the reconstruction and strengthening of 
judicial systems all over Latin America.  
 
The new support to judicial reform was also linked to a parallel regional trend, namely that of 
political liberalisation following the fall of military dictatorships in the 1980s in a number of 
Latin American countries. The wish to promote democracy and human rights through 
strengthening the rule of law after a long period of authoritarianism has been central to many 
of the donors involved, such as the European Commission, the UNDP, and the key state 
donors of Germany, Denmark, and Canada.  
 
Linked to political liberalisation is the alarming surge in crime in the region after the end of 
authoritarianism, which gave urgency to criminal justice reform (and security sector reform).  
 
Interestingly, the former colonial powers of Spain - and, in the case of Brazil, Portugal - seem 
not to have taken any particular interest in judicial reform in Latin America. The fact that 
Latin American countries have enjoyed independence for almost two centuries probably 
                                                 
15 Though there are relatively few comparative studies for the region as a whole, there are some useful ones: See 
Biebesheimer (2001a); Biebesheimer (2001b); Correa Sutil (1999); Domingo and Sieder (2001); Faundez 
(1997); Prillaman (2000); Sarles (2001). There are also some comparative studies focusing on a limited selection 
of countries: Buscaglia and Dakolias (1996); LCHR (1989); Pásara (2003); Skaar (2003). In addition, a number 
of case studies and evaluation reports that deal with different aspects of judicial reform have been issued in 
recent years. 
16 We have, moreover, faced the following difficulties when collecting data on Africa: the vast majority of 
projects are of very recent character; much of the information is thus not publicly available; and much of the 
information is subsumed to the categories of ‘good governance’ or ‘legal reform’. This made it hard to assess the 
full scope of reform efforts – both in terms of area focus, and scope of financial assistance. 
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accounts for why these former colonial powers have not assumed a special responsibility to 
assist judiciaries in Latin America. This, as we shall see, contrasts with the pattern for Africa.  
 
Main problems of Latin American judiciaries 
By the end of the dictatorship periods, Latin American judiciaries were renowned for lacking 
independence and transparency, being biased and inefficient, and – at least in some countries 
– being prone to corruption. The multiple measures set in motion to strengthen Latin 
American judiciaries were in various ways targeted at ameliorating some of these weaknesses.  
 
One of the main problems facing Latin American judiciaries has been a chronic lack of 
judicial independence, resulting from the historical and traditional subordination of the 
judicial branch to that of the executive (so-called hyper-presidentialism). This problem 
became exaggerated during the dictatorships that dominated much of the region in the 1970s 
and part of the 1980s. When the transitions to democracy took place in the 1980s and 1990s, 
from authoritarianism (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay), civil wars (El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua), or one-party states (Mexico, Paraguay), strengthening the rule of law 
in general, and increasing judicial independence in particular, was at the top of many 
governments’ agendas.  
 
Areas of support 
For Latin America as a whole, the 1990s have been characterised by multiple reform agendas. 
In the area of law reform, efforts have been made to change procedural laws in various areas. 
For instance, at least eleven countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Venezuela) have made efforts to 
change their criminal procedures from inquisitorial or quasi- inquisitorial to accusatorial or 
more accusatorial and/or have tried to bring about profound changes in their public 
prosecutors office.17 
 
Various measures to strengthen the rule of law more generally, today often immersed into so-
called ‘sector-wide approaches’, started already at the end of the 1980s in Latin America. 
While only a few external actors were involved initially, ‘rule of law aid’ soon became a 
major area of reform. The rule of law aid programmes cover all the six categories of reform 
outlined in Part I of the report, yet the largest share of the support has gone to law reform. For 
instance, given the problem of lacking judicial independence, by 1998 at least 14 out of 18 
Latin American countries had undertaken constitutional reforms to formally increase the 
independence of the ir courts.18 Also court reform and reform of judicial administration were 
supported, as donors sought to improve the functioning of the state institutions directly 
involved in the making, implementation and enforcement of laws.19 Another large category is 
efforts targeted at NGOs and professional associations that can contribute to rule of law 
reform; i.e. legal community support and access to justice programmes. This includes training 
in legal matters, support for NGOs, aid for human rights groups and legal aid clinics as well 
as programmes devoted to fortify bar associations. A relatively minor share has gone towards 
reform of legal education and training, particularly through establishing clinical law 
programmes in law schools and revising law school curricula.  
 
                                                 
17 For an overview of criminal procedure reform, see Langer (2001). 
18 For an analysis of the reasons leading up to formal increases in judicial independence in Latin America, see 
Skaar (2002).  
19 Prison reform and legislative strengthening also fall into this category, but fall outside the definition of judicial 
reform Carothers (2001). 
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Though many of the judicial reforms have been common to all or most Latin American 
countries, there are some patterns of assistance that make Central America distinct from the 
countries further south. Some comments on Central America are therefore in order.  
 
Patterns of assistance 
In Central America,20 judicial reform may be divided into two phases: the 1980s and the 
1990s respectively. The first phase was initiated by USAID in the early 1980s, which worked 
to promote law reform, judicial independence, professionalisation and modernisation of the 
courts, training of judges, legal education, support to Public Ministries, access to justice, court 
administration, and alternative dispute resolution, to mention but a few areas.21 The overall 
aim was to improve the system of government and to help governments address rampant 
human rights violations. In the second half of the 1980s, the World Bank and the IDB also got 
involved. They were principally motivated by the wish to create a judicial system that would 
resolve disputes related to the market economy, and by the need to protect property rights.  
 
This first wave of reforms was thus centred on improving the infrastructure of the judicial 
system, and on training judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers. However, little groundwork 
was done before the reforms were undertaken. The result was that scant attention was paid to 
a main problem, namely the political nature of appointment procedures of judges; reflecting 
the broader lack of independence. Since judges in four of the five Central American countries 
were appointed for short-term periods by the president of the country, and dismissed 
whenever there was a change of government, the technical focus on infrastructural and skills 
improvements did not have the intended effect.  
 
Learning from mistakes and shortcoming of the first phase of reform in Central America, in 
the second phase – the 1990s – governments and donors sought to base their efforts on more 
careful diagnostics and more concerted strategies. There was also an extension of the areas 
targeted for improvement. Reform efforts were now aimed at five principal areas: (i) access to 
justice; (ii) professionalisation of the courts through recruitment and promotion of judicial 
personnel on the basis of merits; (iii) administrative reform; (iv) financial independence of the 
courts; and (v) the introduction of alternative dispute mechanisms. The efforts were 
undertaken either as isolated initiatives or in a more coordinated fashion. Nevertheless, there 
was frequently a discrepancy between a certain slowness of national actors and the relative 
efficiency and strength of their international counterparts. In several countries and projects 
this gap initially contributed to weaken national ownership to the reform processes. Over 
time, however, national ownership seems to have increased.  
 
In the rest of Latin America, and especially in the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Uruguay), judicial reform seems to have been more driven by national actors. International 
organisations have been invited in to provide financial as well as technical assistance, but 
often after the needs have been identified by either the national government or research 
institutions. The main reform initiatives therefore seem to have stronger national roots than 
they have had in the Central American countries. For instance, the criminal procedure reforms 
(aimed to modernise and strengthen the courts and make them more transparent in order to 
attract foreign investment) have mainly been designed and driven by academics in co-
operation with national politicians, with external financing from international organisations 
such as the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, and the Ford Foundation.  
 
                                                 
20 Much of the information on Central America is taken from Pásara (2003). 
21 For a good overview of USAID’s support to justice reform in Latin America, see Sarles (2001). 
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Across the whole region, the World Bank has been a particularly important player on the 
judicial reform scene. Currently, the Bank is running or supporting projects or programmes in 
nine countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Peru, and Venezuela). Assisted initiatives span a wide range of fields, such as model court 
development, judicial websites, judicial conflict resolution, access to justice, modernisation of 
the courts, improving judicial services and infrastructure, and modernising the Supreme 
Courts.22 It is important to note that the World Bank has, over time, supported a growing 
number and array of issues. While the Bank earlier seemed to back judicial reform mainly in 
view of enhancing economic development, it now seems that an equally important motivation 
is democracy building more generally.  
 
This is in line with what seems to have developed as a regional consensus, namely that 
democracy stability, on the one hand, and economic and social development, on the other, 
tend to reinforce one another. In the wake of this realisation, there has also been a growing 
consensus that the justice system must become more effective in confronting crime and 
violence, and that it must improve access to justice for marginalised groups, and become more 
transparent – if democracy is to consolidate. This is reflected in the types of judicial reform 
projects supported by several of the major donors in the region, such as the IDB and the EU. 
 
Regional learning 
Reforms have not only been promoted by international actors from outside of the Latin 
American region. Another typical pattern for Latin America has been the prevalence of 
regional learning. Many prominent Latin American legal scholars and experts have had a 
central role in what may be termed regional dissemination of different judicial practices. A 
few examples illustrate this point: Uruguayan legal experts have travelled around the 
continent promoting civil code reform, after its own reform in the late 1980s turned out to be 
a success.23 Similarly, prominent Argentine legal experts have assisted criminal procedure 
code reforms in a number of Latin American countries. And Peru’s experience with ‘justices 
of the peace’ is now being implemented in Guatemala. In sum, there has been a widespread 
learning (and failing) process in the region, induced by local as well as international actors.  
 
Shifting the focus to another region of the world, donor assistance to judicial reform in sub-
Saharan Africa seems to follow quite a different pattern to that of Latin America. 
2.2.2 Sub-Saharan Africa 
In Africa, international aid to judicial reform started later and has taken place on a much 
smaller scale than in Latin America. Furthermore, there are distinct patterns with respect to 
the motivating factors for judicial reform, the types of international donors involved, and the 
main foci of reform. In this section we document and explain some of these differences. 
 
Motivation for judicial reform 
As the colonial powers started pulling out from Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, efforts were 
made to develop and strengthen local capacity to operate each country’s legal system. The 
efforts were mainly driven by each country’s former colonial power; i.e. the UK in Southern 
                                                 
22 For details on World Bank supported projects, see www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/ 
23 Please note that this has not guaranteed success of the project in all countries that have adopted the Uruguayan 
model. For instance, in Guatemala, an evaluation of the justice sector carried out in 2003 suggests that the 
attempts to formulate a new civil procedure law forwarded by Uruguayan legal experts was heavily criticised 
and considered “unsuccessful”. Email correspondence from Hilde Salvesen, the Norwegian Embassy in 
Guatemala, 07.12.04. 
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and East Africa, France in Central and West Africa, and Belgium in Central Africa. The 
USAID was also running some judicial reform programmes in selected countries.  
 
This first wave of judicial reform seems to have stranded, however, as the new African states 
assumed one-party regimes and became puppets of one or the other superpower of the Cold 
War – often with violent conflict as a result.   
 
Like for Latin America, the renewed interest in African judiciaries in the 1990s thus 
coincided with the end of the Cold War, when one-party states were dismantled and civil wars 
came to a close in a number of countries.24 In line with the trend in Latin America, many 
donors placed assistance to the judicial sector on their aid agenda for Africa. According to one 
report,  
 
’Justice, constitution and legislative assistance is a rapidly growing area of development 
assistance. Such forms of development assistance represent the largest increase in donor 
funding in the second half of the 1990s….Aid to judicial reform has aimed both at 
strengthening the overall ability of the justice system to provide access to justice, and to 
increase the capacity of the judiciary to fulfil a constraining role vis -à-vis other organs of state, 
and in particular the executive.’25  
 
Though the support in monetary terms has been much smaller than that for Latin America, 
there is still a marked shift in the concern with the judiciary as an institution. Why? A prime 
motivation has been the wish to support democratisation by strengthening the rule of law and 
institutional development. Aid to the judicial sector frequently forms part of a large r ‘good 
governance’ agenda, which also includes strengthening other state institutions and electoral 
processes.  
 
By contrast, the process of economic liberalisation seems to have been much less of a driving 
force for judicial reform in Africa than in Latin America. A main reason for this seems to be 
that Africa is less economically developed as a region, and thus less interesting for donors 
concerned with promoting international trade and foreign investment. The structural 
adjustment programmes advocated in the region by the IMF and the World Bank from the 
1980s onwards have been directed at introducing basic market economy principles, yet as a 
general rule have not been coupled with assistance to judicial reform. Nevertheless, there has 
been an increasing concern with the need for a more efficient and transparent judiciary in 
order to speed up the process of economic development.26 
 
The main donors  
The donors involved in judicial reform in Africa differ substantially from those engaged in 
Latin America. Since economic liberalisation has not been a principal motivating force for 
judicial reform in Africa, the multinational banks do not figure among the main promoters. To 
the extent that the World Bank has been engaged in Africa at all, it has directed its assistance 
                                                 
24 For a good overview of African countries’ transition to democratic rule in the 1990s, see Bratton and Van de 
Walle (1997). 
25 Rakner (2002: 10-11) The Danish evaluation found that 83 per cent of grants to justice, constitution and 
legislation over the period from 1990 to 1998 were allocated after 1995. For the full report, see 
DANIDA/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999. 
26 For instance, the World Bank and the French government have been involved in judicial reform in countries 
such as Côte d’Ivoire to promote market liberalism. See Berg et al. (1999). 
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principally to North Africa – not to sub-Saharan Africa. As of 2004, the Bank appears to have 
offered assistance to the judicial sector only in Mauritania, Morocco, and Ethiopia.27  
 
It is also interesting to note that while the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) placed 
judicial reform on its agenda for Latin America already in 1993, the African Development 
Bank (AfDB) has only recently started to be interested in judicial reform issues. The AfDB’s 
efforts have focused on court reform, training, access to justice, transparency, and the 
building of legal infrastructure, e.g. the establishment of a legal database on African law. 28 To 
the extent that the AfDB has been involved, it has engaged in projects in North Africa rather 
than in sub-Saharan African countries. The first projects in sub-Saharan Africa appear to have 
been initiated only in 2003 – ten years after the IDB started its judicial reform work in Latin 
America. 
 
The main international donors on the judicial reform scene in Africa may be clus tered into 
three groups: (i) multinational organisations, such as the UNDP and the EC/EU; (ii) a battery 
of governmental agencies – the GTZ, DFID, USAID, the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), and Norad among others; and (iii) a large number of non-
governmental organisations.  
 
(i) Of the multilateral donors, the UNDP has been involved in development work and poverty 
reduction in many African countries for a number of years. But only relatively recently, and 
on a limited scale, has judicial reform become part of the UNDP’s agenda for sub-Saharan 
Africa. UNDP assistance to the judicial sector has typically formed part of its efforts to 
promote democratic governance. For example, the UNDP has helped launch a judicial reform 
process in Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Ethiopia; assisted in the training of 
prosecutors in Mauritius,29 and been involved in strengthening the administration of justice in 
Angola.30  
 
The European Commission, for its part, has assisted judicial reform in sub-Saharan Africa in 
the areas of law reform (administrative and criminal codes, commercial codes and judiciary 
acts), court reform, judicial administration reform, legal education, and access to justice  
programmes (especially in North Africa), and public awareness campaigns on the rule of law 
and democracy. The Commission has also given support to the penal institutions.31 
 
(ii) We mentioned earlier that former colonial powers in Africa have taken a particular 
interest in assisting judiciaries in their former colonies. This was true right after 
independence, and seems to hold true today. For instance, France has assisted judicial reform 
effort in former colonies in West Africa,32 and British DFID is actively involved in 
                                                 
27 More information the World Bank’s support  to judicial reform in Africa is given at 
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/MajorStandAloneJudiciallReformProjects.doc. Note, however, that the 
World Bank Development Economics Group at the end of the 1990s had ten case studies prepared for various 
African countries, assessing – among other things – the need for general system reform of the judiciary. For the 
case study of Côte d’Ivoire, see Berg et al. (1999). It is therefore not unlikely that the World Bank initiates more 
judicial reform projects in the near future. 
28 This information is drawn from www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/donortable.htm. The authors have not 
succeeded in finding further information on the projects supported by the AfDB – most probably because they 
are still in the pipeline.  
29 See ‘UNDP’s Work in Africa’ at www.undp.org/dpa/publications/FFafrica090603E1.pdf (accessed 13.09.04). 
30 See http://mirror.undp.org/angola/governance.htm (accessed 13.09.04). 
31 Information on EC assistance is taken from www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/donortable.htm. 
32 See Berg et al. (1999). 
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reconstructing the judicial apparatus in Sierra Leone after the civil war and is involved in 
justice sector development in Malawi.  
 
Beyond the colonial dynamic, there are also a range of bilateral donors that do not seem to be 
motivated by a history as colonial power. To give but some examples:  
 
· Germany’s GTZ has supported constitutional reforms (Eritrea), reform of 
administrative and criminal law (South Africa), reform of courts and the 
prosecutor’s office (Zambia), and legal information campaigns and NGO networks 
(West Africa and Namibia).  
· USAID is involved in ‘democracy and governance’ programmes in 26 African 
countries, and has focused its assistance in the field of judicial reform to support 
for legal advice centres.33  
· Denmark’s Danida has supported the justice sector since the early the 1990s in a 
handful of African countries, including Uganda.34  
· Finally, Norwegian involvement is quite extensive too. Norad and the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs have since 1999 assisted legal and judicial 
development in roughly a dozen African countries, including Ethiopia (see case 
study), Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.35  
 
(iii) Non-governmental organisations have also been involved in judicial reform projects, such 
as the International Development Law Organisation, to mention but one.36  
 
Types of reform 
The above discussion suggests that judicial reform efforts in Africa have, like in Latin 
America, been quite diverse. In Africa, though, an overall aim has been to strengthen the rule 
of law, that is, to get the judiciaries to a point where they can effectively deal with dispute 
resolution and safeguard the rule of law without external assistance. For instance, substantial 
efforts have been made to strengthen judicial independence in various common law 
countries.37 Less donor effort, however, seems to have gone into systematic law reform, for 
instance of criminal procedural codes. It is our impression that this difference reflects a 
broader divergence between judicial reform in Latin America and Africa. In the following, we 
give some tentative explanations why Africa appears to have come somewhat shorter on the 
road to a well- functioning rule of law society than has Latin America 
 
 
                                                 
33 See USAID report Making Progress in Africa, 2003 at www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-
saharan_africa/publications/docs/makingprogress03.pdf (accessed 01.09.04) However, the authors have found no 
further supporting evidence. See also 
www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/regions/afr/angola.html (accessed 13.09.04). 
34 For an evaluation of Danida’s assistance to the judicial sector in Africa, see DANIDA/Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1999. 
35 Summary information from Table in Appendix 3. 
36 See http://www.idli.org/index.htm (accessed 01.09.04). 
37 See Widner (1999). Another principal area of international assistance has been to address the gross human 
rights violations after the end of massacres or civil wars. International assistance through the UN for setting up 
the war crimes tribunal in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, and the mixed tribunal in Sierra Leone to deal with 
massive human rights abuses during the war there, are but two examples of where the international community 
has got involved because the states do not have the capacity to solve these problems on their own. Such efforts, 
however, fall outside our definition of aid to judicial reform, and are therefore not assessed in this report. 
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The gap between Latin America and Africa: Four tentative explanations  
First, the institutional capacities of African judiciaries have, on the whole, been even weaker 
than those of Latin America. The reason is historical: Latin American countries have, on the 
average, a formal legal history of more than 150 years since independence from Spain and 
Portugal. By contrast, most of Africa’s states were decolonised only half a century ago, or 
even less. Because the judicial apparatuses in most of Africa were under colonial 
administration till well past the first half of the  20th century, the tradition is short for involving 
nationals in political or judicial affairs. This, in turn, has meant that when many African 
countries introduced democratic rule, either after independence or after prolonged civil war, 
they started pretty much from scratch in building up their judiciaries – at least in building the 
local judicial capacity. 
 
Second, the lack of human as well as financial resources has been a major obstacle to creating 
functioning judicial systems in Africa.38 To give but two brief examples: at the time of 
independence in Ethiopia, there were only 12 judges to serve 6 million people. Similarly, after 
the Portuguese pulled out of Angola in 1975, there were reportedly less than ten qualified 
lawyers in the entire country. Since the task at hand thus not only has been to re-form but 
partly to form a formal judicial system, the challenges have therefore been substantially 
tougher in Africa than in Latin America.39  
 
Third, the challenges posed by traditional law and pluralist legal systems have been much 
greater in Africa than in Latin America (with the notable exception of Latin American 
countries that have a high percentage of indigenous people, such as Bolivia, Guatemala and 
Ecuador). Typical for African countries have been the parallel existence of a formal legal 
system inherited by the colonial power, and various customary law practices. The existence of 
several legal cultures in one country has created special challenges for donors with respect to 
how most efficiently to strengthen formal legal institutions. 
 
A fourth reason why Africa has come shorter on the judicial reform path than Latin America,  
is that whereas Latin America has one common legal history (with the exception of Brazil) 
and hence rather similar formal legal systems, African countries have inherited formal legal 
systems from colonial regimes with different legal systems and legal practices (Great Britain, 
Germany, Portugal, France, Belgium etc). The combination of different formal legal systems 
and a plethora of customary law systems have made it more difficult for donors to go in with 
a holistic or ‘package’ approach to judicial reform in Africa. The diversity also suggests that 
the transfer of judicial models from one country to another, or other forms of regional 
learning, has a more limited potential in Africa than in Latin America. 
 
Despite marked differences, judicial reform has been an important item on political agendas 
of national governments and of inter-governmental, governmental and non-governmental 
donors for quite some years. Vast amounts of resources have been spent in efforts to improve 
judiciaries – mostly in Latin America; but also in Africa. What have been the effects and 
lessons of these efforts?  
                                                 
38 For a comment on the capacities of the judicial systems in Tanzania and Zambia, see Gloppen (2004). 
39 It should also be noted that there is an enormous variation in institutional capacity of different African 
countries. On the one side of the continuum lies South Africa, whose comparatively well developed court system 
in recent years has issued some of the most progressive judgements in the world on issues such as housing rights 
and gay rights, and whose Constitutional Court has served as a role model for other African countries. On the 
other end of the continuum lie countries such as war-torn countries such as Sierra Leone or Angola, where 
national courts are barely functioning. The need for external assistance therefore varies greatly across countries. 
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2.3 What has been achieved?  
As mentioned in Part I, there is widespread recognition among donors as well as national 
governments that if a state’s legal system is weak and ineffective, reforming it is vital to 
achieve goals such as economic stability, good governance, respect for human rights, social 
justice, and human security. After nearly two decades of assistance to judicial reform, how 
much do we know about its effects? Have the reform efforts had the anticipated positive 
impact on economic and democratic development? The points highlighted below draw on 
scholarly accounts as well as reports from the major donors involved in the reform 
processes.40  
 
The ‘success’ of a judicial reform project can mean two different things: either, in the narrow 
sense, that the project has been executed so that the various items on the reform list have been 
carried out according to plan and achievements have been made on quantifiable variables; or, 
in the broader sense, that the reform that the project seeks to promote has had the desired 
impact on a particular societal trend – such as a decrease in crime rates, more respect for 
democracy, or higher economic growth. The latter kind of ‘success’ is, needless to say, much 
harder to document and measure. The literature on (aid to) judicial reform tends to mix the 
two when talking about ‘lessons learned’. In the following we comment broadly on both.  
 
For the case of Latin America, there have been several positive achievements:41 (i) the 
concept of judicial reform has been accepted in the region and has become public policy; (ii) 
resource shortages have become less acute governments have increased their budgets for the 
judiciary; and (iii) judicial independence has increased. As judges are now publicly selected 
(i.e. no longer appointed unilaterally by the President) and the nomination of Supreme Court 
judges has become more transparent, judicial independence has started to manifest itself in 
case rulings. This has been evident particularly in the prosecution of military for gross human 
rights violations committed during the dictatorship period in the 1970s and 1980s. Argentina 
and Chile are the two countries where judicial independence has manifested itself most 
strongly in the dealing with human rights violations, but there are signs of independent 
judicial action also in countries like Uruguay and Mexico.42 
 
It is further clear that training of judges and court personnel has improved in many countries. 
For instance, human rights curricula have started to become part of the training of judges in 
Chile. In the area of law development, antiquated criminal procedural codes have been 
revised. Criminal prosecuting is made more transparent and efficient, partly because the role 
of judges has been diversified. Another positive achievement has been the successful 
establishment of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in countries such as Peru and 
Bolivia, which have given poor and marginalised people better access to justice. Though it 
may be too soon to assess the full effects of such reforms, they are reported to have gone quite 
well. 
 
                                                 
40 The following review of successful experiences with judicial reform builds on the following sources: 
Biebesheimer (2001a); Biebesheimer (2001b); Correa Sutil (1999); Domingo and Sieder (2001); Faundez 
(1997); Sarles (2001). Buscaglia and Dakolias (1996); LCHR (1989); Pásara (2003).  
41 The first three points are based on an analysis by Pásara (2003). Though his analysis focuses on Central 
America, we consider these points to be valid for Latin America as a whole. 
42 For a comprehensive analysis of the effects of increased judicial independence on the prosecution of human 
rights violators, see Skaar (2002). 
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Perhaps most importantly, the judiciary as an institution has gained increased attention across 
the continent  as a result of the extensive reform processes. This in turn has made it possible 
for the judiciary to carve out a more active role in the process of democratic development.  
 
On the negative side, it is a fact that there have been many less successful projects, where 
objectives have not been met. More importantly, the legitimacy of Latin American judiciaries 
has in fact decreased, rather than increased, after the wave of judicial reform started in the 
early 1990s. Why is this so? One possible explanation may be that reforms that have been 
targeted at – and successfully improved – one part of the judicial system, may have 
unintended effect on different parts of the system. For instance, increasing access to justice 
and thus increasing the number of cases brought before the courts can slow down the average 
time for ruling on a case, if the capacity of the judiciary is not simultaneously increased to 
respond to the larger number of cases. The result, then, is that people realise, to a greater 
extent than they did earlier, that the judiciary is not responding adequately to their needs.43 
Another factor may be the unrealistically high expectations people have had to the judiciaries 
after reform started. Seeing the fruits of reform have taken longer than people expected; thus 
people are disappointed when their cases get stuck in the judicial system, or when they note 
that crime in their neighbourhood has increased rather than decreased – in spite of political 
promises of the contrary. 
 
The same problems pertain to judiciaries and judicial reform in other parts of the world. For 
the African continent, no comprehensive surveys or analysis of assistance to judicial reform 
exists. Because assistance to judicial reform in Africa is a relatively new undertaking, it may 
be too soon to say much in terms of evaluating the effectiveness or usefulness of reform.  
 
What is clear, though, is that the increased focus on the judiciary has had a positive effect in 
that this institution is taken more seriously. More judges have been trained, court 
administration and resource allocation to the judiciary has improved in many countries. In 
particular, the issue of rule of law has begun to be taken seriously by governments and 
judiciaries across the continent.44 The fact that many donors have placed judicial reform on 
their agendas has resulted in international as well as national attention on domestic legal 
systems. This is a crucial first step in improving judiciaries in developing countries.  
 
Nevertheless, it is hard to prove the connection between judicial reform and increased respect 
for human rights or improved economic development The difficulty is to measure the 
combined effect of multiple reform efforts, especially its effect on complex political or 
economic processes. A reason why this is hard, is that a number of other variables than the 
potential results of judicial reform are likely to affect human rights or economic development. 
 
What we can tentatively conclude from our brief comparative analysis of international 
assistance to judicial reform in Latin America and Africa, is that there is still a long way to go 
before reforms become effective, and courts start operating independently and efficiently in 
all countries. We will return to a more systematic assessment of potential obstacles to 
efficient or successful reform in the last part of our report. First, though, we turn our attention 
to Norway, and to the Norwegian aid to judicial reform – within the broader justice sector. 
                                                 
43 For a fuller discussion on potential negative synergy effects of reform of different components of the judicial 
system, see Prillaman (2000). 
44 For a comprehensive analysis of efforts to build the rule of law in Africa, see Widner (2001).  
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Part III.  Norwegian Aid to Judicial Reform 
How have Norwegian agencies attempted to support the justice sector in other countries, and 
what lessons can be learned from their efforts?  
 
This is the overall question of this part of the report. As opposed to the two preceding parts, 
we will in the following not restrict ourselves to analysing aid to the judiciary only. The 
reason is that the history and context of Norway’s assistance in this field are closely linked to 
support of other parts of the justice sector; the police in particular.  
 
To contextualise Norwegian aid to judicial reform, this part therefore first gives a bird’s view 
of Norwegian assistance to the judiciaries, police forces, and penal bodies of other states. 
Secondly, we assess engagements in two particular countries where Norway’s efforts have 
been important, namely Guatemala and Ethiopia.  
 
Our analysis is based on data collected from November 2003 through 2004, consisting of (1) 
interviews with representatives of agencies involved in justice sector support,45 (2) literary 
sources such as project outlines, strategy papers, appraisals, evaluation reports, and press 
articles, and (3) statistics. Excerpts of one key statistical source, reflecting the support to 
‘legal and judicial development’ from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(Norad) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for the period 1999-2003, are 
given in Appendix 3.46 
 
Yet given the considerable size of the terrain to be mapped – i.e., all significant contributions 
by Norwegian institutions and organisations over recent years to any institution or process 
linked to the justice sector, anywhere in the world – the ‘map’ given in the following cannot 
be entirely true to the terrain. Nonetheless, it is likely to give the reader a helpful guide to 
make sense of the multidimensional and multidirectional world of Norway’s justice sector 
support.  
3.1 Norwegian aid to the justice sector 
In this section, we discern the patterns of Norway’s assistance to the justice sector. We do so 
along four dimensions: agency, geography, type, and finance. We address the questions who, 
where, what, and how much – while also touching on how and why – of Norway’s efforts. 
First, who are involved? 
                                                 
45 See Appendix 1 for the List of Informants and Appendix 2 for the Interview Guide (in Norwegian). 
46 ‘Legal and judicial development’ is a code (no. 150.30) used by the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee, which in 1999 was adopted by Norad as a basis for classifying Norad and MFA projects. Prior to 
1999, most of the allocations that later were put into this category were classified as ‘human rights assistance’. 
Two notes are in order with regard to this key source. First, ‘legal and judicial development’ is defined by the 
OECD (2002) as embracing ‘constitutional development, legal drafting, institutional strengthening of legal and 
judicial systems, legal training and education, legal advice and services, crime prevention’. Compared with the 
definition of ‘judicial reform’ or ‘legal sector reform’ provided in Part I of this report, the definition of ‘legal and 
judicial development’ is fairly close. Second, when investigating some of the initiatives categorised as ‘legal and 
judicial development’ we found that certain projects had a very weak link, if any, with judicial reform. There is 
hence reason to assume that some projects have been misplaced, and that the total amount of Norwegian aid to 
‘legal and judicial development’ therefore may be slightly different, most probably smaller, than what this source 
of information gives the impression of. 
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3.1.1 Agencies involved 
Economic aid from Norway to other countries’ justice sector involves two sets of actors: the 
Norwegian agencies, and their partners in the recipient countries. On the Norwegian side it is 
useful to distinguish between government and non-governmental actors, and among the latter 
between research institutes and private, not- for-profit organisations. True, both of the latter do 
obtain a lot of their funding from state ministries and directorates. For the NGOs, the share is 
as high as 80-90 percent.47 Nevertheless, in practical terms the aid activities of state and non-
state bodies often diverge significantly, as few policy strings have tended to be attached to 
funds from state to non-state bodies in Norway.  
 
Beyond using research institutes and non-governmental organisations in Norway as a channel, 
the Norwegian government has also supported justice sector reform via its own institutional 
structures. 48 The economic aid originates in an ‘inner triangle’ consisting of:  
 
· The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),  
· The Ministry of Justice and the Police (MJP), and  
· The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).49 
 
Funds from these agencies, in turn, often pass via subordinate bodies in the government 
structure before reaching their justice sector target in another country. Two such sub-bodies in 
the state system stand out, namely: 
 
· The National Police Directorate (NPD) within police support, and of course 
· In individual recipient countries, the Norwegian embassies.50 
 
Of the non-state actors, research institutions working on justice sector reform have primarily 
included: 
 
· The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and 
· The University of Oslo’s Faculty of Law: 
- The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and 
- The Institute for Women’s Law (IWL).  
 
Non-governmental organisations that have backed justice sector initiatives include all of 
Norway’s ‘big five’: 
· The Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), 
· The Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA),  
· The Norwegian Red Cross (NRX), 
· The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and 
· Redd Barna (RB). 
                                                 
47 Exceptions include Amnesty International, whose organisational policy is not to accept state funding.  
48 Institutions are listed in alphabetical order. See also our List of Abbreviations earlier in this report. As a rule 
we use the abbreviation of the English spelling, except in cases where the Norwegian name is commonly used 
also by non-Norwegian speakers (e.g. the Norwegian chapter of Save the Children, Redd Barna), and/or when 
the institution itself uses the Norwegian-based abbreviation in English presentations (e.g., NUPI, JURK, DNA).  
49 The reorganisation of the MFA and Norad in 2003-2004 will impact on the practical organisation of Norway’s 
development cooperation, also in the justice sector. Given that data for this report was collected whilst the 
restructuring process still was ongoing, we mostly paint the picture of ‘how it used to be’. 
50 When analysing embassy disbursements, in general we do not to specify whether the aid was Norad or MFA 
money in the text. Yet more information on Norad versus MFA financing is given in Appendix 3. 
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Three NGOs that are less predominant in the Norwegian context have also worked in this 
field:  
· Amnesty International Norway (AIN),  
· Legal Advice for Women (JURK), and 
· The Norwegian Bar Association (DNA).  
 
The Norwegian agencies have targeted four channels of support to channel their aid to police, 
judiciary, and penal systems can be identified: the inter-governmental, governmental, and 
non-governmental ones; as well as what can be called the ‘non-partner’ channel.51  
 
A. The Inter-Governmental Channel52 
At the inter-governmental or multilateral level,53 Norwegian agents have worked through four 
distinct organisational structures to support the justice sector: 
· The European Union (EU) – e.g. the Council of Europe; 
· The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – for instance its 
Secretariat and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; 
· The United Nations (UN) – e.g.:  
- the UN Secretariat,  
- the UN Development Programme (UNDP),  
- the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), and 
- the UN Centre for International Crime Prevention; and finally 
· The World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
 
It is first and foremost Norwegian state agents that use the multilateral system. Hardly any 
non-state Norwegian actor features on this scene. While Norad has used the UNDP only, the 
MFA has supported the entire range of the above-mentioned agencies. The World Bank, 
however, has hardly been used as a channel at all. According to our sources it has only been 
used once in recent years, when the MFA channelled a loan via the IBRD to Kenya in 2003. 
Given the fact that the World Bank has much expertise on justice sector reform and is a close 
partner within Norwegian development cooperation in other areas, this is surprising.  
 
Out of the four multilateral structures – the EU, OSCE, the UN, and the World Bank – it is the 
UN system that has absorbed most of Norway’s multilateral support to the justice sector. The 
numbers speak for themselves: From 1999 to 2003 Norad and the MFA gave a total of 400m 
NOK to legal and judicial development.54 124 of these 400m were channelled via the 
multilateral agencies and 103.5 of the 124 ‘multilateral millions’ went to the UN. In other 
words, more than one quarter of all Norad and MFA aid to legal and judicial development 
was channelled via the UN. 
                                                 
51 Beyond the description of these channels in the text below, we also refer the reader to Appendix 4 for a 
tabular overview. 
52 Unless otherwise specified, this section and ensuing sections draw on interview data as well as the information 
provided in Appendix 4. 
53 We distinguish between ‘inter-governmental’, ‘governmental’ and ‘non-governmental’ agencies since this 
distinction appears clearer to us than the oft-used distinction ‘multilateral’ versus ‘bilateral’. For reasons of 
simplicity though, we have chosen to equate ‘inter-governmental’ with ‘multilateral’, and ‘governmental’ with 
‘bilateral’. We use these terms to identify types of aid agencies or aid channels.  
54 This amount corresponds to between 60 and 65m USD, depending of the rate of exchange between the 
Norwegian krone and the American dollar. The higher amount (65m) corresponds to the exceptionally low 
exchange rate at the time of writing (December 2004), i.e. some 6.2 NOK/USD, whereas the lower end of the 
range (60m) would correspond to an exchange rate closer to the average, i.e. 6.7 NOK/USD.   
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Of the funds going via the UN system, the UNDP got 92m – nearly 90 percent of Norway’s 
UN allocation and roughly three quarters of its total multilateral aid to the sector. 
Geographically, more than half of the funds channelled via the UNDP went to Guatemala 
alone (47m), while Mozambique and Afghanistan got 15-20m NOK each. 
 
Lifting our perspective somewhat, we see that Norway’s use of the multilateral system to 
support the justice sector reflects two main, and partly separate, purposes. These are: 
 
(1) To support transitions; often expressed as large-scale, temporary missions linked to a 
post-war reconstruction and/or democratisation process. Cases include the Balkans, 
Guatemala, East Timor, and Afghanistan; and 
(2) To support development; i.e. the work of agencies with a more permanent presence at 
country level, which – often in cooperation with the country’s government – seek to 
promote longer-term social and econo mic development. Examples of countries where 
this rationale may have justified Norwegian use of the multilateral system include 
Cambodia, Zimbabwe, and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
While Norad has supported both kinds of UN work, often via the Norwegian embassy in the 
country concerned; the MFA and the Ministry of Justice and the Police (MJP) have 
channelled their justice sector support mainly to the transitional type of UN work. This has 
gone either directly to the UN agencies, via Norway’s National Police Directorate; or via 
NORDEM – a pool of personnel on stand-by for such missions, administered by the 
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. 
 
Beyond funding the UN system and the Europe-based multilaterals, Norway’s transition 
support has also involved the contribution of personnel. This kind of aid started in response to 
a demand that arose in the early 1990s, and that first was met on an ad hoc basis. Eventually, 
however, rosters of people were established to enable a swifter and more accurate response. 
Within the field of justice sector reform, these rosters include:  
 
· The above-mentioned Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights 
(NORDEM), set up in 1993 and counting 250 experts, on e.g. electoral legislation, 
investigations of serious human rights violations, and legal reform (NCHR 2003); and 
· The Norwegian Crisis Response Pool or ‘Styrkebrønnen’, established in 2004, 
administered by the MJP and having altogethe r 30 judges, prosecutors, prison 
personnel, and police lawyers to offer upon demand (MJP 2003, 2004).  
 
Beyond these, police staff is also being provided to transitional operations – for purposes of 
training as well as structural reforms of the police. The Police Directorate, established in 
2001, offers to have deployed at any time one percent of the Norwegian police force, which 
corresponds to a maximum of roughly 80 persons.  
 
Norwegian recurrence to the UN’s development work to support the justice sector, on the 
other hand, mainly involves support from Norwegian embassies to country chapters of UN 
agencies – in particular the UNDP and the UNHCHR, which have supported judicial reform 
of various types. We will get a closer impression of the dynamics at play in this regard when 
looking at the case of Guatemala below. 
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Norway’s traditional UN loyalty thus seems to have made its mark in the use of the 
multilateral channel. Still, other inter-governmental agencies have also been supported – 
primarily the Europe-oriented ones, the EU and the OSCE. With regard to Norway’s support 
to the justice sector in Europe, most support has been channelled bilaterally.  
 
B. The Government Channel 
 
Beyond the inter-governmental organisations, Norwegian agencies have also channelled their 
support to the justice sector directly to the governments of the countries concerned. Within 
each county, common partners when using this channel include the judiciary itself, the 
Ministry of Justice or its equivalent, as well as the national police and prison authorities 
alongside local prisons and police forces.  
 
If Norwegian NGOs were absent from the multilateral channel, they do feature in the bilateral 
one. Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) has worked with state representatives of all three parts of 
the justice sector – police, judiciary, and prisons. Redd Barna and Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA) have partnered two out of the three sections of the legal chain, while the Norwegian 
Red Cross, via its support to the International Committee of the Red Cross, has cooperated 
mostly with penal authorities.  
 
Of the research entities, only the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights has worked with other 
states’ judicial authorities. At the level of the Norwegian government, as could be expected 
Norad, MFA and MJP partner other countries’ judiciaries and justice ministries, while the 
MJP supports prison and police authorities as well. Some MJP support goes via the National 
Police Directorate (NPD), and much MFA and Norad funds go via the Norwegian embassies.  
 
What types of justice sector aid has Norway channelled via the government agencies of other 
states?  
 
Police reform. Beyond some material assistance (NPD), the government channel has 
primarily been used to train police forces. The focus of the training has often been on human 
rights, but the purposes have been manifold, e.g. to fight trafficking (NPD), to make the 
police more accommodating towards women (NCA) and towards children and adolescents 
(Redd Barna). 
 
Judicial reform. In order to assist the judiciary, the government channel has been used to 
support the building of new courts (Norad via Norway’s embassy in Zambia), for general 
judicial reform (Norad via embassies in Tanzania and Uganda), for law reform and access to 
justice programmes (embassy in Uganda), and training of court staff (MFA, Norwegian 
Centre for Human Rights). 
 
Penal reform. Here, the interventions channelled via government agencies have been rather 
diverse – including skills development of convicts (MJP), building of prisons (NPA), and last 
but not least, the Red Cross’ work to protect prisoners of war, and as part of that, to train 
attendants and give material assistance to penal institutions. 
 
Finally, where has the bilateral channel been used? As noted earlier, within Europe Norway’s 
efforts to support the justice sector have largely been bilateral. Norwegian ministries and 
directorates have sought direct cooperation with corresponding bodies in the European 
countries, motivated by a wish to strengthen ties on the basis of an idea of common interests 
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within the European community.55 Thus, from 2001 to 2003 there was a growing bilateral 
justice sector support via Norway’s Action Plan for aspiring EU members. As a part of the 
Action Plan, police has been trained in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and prisoners have 
given skills training in Latvia. Another important arena of bilateral aid has been the Balkans 
and, to a lesser extent, former Soviet Republics, where one in particular has sought to 
strengthen the police.  
 
Beyond Europe, the Norwegian embassies involved in justice sector support have favoured a 
government-to-government route in Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Ethiopia. Norwegian 
non-governmental organisations have worked with state agencies in Brazil, Mauritania, 
Malawi (NCA), Rwanda (NCA and NPA), and Ethiopia (Redd Barna). Others institutions 
have not cooperated directly with state bodies but rather seen the state’s implication as a 
longer-term aim. This applies in particular to the NCHR’s human rights training in China, 
Indonesia, South Africa, and Ethiopia, which has targeted research environments.  
 
C. The Non-Governmental Channel 
 
A substantial part of Norwegian aid to justice sector reform, and to judicial reform in 
particular, has been channelled via non-government bodies in recipient countries. Not only 
have all of the efforts of the three minor Norway-based NGOs gone through this channel (the 
Norwegian Bar Association, Legal Advice for Women, and Amnesty International Norway), 
but also most of the projects of the ‘big five’, the two research institutes, and a significant 
share of Norad and MFA contributions. From 1999-2003, roughly ten percent of the funds 
that Norad and MFA allocated to legal and judicial development – some 40 out of a total of 
400m NOK – were given directly to non-Norwegian non-state actors. 
 
Within the heterogeneous channel dubbed ‘non-governmental’, it is useful to distinguish 
between international bodies on the one hand, and organs that are unique to one country or 
locality on the other. The non-governmental channe l can thus be seen as a double channel 
made up of an ‘international’ and a ‘local’ channel of support. 
 
Within the international part of the non-governmental channel, Norway’s support has differed 
according to whether it is NGO or government agencies in Norway that have been involved. 
On the NGO side, Norway-based organisations that represent branches of international ones 
support their ‘umbrella’ in a relatively systematic way. This is the case with the Norwegian 
Red Cross, which funds parts of the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross; 
with Redd Barna supporting other (Western) countries’ Save the Children offices in countries 
where there is no Norwegian branch; and with Amnesty International Norway channelling its 
support via its international secretariat to national chapters in other countries. Yet on the state 
side in Norway, the support to non-Norwegian, international NGOs seems to come forth in a 
less systematic manner, if particular projects of such NGOs fit current priorities of Norway’s 
government. For instance, the MFA has given one-off support to organisations such as the 
International Police Association, the Asian Forum for Human Rights, International Alert, and 
Médecins sans frontières, while the embassy in Angola has financed training and access to 
justice projects of the Ireland-based international NGO Trócaire.56 
 
                                                 
55 For an elaboration see MFA (2001). 
56 Beyond such direct support of international NGOs, as mentioned earlier Norwegian state agencies also 
channel support to the international NGOs via their Norwegian chapters. For example, parts of the Norwegian 
Red Cross funds to the ICRC first come from the Norwegian government.  
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The ‘local’ part of the non-governmental channel is used to support entities established by 
residents in a country in response to local needs, independent of both state structures and 
international organisations. Two types of partners emerge: local universities and research 
institutes, and local NGOs.  
 
Among the Norwegian agents that have used the local channel to support the justice sector, 
non-state bodies dominate. While Norad and the MFA have, as indicated above, supported 
non-state bodies directly, most Norwegian state support has gone either via embassies or 
indirectly via Norwegian research institutes or NGOs. Below, the approach to the non-
governmental channel of the three types of Norwegian agencies – state bodies, research 
institutes, and NGOs – is outlined. 
 
State bodies. Norwegian state bodies have supported a range of non-Norwegian non-state 
agencies within the justice sector. Geographically, Africa stands out. Local NGOs and 
research institutions have been supported significantly by the Norwegian embassies in 
Mozambique and Ethiopia. Further, single non-state actors that Norad has assisted from 1999-
2003 include the National Constitutional Assembly in Zimbabwe (approximately two million 
NOK), the Legal Research Foundation in Zambia (three million NOK), and the International 
Law Institute in Uganda (3.5m). Beyond Africa, examples are more scattered. From 1999-
2003 Norad allocated 7.3m NOK to AGHS Legal Aid in Pakistan, and 5.2m to FESPAD in El 
Salvador. 
 
Research institutes. The research institutes active in justice sector reform have primarily used 
the local non-governmental channel – by partnering likeminded research institution or NGOs 
with a research profile. In its Training for Peace initiative,57 the Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs (NUPI) has thus cooperated with two South Africa-based bodies, 
ACCORD and the Institute for Security Studies. The partners of the Norwegian Centre for 
Human Rights have primarily included legal research centres – based at universities or 
constituting more independent NGOs. The Institute of Women’s Law at the University of 
Oslo, finally, has partnered the University of Zimbabwe as well as a Human Rights Study 
Centre in Pakistan. 
 
NGOs. Many Norwegian not- for-profit organisations involved in this field have chosen to 
partner likeminded bodies. For instance, the Norwegian Bar Association (DNA) has 
cooperated with bar associations in Uganda and Nepal and supported their lega l aid work, 
while Legal Advice for Women (JURK) has partnered women’s rights networks in Tanzania, 
Guatemala and Lithuania. But the pattern is far from uniform. As noted earlier, the 
Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People’s Aid, and Redd Barna have cooperated with state 
agencies too, and there is variation between countries as to the extent to which these three 
also partner local NGOs. If they do, the NCA tends to target churches, ecumenical or inter-
religious networks (e.g. in Bosnia and Rwanda), while the two others work mostly with 
human rights organisations (RB in Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Honduras, and Zimbabwe; the NPA 
in Ecuador, Rwanda and the West Balkans).  
 
D. The ‘Non-Partner’ Channel 
 
To complete the picture of what channels Norwegian agents use to promote justice sector 
reform, it should be noted that some agents have chosen not to partner any particular type of 
                                                 
57 Training for Peace started as a project and later got programme status. 
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organisations in the recipient country. Instead, they have primarily relied on their own 
capacities and resources in the field. Underlying this choice seems to be a concern that 
potential partners may not be ‘neutral’ in a politically sensitive context where the work 
requires a high degree of professionalism. 
 
Beyond the Norwegian Red Cross and its work through the ICRC, this approach has been 
adopted by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). This organisation’s work to give legal aid 
to refugees in the Balkans from the early 1990s onwards was anchored in a large presence of 
Norwegian staff in the field. Local partners existed, but they were not part of a distinct, local 
organisation but rather individuals that expatriate NRC staff identified and employed as they 
went along.  
 
A note on experiences is useful here, as we conclude the partner assessment. For in using the 
‘non-partner’ channel, the NRC eventually realised that it was difficult to make its projects 
sustainable in the long run, since their own organisation at some point would have to 
withdraw. 58 Mainly for this reason, the agency has recently sought more systematic relations 
of cooperation with local bar associations and similar NGOs to provide legal aid in new 
countries of operation. The use of the ‘non-partner’ channel, in other words, seems to require 
that the organisation using it has a long time horizon and is willing to accept the various costs 
of continuous presence of its own staff in the field.  
3.1.2 Location, type, and size of support 
Having outlined the Norwegian agents involved, who they partner and what channels they 
use, we will now introduce (A) where they operate, (B) what kind of aid activities they are 
involved in, and (C) roughly how much they contribute.  
 
A. Location 
 
Have Norwegian efforts to support the justice sector been characterised by a broad 
geographical spread, or rather by concentration in certain countries or regions? If aid has been 
geographically concentrated, what areas have been targeted? To what extent do the various 
types of state and non-state agents from Norway choose the same countries? And why has the 
justice sector assistance been channelled into these particular areas? 
 
Appendices 5 and 6 are sources of reference for the following presentation. They include a 
figure outlining the spread across regions of Norwegian aid, and a set of tables describing the 
country- level engagement of the various Norwegian agencies.  
 
The geography of Norwegian aid 
Norwegian assistance to justice sector reform is spread across a number of countries, but it is 
more concentrated across regions. Europe and Africa are the main continents of support. 
From 1999-2003, when Norad and MFA supported judicial development with 400m NOK in 
total, 121m was spent in Europe and 113m in Africa – while the rest of the world got the 
remaining 40% of the total support.  
 
It is noteworthy that Latin America, a pioneer and partly a model for judicial reform efforts, is 
a continent that Norway hardly has targeted with justice sector aid. The exception is the case 
                                                 
58 This reflection draws on interviews with NRC staff. For an evaluation of the NRC legal aid project at the 
Balkans, see Kerrigan et al. (2003). 
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of Guatemala. Out of the 61.4m NOK that Norad and the MFA gave to judicial development 
in Latin America from 1999-2003, Guatemala got 47.4m, or 77 percent. Only 14m went to the 
seven other countries that were supported on the continent.59 Out of the Norwegian NGOs 
involved Redd Barna has supported three Latin American countries (Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and Guatemala), while other NGOs (NCA, NPA, NRC, AIN, and JURK) have assisted justice 
sector work in single states only. South America is most neglected area, while Central 
America features more – mainly due to the engagement in Guatemala, which we will recur to 
in the case study below.  
 
The Asian continent – the Middle East excluded – received a bit more justice sector aid than 
Latin America: roughly 75m NOK from Norad and MFA from 1999-2003. Yet while 
Norway’s support to Latin America dropped in 2003, the support to Asia quadrupled – from a 
level of 9-10m NOK in 2001 and 2002 to 46.2m in 2003. The rise was primarily due to MFA 
allocations of 19m NOK to Afghanistan and 7.2m to Kyrgyzstan in 2003. Apart from these 
two states, however, a broad range of countries have been supported on a lower scale – 
including Georgia, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, and East 
Timor. Norway has relied on the multilateral channel in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia 
and East Timor, while the six other states have been assisted via non-governmental agencies, 
Norwegian and local. As for Norwegian NGOs, Redd Barna has been active in six Asian 
countries, the Norwegian Refugee Council in four, while Amnesty International Norway and 
the Norwegian Bar Association have worked in two countries each – the latter’s engagement 
in Nepal standing out as most significant. Finally, as for Norwegian research institutions the 
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights has been active in China and Indonesia, and the Institute 
of Women’s Law in Pakistan and South Asia. 
 
In the Middle East Norwegian aid has been significant, but on the decline since 1999. 
Norway’s justice sector support has centred on the Palestinian area, and amounted to 16.4m 
NOK from 1999-2003. Given that there has not been a fully-fledged ‘government channel’ in 
this case, Norway has mostly used inter- and non-governmental channels as well as some 
Palestinian ‘parastatal’ agencies to channel its support.60  
 
The fact that only some 150m of the 400m NOK that Norway allocated to justice sector aid 
from 1999-2003 went to Latin America and Asia – continents that combined host the bulk of 
the world’s population as well as some of the most telling judicial reform experiences – sheds 
light on two features of Norwegian aid to this area. One, in geographical terms Norwegian aid 
to legal and judicial development is relatively concentrated. Two, this concentration reflects a 
traditional geography of Norwegian aid, bluntly put as follows: an ‘altruistic’ focus on the 
economically least developed countries in Africa; combined with a more ‘self- interested’ 
focus on the economically more developed countries in Europe.  
 
If Africa is a target continent of Norwegian justice sector aid, within Africa it is concentrated 
in certain areas. The Arab-speaking North and French-speaking West and Central Africa 
largely escape Norwegian support initiatives. In line with the history of Norwegian assistance 
to the continent, Norway’s justice sector support – which is a relatively new sector of support 
in Africa – has been concentrated in Southern and East Africa. This concentration especially 
                                                 
59 These included, listed according to size of the ‘legal and judicial reform’ allocation: El Salvador, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Haiti (these four received one million NOK or more in the five-year period), and the Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, and Nicaragua (which received less than one million NOK).  
60 For details on Norwegian aid to rule of law projects in the Palestinian area prior to 1999 see Endresen, Schou, 
and Stadig (2000). As for police support in Palestine, a thorough study is given by Lia (2003). 
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applies to Norwegian government aid. Norad, often via the Norwegian embassies, has 
supported the justice sector in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. As for the research institutes, the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights started its 
first country programme in South Africa, NUPI’s Training for Peace initiative has covered the 
entire SADC region, and the Institute for Women’s Law has been active in Zimbabwe, as well 
as in the broader Southern and East African regions.61 At the NGO level, Redd Barna has 
given project support in Zimbabwe and Mozambique and the NCA in Malawi, while Amnesty 
International Norway has initiated work in South Africa and the NPA in Angola. However, 
most NGO support to the justice sector in sub-Saharan Africa seems to be concentrated 
further north, namely in Rwanda (NPA, NCA), Uganda (DNA, NRC), and Ethiopia (Redd 
Barna). Norwegian government assistance beyond SADC has been restricted to Uganda and 
Ethiopia. 
 
In Europe, finally, Norwegian support has primarily targeted two groups of countries: those at 
the Balkans, and more recently, states aspiring to become members of the EU. 62 The latter 
group of countries has primarily been supported by Norwegian state agents, while the former 
has received support from a broader range of actors. Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, 
has received massive Norwegian justice sector aid, peaking in the second half of the 1990s. 
Here the MFA and the National Police Directorate, NUPI and the Norwegian Centre for 
Human Rights, and four of the ‘big five’ NGOs (excluding Redd Barna) have supported 
major programmes. Some of these initiatives have also applied to other Balkan states. With 
regard to Norway’s support to new and future EU members, the four countries surrounding 
the Baltic Sea – Poland, and the three Baltic states – have been given special priority.  
 
Why this geography? 
While Norwegian ‘aid to justice’ seems to follow the traditional Europe-Africa axis of 
Norwegian aid policies, there is a broad spread across countries. Also, clear differences can be 
spotted when it comes to the reasons why Norwegian agents first chose to get involved in a 
particular geographical area. Such differences are important to understand, since the  context 
of Norwegian agencies’ entry into a particular country is likely to contribute to shape the 
framework within which they later will operate in their efforts to aid the justice sector in the 
country concerned. 
 
The main distinction that can be made with regard to how Norway has initiated relationships 
of development cooperation with particular countries, largely parallels the one we made 
earlier in relation to the types of UN operations that Norway supports. The UN’s ‘transitional’ 
and ‘development’ work reflects a more fundamental distinction between different types of 
country situations. The distinction goes between low-income countries which, at a certain 
point in time, are marked either by (a) problems of development in general, social, political,  
and economic; or by (b) problems related to an armed conflict, whether ongoing or recently 
settled, or to a period of state repression.  
 
                                                 
61 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) comprises Angola, Botswana, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
62 The 13 states are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. All but three (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) became members of 
the Union on 1 May 2004.  
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This distinction serves to identify two main ways in which Norway first approached a country 
in which it later has come to support justice sector reform. The two ways can be labelled a 
‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top-down’ approach: 
 
A bottom-up approach to justice sector assistance often applies to countries marked more by 
general development-related problems than by war or repression, and where a long-standing 
presence of Norwegian non-state agencies has led to a strong Norwegian knowledge base on 
the country, and tight bonds with the civil society. Examples include Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and South Africa. 
 
A top-down approach to justice sector aid, on the other hand, tends to apply to countries 
marked more by armed conflict than by general development problems, where Norway’s 
entry often is linked to a post-Oslo process MFA agenda of peacemaking and peacebuilding. 
This has tended to combine with relatively strong ties with multilateral agencies or other 
bilateral donors. The Balkans, Guatemala, Angola, and Afghanistan are examples of this 
approach. 
 
This way of analysing Norwegian choice of justice sector support does not explain the choices 
made by NGOs and research institutes from Norway, but it does give an idea of the ground-
breaking role that the Norwegian non-state actors can play to shape the framework of the state 
actors. We will return to how these dynamics have been played out in practice in our case 
studies of Ethiopia and Guatemala. 
 
B. Type 
 
The justice sector is composed of the police, the judiciary, and the penal system. Why did 
Norway start supporting each of these three areas? What types of aid to each area have been 
more prevalent, where has it been given, and involving whom?63 A summary of key facts of 
the following presentation is tabulated in Appendix 7. 
 
Support to the police64 
In a historical perspective, police support can be seen as the entry point of Norwegian 
assistance to the justice sector in general. Norwegian justice sector assistance is thus a fairly 
new phenomenon: it only started with the police assistance in the 1990s. Apart from the long-
standing prison work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, supported by the 
Norwegian Red Cross; we found no evidence of Norway supporting other countries’ justice 
systems before the end of the Cold War. When engagement began, the police was the first 
part of the sector to be targeted. While police assistance started taking off already in the first 
                                                 
63 As mentioned earlier in this report, our mapping of international aid to judicial reform and of Norwegian aid to 
the justice sector focuses on support to structures of the conventional, ‘permanent’ justice system in single 
countries, and not on ‘transitional’ justice (which can be defined as mechanisms set up, at local, national, or 
international level, to deal with serious crimes committed during a period of war or repression, in an effort to 
make a transition to a more peaceful and democratic situation). Nevertheless, we do touch on aid to transitional 
justice efforts in certain cases, i.e. whenever these processes (1) not only have the function of dealing with a 
violent past, but also of contributing to restoring the rule of law and strengthening the judiciary in the country 
concerned in the present; and/or (2) have involved significant Norwegian support – which has been the case, for 
instance, with regards to Norway’s aid to the UN’s transitional operations. Note, however, that Norwegian aid to 
transitional justice initiatives at the international level, such as the establishments of international or mixed 
tribunals or courts, is excluded from our analysis. 
64 The assessment in this section draws principally on interview material with people who have been involved in 
Norwegian police support.  
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half of the 1990s, Norwegian aid to the judiciary only got more widespread in the second half 
of the decade.  
 
Two questions thus arise. Why did Norway enter this area so late? And when it did, why did it 
come to support the police first, the judiciary only later? 
 
There are two main reasons why Norway’s history as a judicial reform supporter is relatively 
short. First, as noted in Part II of this report, most of the aid to judicial reform that was 
disbursed during the Cold War period was linked to economic interests of powerful states, 
e.g. of the USA in Latin America and former European colonial powers in Africa. Norway did 
not have a similar incentive as other Western countries to protect its investments abroad by 
supporting judicial reform. Norway had never been a colonial power, and during the Cold 
War period, Norwegian investments abroad were far smaller than those of other Western 
countries, and than they are today. Beyond certain business sectors such as shipping and 
fisheries, to the extent that Norway was involved in low-income countries it was primarily 
through its policy from the 1950s onwards of development assistance, focussing on poverty 
alleviation.  
 
Second, the first, major externally-supported drive towards judicial reform took place in Latin 
America. This is a continent where Norwegian presence historically has been weak. So in the 
1990s, when the second and major wave of judicial reform reached the shores of countries 
where Norway was present as a donor, Norway had little experience in the area.  
 
As opposed the judiciary, with regard to the police there was a clearly articulated demand for 
support from multilateral agencies, in particular the UN. This demand arose from the fact that 
in the early 1990s, a number of countries were facing a transition from war or repression to a 
post-conflict or democratisation process, and that the UN, with the Cold War having come to 
an end, found itself both able and willing to assist these countries – if member states would 
contribute. In this early phase, however, the focus on rebuilding the police forces of 
transitional states was far stronger than the focus on reconstructing the judiciaries. There 
were, in other words, ‘push factors’ present with regard to police support that were hardly 
existent as yet for aid to judicial reform.  
 
Norway was thus facing a demand from the UN, to which it historically had been loyal, for 
police personnel, mainly – a demand it found that it relatively easily could meet. But given 
the proliferation of international operations to assist countries in transition, the first ad hoc 
responses from Oslo were soon followed by the set-up of pool structures to enable a more 
accurate response.  
 
Yet if an initial reason why the contribution of Norwegian police personnel came about was 
the decision to meet UN demands as far as possible, as Norwegian police men and women 
made their mark in the field a new reason emerged why police support was sustained and 
turned quite prominent. This was the experience that Norway fared fairly well in this area: 
Norwegian police forces came to be reputed for a high degree of professionalism. Since part 
of the honour and recognition for their satisfactory performance also reached the government 
level, Norway got an impetus to make police support a Norwegian ‘export article’ and support 
the broadening of Norwegian inputs, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.  
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Qualitatively, Norwegian personnel started going beyond their main activity of training 
colleagues from other countries. To take the Balkans as an example, the qualitative expansion 
took place at two levels:  
 
· From training in operative tasks to training in general human rights standards;  
· From training actors to reforming structures, e.g. downsizing of police forces and the 
establishment of new entities such as internal audits and border police.  
 
Geographically, Norwegian police staff has since 1989 been deployed in the following areas, 
listed in a rough chronological order: Namibia, Western Sahara, El Salvador, Cambodia, 
Mozambique, the West Bank, Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, East Timor, 
Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Liberia, and Afghanistan.  
 
While these contributions have largely been multilateral operations, more recently a bilateral 
channel of police support has been set up. A purpose has probably been to use the acquired 
police competence to forward Norway’s national interests more systematically. In particular 
after 9/11, a new motive – beyond contributing to the multilateral system and getting 
recognition abroad – has gained ascendancy: the wish to combat terror and organised crime. 
Since effectiveness in this regard requires inter-state cooperation, the National Police 
Directorate has run bilateral police cooperation programmes since 2002. Support has been 
given to new EU members, as well as to Serbia and Montenegro. The multilateral channel has 
also been used for police reform in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It 
hence seems that in line with the emerging security thinking post-2001, Norway’s police 
support has become more focused on Europe and adjacent areas. 
 
But what explains Norway’s qualitative expansion from supporting the police only to embrace 
the other two parts of the justice sector as well? What stands out is the combined effect of the 
wish to capitalise on and broaden the recognition that Norway had got for its police 
performance, and the realisation that further success largely hinged on the other parts of the 
justice sector, too, being supported. This helps explain, for instance the establishment in 2004 
of the Norwegian Crisis Response Pool (or ‘Styrkebrønnen’), which unlike NORDEM and the 
National Police Directorate’s pool covers the entire justice sector.65 
 
On the state side, Norway’s police support has been dominated by the MFA, Ministry of 
Justice and the Police, and the NPD – Norad has hardly been involved. Several non-state 
Norwegian actors have, however – primarily by providing training to police officers. Police 
has been trained on human rights by the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (in Indonesia), 
on peacekeeping operations by NUPI (in the SADC region), on children rights by Redd Barna 
(in Ethiopia), and on international humanitarian law by the ICRC, partly financed by the 
Norwegian Red Cross.66 Beyond training efforts, NORDEM has provided police units abroad 
with investigators of human rights abuse. 
 
Support to the penal system 
Compared to the police, penal institutions have figured far less prominently in Norwegian 
efforts to support other countries’ justice sectors. At the state level, except for MFA support 
to build prisons in Kosovo; prison assistance has been a relatively minor part of the Action 
Plan for new EU members. It is the Norwegian NGOs that dominate this scene. Players 
                                                 
65 For an elaboration, see MJP (2003, 2004). 
66 For further discussions of various aspects of police reform and aid to such, see Eide and Holm (2000). 
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include the Norwegian Church Aid, People’s Aid, and Red Cross; Legal Advice for Women 
(JURK), and Amnesty International Norway (AIN).  
 
Prison support is first and foremost the arena of the Red Cross, which is reputed for its work 
to monitor the conditions of prisoners of war. ICRC activities in this area also include 
material support to prisons, lobbying for reform of penal laws, and training of prison staff. 
Training has also been supported by AIN (in Morocco and Thailand) while JURK has backed 
prisoners’ rights work (in Guatemala). As opposed to the ICRC, which only deals with people 
jailed due to a war situation, neither JURK nor AIN has this restriction on their prison 
assistance.  
 
The Norwegian People’s Aid and the Norwegian Church Aid have chosen different 
approaches in their prison support. Both have channelled it into one and the same state: 
Rwanda. Due to the 1994 genocide this country has faced huge justice sector challenges, 
including the crowding of prisons and difficulties in reconciling former inmates with their 
local communities. The NPA has assisted Rwandan authorities on the first score by means of 
building a new prison, while the NCA has focused on the last part by helping to reintegrate 
released prisoners into society. 
 
Support to the judiciary 
Why did Norway start supporting judicial reform? For state agencies, three motivations seem 
to have reinforced one another, adding up to a couple of overall dynamics.  
 
First, among those Norwegian agencies that had been active in police support there was a 
realisation that the judicial chain is not stronger than its weakest link. For instance, it is not 
enough to improve the police if the people that police officers arrest cannot be brought 
through a due trial process to have their guilt or innocence proven. Such considerations gave 
way to an exploration of how the judiciary too could be reinforced.  
 
Second, in Norwegian development agencies there seems to have been a growing and more 
general concern throughout the 1990s regarding the state of the legal systems of the countries 
receiving aid. Rather than stemming from experience of supporting one particular part of 
those systems, this concern seems to have risen in response to the general focus on good 
governance, democratic accountability, and the fight against corruption that gained 
prominence in the development community in the late 1990s. In a number of countries, 
problems in the judiciary were seen as obstacles that needed to be overcome if governance, 
accountability and transparency were to be improved.  
 
While this second agenda institutionally has been rooted most strongly in Norad, and the first 
has had its strongest proponents in the Ministry of Justice and the Police and in the Police 
Directorate, the third Norwegian motivation for going into judicial reform has primarily been 
anchored in Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This motive is linked to the fact that, 
especially after the Oslo process to resolve the Middle East conflict in the early 1990s, post-
conflict peacebuilding has become a key objective of Norwegian foreign policy. As Norway 
sought to play a constructive role in societies emerging from war, it soon realised that the 
judiciary of those societies need to be strengthened in order to deal with a violent past, and to 
deter crimes from being committed in the present.67 
 
                                                 
67 A recent expression of the official Norwegian line on the policy links between development cooperation and 
peacebuilding is given in MFA (2004). 
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At a more general level, these motivations – the need for judicial reform to strengthen police 
reform, governance, accountability, transparency; and post-war peacebuilding – coincided 
with two overall trends. One was the second and major wave of judicial reform and donor 
assistance to support it, which emerged in the 1980s and rolled on throughout the 1990s. The 
other was the increased focus on human rights, which has become particularly prominent after 
the end of the Cold War and has expressed itself in concepts and activities such as rights-
based development, human rights dialogues, human rights training and human rights 
monitoring. While judicial reform was seen as a required task in and for itself, the expansion 
of the human rights discourse has provided an additional ideological rationale underpinning 
such reform.  
 
Reasons why Norwegian state agencies started supporting judicial reform were, in other 
words, partly idiosyncratic to Norway’s own experiences within assistance to the police, to 
development, and to post-conflict reconstruction, and partly a response to new international 
foci of donor and foreign policy attention. 
 
Some of the same motivations for going into judicial reform also apply to Norwegian NGOs, 
although in this group motivations are more heterogeneous and difficult to map. The new 
wave of judicial reform efforts, the perception that such reform is needed for human rights 
purposes and the conflict resolution and peacebuilding agendas all seem to have motivated the 
NGOs as well. But beyond this is an additional view, which appears more central to the non-
governmental than to the government actors, that the judiciary is an emerging site of struggle 
for social change. In many of the countries where Norwegian NGOs operate the image of 
politicians has been tarnished by corruption scandals and by a failure to stand up against 
external pressures from, for instance, the international financial institutions. But while many 
people have been disillusioned with politics, the judiciary seems to have increased in 
importance: judges and prosecutors have in some cases seen their recognition grow as they 
have been able to distance themselves from the executive.68  
 
As indicated above, after the end of the Cold War the need for judicial reform was seen as 
particularly acute in states going through a transition. We earlier made a distinction between 
the transition and development work of multilateral bodies such as the UN. The transition 
category can be though broken down into two main types of processes:   
 
· Processes of post-conflict reconstruction from war or genocide to relative peace, as in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Rwanda, and 
· Processes of democratisation from an undemocratic to a more participatory 
dispensation, as in Ethiopia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.69 
 
We make this distinction to shed light on the different contexts of the countries where 
Norway has intervened, since these contexts and, accordingly, Norway’s motive for 
supporting judicial reform will impact on the support given, in particular on the choice of 
                                                 
68 For a broader discussion of these dynamics, see Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar (2004). 
69 Two notes are in order. One, in the sense that a process of democratisation is often part of a process of post-
war reconstruction, the two processes may overlap. The distinction is made since those countries that ‘only’ go 
through a democratisation process face other challenges than those that also emerge from a situation of armed 
conflict. Two, while we earlier distinguished between ‘transitions’ and ‘development’, democratisation processes 
can be part of both. However, we make the distinction since those countries that emerge from a period with an 
authoritarian rule (transitional states) face other predicaments on their road to democracy than those with a more 
democratic point of departure, whose efforts to democratise will not need to focus on a general overhaul of the 
political system but rather of reforms of parts of it. 
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channel. For in the cases where Norway chooses to support judicial reform mainly to 
strengthen a post-war reconstruction process, evidence suggests that Norway often does so in 
spite of a relatively limited prior experience in the country concerned. Therefore, when 
initiating judicial reform assistance in such countries, Norway often chooses to rely on 
multilateral organisations; an approach which can be labelled ‘top-down’ since it tends to 
make less use of local forces than a bilateral or civil society approach. If, on the other hand, 
Norwegian aid judicial reform is motivated by a wish to advance a democratic transition, such 
support will normally materialise in countries where Norway already is present as a donor.70 
It will thus build on years of experience and knowledge of the country concerned; an insight 
which in practice tends to lead to the selection of a government-to-government and/or civil 
society channel of support to judicial reform; channels that reflect a more ‘bottom-up’ 
approach.  
 
We will return to this discussion when assessing the cases of Guatemala and Ethiopia. First, 
to understand Norway’s support of judicial reform more in depth, a more systematic 
presentation of Norwegian aid to the judiciary will be structured along the six types of such 
aid that were identified in Part I, and reflected in Figure 1. These include support to law 
reform, courts reform, judicial administration reform, legal community support, legal 
education and training, and access to justice. 
 
(1) Law Reform 
 
Norwegian aid to the reform of a country’s laws and regulations has been relatively low-key. 
It has involved little direct support from state agencies; recent efforts by the Norwegian 
embassies in Mozambique and Uganda being exceptions. None of the research institutes has 
worked to reform other countries’ laws directly, although the Norwegian Centre for Human 
Rights’ work in China, and to some extent in Indonesia and South Africa, aims at reforming 
human rights laws in the longer term.  
 
Norwegian NGOs have been more proactive in the field of law reform, advocating changes 
within its particular field of interest. Redd Barna has supported country- level studies to 
identify how state laws need to be adapted to comply with the 1989 Convention of the Rights 
of the Child, as well as subsequent advocacy for such changes to be implemented. Likewise, 
the NCA has proposed changes in the laws on religious freedom and on human rights. JURK 
has supported women’s efforts to change property laws and other customary law, while the 
Norwegian Red Cross has supported the ICRC’s work to integrate international humanitarian 
law into national legislation. 
 
(2) Courts Reform 
 
Efforts to strengthen a country’s courts and tribunals have figured more strongly in efforts by 
the Norwegian state agencies to reform judiciaries. Zambia is a case in point, where the 
Norwegian embassy has been part of a donor consortium that together has been instrumental 
in building a new Magistrate Courts Complex in the country’s capital. This endeavour follows 
previous technical assistance to the country’s courts, which primarily was disbursed as local 
levels.  
 
                                                 
70 In countries where Norway has not historically been involved in development cooperation, such as West 
African states, the advent of democratic transitions has not triggered significant Norwegian aid. 
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In Rwanda the Norwegian People’s Aid has followed a very similar strategy, yet on a smaller 
scale: it has contributed material support to the courts, and supported the building of new 
courts. In this country both the NPA and the NCA, moreover, have supported the 
establishment of a new leg in the national court system, namely the local gacaca tribunals set 
up to decentralise and speed up the post-genocide trial process.  
 
Apart from these two major organisations’ efforts, court reform has been given less priority 
by Norwegian non-state actors.  
 
(3) Justice Administration Reform 
 
A striking feature of Norwegian aid to the judiciary is the virtual absence of contributions to 
the reform of the administration of justice in single countries. With the exception of projects 
supported by the Norwegian embassy in Ethiopia, we found little evidence of Norwegian 
actors involved in reforming areas such as financial management and budget processes within 
courts, case management systems, processing, filing and dissemination of judgements, and the 
rules and procedures for judges’ appointment, promotion, terms of tenure, and remuneration. 
Virtual Norwegian absence in this field stands in stark contrast to the engagement in it by 
major donors such as USAID and the World Bank. 
 
(4) Legal Community Support 
 
Norwegian aid to the community of legal scholars in other countries has also been small, yet 
not insignificant. Most noteworthy here is the 15-year-old cooperation of the Norwegian Bar 
Association (DNA) with corresponding organisations in Nepal and Uganda, which partly has 
aimed as strengthening the standing and authority of the lawyers. Also, the Norwegian 
Refugee Council is increasingly targeting bar associations with whom they seek to cooperate 
to implement legal aid programmes. While the DNA’s support more directly aims at legal 
community support, the relatively greater size of NRC support to similar associations, 
although not primarily aimed as strengthening the lawyers as a group, does bode for similar 
effects in terms of legal community boosting.  
 
At the level of Norwegian state agencies, however, legal community aid has been largely 
absent. If NGOs have been supported by Norwegian ministries, directorates or embassies; bar 
associations, law societies and similar groups have figured less predominantly than have, for 
instance, human rights organisations.  
 
(5) Legal Education and Training 
 
The two remaining categories of aid to judicial reform – legal education and training, and 
access to justice – stand out as those where Norwegian inputs have been most considerable. 
At least two factors explain why training and education of lawyers and legal staff have been 
central areas of Norwegian aid to judicial reform. 71  
 
First, within the area of training relevant experience has been accumulated by Norwegian 
agents. These include Norwegian police personnel, and those running the training 
programmes of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Second, needs for legal training and 
                                                 
71 The training component of the ‘legal training and education’ category refers to the training of lawyers and/or 
legal staff, including judges and prosecutors. Projects involving training of people at large on their rights and on 
the judicial system is subsumed to the ‘access to justice’ category. 
  39 
education have been significant in many countries, and the demand has been expressed by 
state and non-state actors alike. Given the relative consensus on the need for legal training,72 
this has been seen as a relatively ‘politically safe’ area to venture into. This concern may have 
been particularly important for a country like Norway, which had little experience in other 
areas of judicial reform assistance and therefore needed to carve out a niche in which more 
experiences could be accumulated.  
 
A sizeable section of Norwegian agents have thus been involved in legal training and 
education projects. Bodies that have supported training of lawyers and judicial staff include, 
on the state side, the Norwegian embassies in Zambia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola, 
and on the non-state side, the NCHR (in China, Indonesia and South Africa), the NPA (the 
Balkans), Redd Barna (Zimbabwe), and AIN (India).  
 
Beyond the training efforts, an education commitment has been taken up by the Institute of 
Women’s Law at the University of Oslo, which has developed teaching programmes in law 
and human rights and helped implementing them. A masters’ programme is offered at the 
University of Zimbabwe, serving 9 countries in southern and eastern Africa; while courses 
leading to diplomas and certificates in human rights have been given by the University of 
Peshawar in Pakistan.  
 
(6) Access to Justice 
 
Programmes classified as ‘access to justice’ typically involve legal aid, such as test case 
litigation, and legal awareness programmes, such as human rights training and information to 
people at large. Among Norwegian state agents, initiatives including these components have 
been supported by the Norwegian embassies in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guatemala 
and South Africa. In the latter country, support has been disbursed in cooperation with the 
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights.  
 
On the NGO scene the Norwegian Refugee Council is a key actor, as it since the early 1990s 
has offered legal advice and assistance to refugees. JURK, for their part, has provided legal 
aid to women and Redd Barna to children. The bar associations supported by DNA, finally, 
have had a more all-encompassing target group: Their legal assistance has been offered to 
anyone, although marginalised groups such as children, women and the poor have been given 
priority.  
 
Beyond legal training and education, access to justice has thus emerged as a focal point of 
Norwegian aid to judicial reform. This is in spite of the fact that prior to the late 1990s 
Norway had accumulated little experience within this field, apart from at the NGO level of the 
Norwegian Bar Association (Nepal) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (the Balkans). A 
main reason why access to justice still became central probably parallels one of the rationales 
underlying support to legal training and education, namely the broad consensus on the need 
for such aid. Since Norway has little experience in judicial reform assistance, it was 
preferable to enter an area where it was unlikely that adverse government reactions would be 
confronted. Albeit to a slightly lesser extent than with regard to training and education, 
                                                 
72 This consensus has, however, been challenged in recent years in countries such as Ethiopia, where the number 
of different training programmes supported by various donors have grown dramatically over recent years, while 
it remains uncertain what effects these training programmes have had. The case study below will provide details.  
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providing people with access to the justice system tends to be seen as a relatively 
uncontroversial and commendable aim by state and non-state actors alike.73 
 
Cross-cutting support 
To complete this round-up of Norwegian support to the justice sector, the initiatives that cut 
across several of the categories should be included. Within the judiciary, this applies to the 
NORDEM roster and the MFA’s support to an EU initiative to strengthen cooperation 
between courts in Africa – both of which are likely to contribute to build several parts of the 
judiciary. So are, indeed, the aid given by the Norwegian embassies in Angola, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Ethiopia to support overall judicial reform in those countries.  
 
The embassy- level reform assistance, however, not only intends to benefit different sections 
of the judiciary, but also the different parts of the justice sector in its entirety. This also 
applies to other initiatives. JURK’s efforts, for instance, have women’s rights as their foci – 
which translates into engagement in the fields of law reform, training, and access to justice 
within the judiciary, and to prison reform beyond it. The Crisis Response Pool will benefit the 
entire justice sector, and this also applies, finally, to NUPI’s initiatives related to reform of the 
security sector. In line with this conceptualisation, the justice sector can be seen as part and 
parcel of the larger sphere of society, which includes the armed forces, destined to promote 
the security of the state – as well as the human security of citizens. 
 
C. Size 
 
Roughly how much have Norwegian agencies donated, where, and to what types of aid?  
 
As Appendix 8 shows, the part of Norwegian aid to legal development that originates in 
Norad and the MFA has tripled in recent years – from 40m NOK in 1999, to nearly 120m in 
2003. The growth was clearest with regard to the MFA allocation, which rose from less than 
10m NOK in 1999 to more than 60m in 2003. Norad’s support ranged between 30m and 60m 
NOK a year throughout the period. Even in the peak year of 2003, however, when total Norad 
and MFA aid to the area amounted to 119m NOK, the sum represented a tiny share of 
Norway’s total development assistance, which that year amounted to 14.5 billion NOK 
(Norad 2004). 
 
Importantly, however, the statistics of the 1999-2003 allocations do not capture the entire 
picture, as some key initiatives transcend the category of ‘legal and judicial development’. 
Among the projects run by state agencies, this applies in particular to the ‘Applicant Country 
project’, which in a three-year period channelled more than 285m NOK to prepare 12 aspiring 
                                                 
73 For national authorities, however, two opposite reactions can be imagined. If offered assistance from a donor 
to improve the population’s access to justice, they may, on the one hand, welcome the offer since such assistance 
will reduce the workload of their national system. On the other, they may realise that if the programmes are ‘too’ 
successful they may contribute to augment the pressure on themselves, as the programmes may make people 
readier to ‘stand up for their rights’ if the state, the prime responsible for ensuring that the rights are respected, 
does not take that responsibility. In the longer term therefore, the government concerned may, as a result of the 
external assistance, be faced with a ‘tougher’ population. Whether access to justice aid will be welcomed or 
refused thus to a large extent depends on the nature and policies of the regime, and the extent to which it is 
prepared to be held accountable in the longer term.  
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states for EU membership (MFA 2001). This represents, on average, 8m NOK to each 
country per year – which is a significant amount.74  
 
Other major cross-cutting projects, not captured by the statistics given first, include the 
NORDEM roster which has had an annual budget of 25m NOK. Even though only a relatively 
minor share of this amount will have been deployed on seconding legal experts, an estimated 
ten per cent share would make this project relatively substantial – representing a contribution 
of 2-3m NOK a year. If this is the case, NORDEM’s support to the justice sector would 
roughly correspond to that of NUPI’s Training for Peace programme; where 20-30 percent of 
the 10m NOK annual budget is estimated to cover ‘rule of law’ issues. The Crisis Response 
Pool, on the other hand, is far smaller so far: At the MJP, only one million NOK was 
estimated to be needed in 2004, the first year of operation. 
 
Beyond the projects that cut across sectors and countries, several major initiatives are 
concentrated at country level. This applies, for instance, to the bilateral line of police support, 
and to the country programmes of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. The China and 
Indonesia programmes each has a 3m NOK budget line, while the South Africa programme is 
three times that size – disposing of roughly 9m NOK a year.  
 
Appendix 3 gives details on how Norwegian aid is spread across all countries of support. Yet 
to get a closer idea of the magnitude, it is also useful to highlight the areas that have received 
most of the funding. Appendices 9, 10, and 11 list the ‘top ten’ – i.e. the ten countries, 
agencies, and projects that received most money from the Norwegian state from 1999 to 2003. 
As noted earlier, the total amount of support during this period was 400m NOK. As the 
appendices show, the top ten projects only got a moderate share of this support, that is, less 
than one third. No single project received more than 20m NOK during the five-year period. 
With regard to countries and partners, however, the aid was more concentrated: on both 
accounts, the ‘top ten’ absorbed nearly two thirds of all the funding. The ‘winners’ were 
Guatemala, Zambia, and various Balkan states, and among partners, as noted earlier, the 
UNDP – which received far more Norwegian state money than any other agency. Of the 
Norwegian NGOs, only the Refugee Council, Bar Association, and People’s Aid feature 
among the top ten. More information about the state funds channelled via Norwegian NGOs 
is given in Appendix 12.75 
3.2 Case studies: Guatemala and Ethiopia 
To understand more in depth how Norway has supported judicial reform, we will now take a 
closer look at the cases of Guatemala and Ethiopia. We have chosen these two countries 
because they diverge with regard to three key aspects of justice sector reform. 
 
The first aspect is geographic. The cases are located on continents that differ considerably 
when it comes to justice sector developments. In Latin America, major reform efforts have 
been undertaken for a comparatively long time – but beyond Guatemala, Norway has hardly 
                                                 
74 However, this project not only cuts across categories of the justice sector – it also goes beyond the justice 
sector itself. And as is the case with many of the transcending projects, it is hard to trace how much of the 
average eight million per country per year would have gone to the justice sector. 
75 Not all of the Norwegian NGO support is reflected here, since some of the organisations’ funding comes from 
sources other than Norad or the MFA. But since statistical data from these organisations were difficult to 
acquire, we are not in a position to give an accurate ranking of the relative contributions of all the major 
organisations involved. The appendix is a good substitute, however, as it gives an idea of the parts of the 
organisations’ input that were obtained from Norwegian state sources.  
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been engaged in supporting them. In Africa, it’s the other way around: justice sector reform is 
a more recent and less widespread phenomenon, yet one in which Norway has become 
involved.  
 
Secondly, the two cases diverge when it comes to the magnitude and timing of Norwegian 
efforts. As noted, Guatemala is the country that received most Norwegian legal development 
aid from 1999-2003, while Ethiopia does not even feature among the ‘top ten’ country 
recipients. And while Norwegian aid to the justice sector in Guatemala started in the mid-
1990s, in Ethiopia it began half a decade later. Since the Norwegian history of aid to judicial 
reform in Guatemala is twice as long as the Ethiopian experience, and since aid to Guatemala 
has been far greater, we ask: what can Norwegian actors in Ethiopia learn from the 
Guatemalan experiences?  
 
Thirdly, the cases diverge with regard to what agencies, partners and channels Norway has 
targeted. While judicial reform has been supported via the government and non-governmental 
channels in Ethiopia, in Guatemala the multilateral channel of the UN has been the prime 
vehicle. Moreover, in Ethiopia Norway’s state support has come on top of a longer history of 
Norwegian presence in the country by missionaries, humanitarian and development agencies. 
Norway’s support in Guatemala, on the other hand, was not preceded by any significant 
presence of Norwegian non-state groups. And finally, while the Ethiopia programme of the 
Norwegian government was established primarily to realise the Norad agenda of poverty 
alleviation; driving forces of initiating aid to Guatemala were closely intertwined with the 
MFA’s emerging policy of post-war peacebuilding. As suggested earlier, these backgrounds 
are likely to have influenced the choice of channel: In Ethiopia Norway adopted a ‘bottom-
up’ approach to justice sector assistance by backing the non-governmental and government 
bodies; while in Guatemala a ‘top-down’ approach via the UN system was adopted. How 
have these divergences, both in channel selection and in the history of Norway’s relations 
with the two countries, influenced Norwegian experiences in aiding the two justice systems? 
What do the cases tell us about pros and cons of using the inter-governmental versus the 
government and non-governmental channels, and about the conditions under which different 
strategies will work?  
3.2.1 Aid to judicial reform in Guatemala 
Since the mid-1990s, Guatemala has received extensive external assistance to its judicial 
reform efforts.76 Norway’s aid has principally been channelled through the UNDP, not 
bilaterally; and has sought to strengthen courts, court administrations, and access to justice – 
especially for indigenous people. In the following we (A) give an overview of the efforts to 
reform Guatemala’s justice sector; (B) outline Norwegian assistance to the field; and (C) give 
a brief assessment of key aspects of Norway’s support.  
 
A. Context: Justice Sector Reform Efforts in Guatemala 
 
In a historical perspective, external assistance to judicial reform in Guatemala has come in 
two main waves: the first in the late 1980s and a second from 1996 to date. In the 1980s 
assistance to judicial reform constituted an important part of US foreign policy towards 
Central America (see discussion in Part II of this report). In Guatemala, assistance in the form 
of monetary and technical support was channelled through the USAID-funded Harvard Law 
                                                 
76 For a useful bibliography on the rule of law and judicial reform in Guatemala, see  
http://larcdma.sdsu.edu/humanrights/rr/Guatemala/JJR.html#GuJJRGovWebsites (accessed 25.08.04). 
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School project from 1987. Harvard abandoned the project in 1990, however, due to a 
perceived failure by the Guatemalan government to prevent human rights abuse.77 Judicial 
reform was then put on ice by the Guatemalan government. 
 
The second wave of assistance to judicia l reform in Guatemala has been far bigger. When 
UN-brokered peace accords ended the country’s 36-year long civil war in 1996, judicial 
reform was placed high on the agenda. The justice system was at that stage ill equipped to 
face up to the tasks at hand, i.e. to address past human rights violations,78 continuing violence 
and increasing crime rates; and to secure a stable legal environment to encourage investments 
and economic development. The justice system was also characterised by problems of 
exclusion, unequal access, discrimination, corruption and impunity.  
 
The need to transform the system of justice was taken seriously by the Guatemalan 
government, as well as of the UN – which played a central role in the country’s peace 
process. To quote the peace agreement of 1996:  
 
‘The Peace Accords have opened new doors and possibilities of judicial reform in Guatemala. To that 
end, the obligation of promoting a group of constitutional reforms, legal reforms, administrative 
measures and the creation of the Commis sion for the Strengthening of Justice has been assumed’.79  
 
Historically speaking, the end of Guatemala’s civil war coincided with the emergence of a 
new ‘peacebuilding’ agenda in the international community of states and donors; in response 
to opportunities opening up after the Cold War. Since the UN Secretary-General launched his 
‘Agenda for Peace’ in 1992, there has thus been no lack of interest to respond to Guatemala’s 
justice sector challenges.  
 
In the second and current wave of support, three multilateral agencies – the World Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the UNDP – as well as one bilateral donor, the 
USAID80 – have thus been key supporters of the government’s strategy to reform the judicial 
system. In support of the reform programme, in 1998 the WB approved a USD 33 million 
loan for a 20-year term to the Guatemalan government,81 and the IDB gave a USD 25 million 
loan for a 30-year term.82 Beyond the Banks and the UNDP, other multilateral contributors 
include the European Union and the UN’s verification mission MINUGUA. 
                                                 
77 See (Salas 2001: 21, fn 19). See also USAID: Final Report: Evaluation of Harvard Law School Program: 
Guatemala (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1994) (USAID 1994). 
78 An estimated 200,000 people died during the civil war (including 50,000 disappeared). For a conservative 
estimate, see document from Guatemala clarification commission, CEH (Comisión de Esclarecimiento 
Histórica), 1999. 
79 Final Report of the Commission of the Strengthening of Justice, ‘A New Justice for Peace’. 
80 As of 2001, USAID was assisting Guatemala in justice and human rights programming through the following 
programmes: revision of legal framework and code reform (such as Constitutional reform, criminal procedures 
codes reform and reform of organic law); judicial independence, professionalisation and judicial councils; 
judiciary training (includes, but not limited to, training of judges, prosecutors and defenders); national judicial 
schools; establishing/strengthening the Public Ministry; NGO strengthening (for justice reform); model courts 
for oral trial procedures; legal assistance/access to justice; creating/assisting ombudsman office; court 
administration and case tracking; alternative dispute resolution; assistance to law schools and universities; police 
assistance; and creating/strengthening public defence (see Appendix 3.1. and Appendix 3.2 in (Sarles 2001). 
81 Project assistance centred on several problems: improving court functions and institutional procedures; 
improving citizens’ access to justice; fighting corruption; restoring faith in the judicial system. See WB at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WESITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20016871. See also WB at 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=104231&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=
228424&Projectid=P047039 (accessed 31.08.04). 
82 See IDB at http://www.iadb.org/exr/PRENSA/1998/cp19198e.htm  
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Apart from the inter-governmental organisations, donors offering assistance to judicial reform 
in Guatemala have included governments and/or NGOs from 20 countries: Austria, Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.83 There is great variation in terms of the number of agencies involved 
from each country, the sectors the agencies are involved in, and the type and volume of 
assistance. An assessment estimates donations and loans to the country’s justice sector to total 
over USD 188 million between 1996 and 2001, which corresponds to an annual average of 
USD 31.3 million. 84 Unfortunately, we do not have the data to estimate the total volume of or 
technical and financial resources that have gone into the judiciary after 2001 in Guatemala. 
 
What is clear, though, is that given this plethora of actors and the weak capacity of the post-
war Guatemalan state, it has been essential to coordinate the reform efforts. Two coordination 
bodies were thus established in 1997 as part of the process to implement the 1996 peace 
accords, namely: 
 
(1) The Commission for the Strengthening of Justice (Comisión de Fortalecimiento de la 
Justicia, CFJ); tasked with modernising the judicial apparatus; developing recommendations 
for criminal reform; and implementing the new criminal procedure code; and 
 
(2) The Judicial Branch Modernisation Commission (Instancia Coordinadora de la 
Modernización del Sector Justicia, ICMSJ),85 composed of four justice sector actors:  
- the Judiciary (Ministério de Organismo Judicial),  
- the Attorney General (Ministerio de Gobernación),  
- the Institute for Public Defence (Instituto de la Defensa Pública Penal) and  
- the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público).86  
 
The ICMSJ’s role is to coordinate the work of these institutions; including the development of 
joint project plans and actions. Furthermore, it has offered programmes on e.g. the 
establishment of justice centres, the integration of computer systems, training, and the 
development of common policies with regard to crime control. 87 According to Guatemala 
expert Rachel Sieder, the ICMSJ is ‘functioning unevenly’.88 
 
B. Norwegian Aid to Judicial Reform in Guatemala 
 
As we have seen, Guatemala has been given top priority in Norwegian aid to judicial reform. 
Nevertheless, in the Guatemalan context Norway remains a relatively small donor. While the 
                                                 
83 The donors are listed in alphabetical order. For a more detailed overview of bilateral donors, see 
http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/donor_bd.html 
84 Cited in Sieder (2004: 145). 
85 There are various English translations for the original Spanish Instancia Coordinadora de la Modernización 
del Sector Justicia, such as the Coordinating Instance for the Modernization of the Justice Sector. 
86 The English translations from the original Spanish are the authors’. For achievements of the ICMJS and multi-
donor judicial reform projects underway in Guatemala, see CEJA-JSCA at 
http://www.cejamericas.org/reporte/muestra_pais.php?idioma=ingles&pais=GUATEMAL&tipreport=REPORT
E0&seccion=PROYREFO (accessed 31.08.04). 
87 The information and translations are adopted from a web publication by The Danish Institute for Human 
Rights at http://www.humanrights.dk/departments/international/partnercountries/Guatemala/mainpartnersguat/ 
(accessed 15th September 2004). For a more comprehensive analysis of judicial reform efforts in Guatemala, see 
Svendsen (2002). 
88 Email correspondence from Rachel Sieder, 18.09.04. 
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Norwegian share of UNDP financing is relatively high, it should be borne in mind that the 
UNDP is only one of almost 30 international agencies involved in various aspects of 
reforming and strengthening the judicial sector in Guatemala. 
 
Even though Guatemala has not had the status as a ‘priority country’ in Norwegian 
development cooperation policy, Norway has taken a particular interest in the Guatemalan 
justice sector following its active political involvement in the country’s peace process.89 
According to the Norwegian MFA,  
 
‘Since the final peace agreement in Guatemala…..Norwegian development assistance for this country 
has been concentrated on efforts to promote democracy and human rights monitoring, police training 
programmes and judicial reforms…. Support for civil society, the dissemination of information on the 
peace accords and programmes related to the rights of indigenous peoples have had high priority’.90 
 
Norway’s assistance to justice sector reform in Guatemala can thus be seen both as a follow-
up to the peace agreement, and in a broader perspective, as part of the MFA’s emerging 
policy line of ‘post-war peacebuilding’. Rather than being rooted in the traditional poverty 
reduction focus of Norway’s development cooperation, reasons why Norway first entered into 
a relationship of development cooperation with Guatemala thus seem to relate more to MFA 
than to Norad agendas. The rapidly consolidating MFA peacebuilding strategy helps explain 
why Norwegian aid efforts turned rather significant over a short period of time, in a country 
and region where Norwegian aid historically has been small. 
 
Since 1994-95, assistance to the justice sector has been a central part of Norwegian bilateral 
aid to Guatemala. A prime concern has been the protection and expansion of human rights, 
especially for indigenous people.91 After the peace agreement and prior to 1999, Norwegian 
assistance to the justice sector was principally directed towards (1) MINUGUA’s police 
projects, (2) local human rights organisations, and (3) the Ombudsman Office. Since none of 
these areas fall entirely into the category of judicial reform, which is the focus of our 
assessment, we will not further comment on these projects here.  
 
After 1999, however, Norway’s engagement shifted increasingly towards judicial reform, 
including the reform of courts and judicial administration, as well as access to justice issues – 
especially aimed at increasing the rights of the indigenous population. The Norwegian efforts 
have been concentrated in four large projects. All of the support projects have been initiated 
by the Norwegian embassy in Guatemala, financed by Norad, and channelled through the 
UNDP. The Guatemalan government, for its part, has been responsible for co-financing and 
executing the projects. The four projects are: 
 
1. Strengthening the Administration of Justice (GTM-98/006). The project was initiated in 
1999 to improve the efficiency of the administration of justice in Guatemala through 
supporting the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) and also to assist in the 
reorganisation of the judiciary. The total budget is 11.43 million NOK.  
 
                                                 
89 The first attempt at dialogues for peace started in 1987, but only had a breakthrough after the Oslo Peace 
Accords in 1990, when the government and the military opened up for an official dialogue Svendsen (2002). 
90 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Report on Norwegian Development Cooperation in 2000. 
Available at http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/development/032111-220004/index-hov002-b-n-a.html#hov2.0.4  
91 For a more thorough analysis of debates over indigenous rights and judicial reform in Guatemala, see Sieder 
(2002). 
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2. Plan for Modernising the Judicial Branch (GTM-00/216). This project, which started in 
2000, forms part of a larger five-year strategic plan for modernisation of the Guatemalan 
courts. It was initiated by the courts themselves through the Judicial Branch Modernisation 
Commission. A major purpose of the project has been to make court procedures more 
efficient, by reengineering the judicial process and simplifying judicial procedures - including 
developing a new procedural code. The project (for the period 2000-03) had a budget total of 
12.32 million NOK. 
 
3. Public Prosecutor’s Office Project (Ministerio Público) (GTM-99/217). In this project 
(approved by Norad in 2000, launched in March 2001, and planned to last for two and a half 
years), support to the Prosecutors Office was a central concern. Through the UNDP, Norway 
was involved in the third phase of the project. The objective has been to improve criminal 
prosecution, foster professional excellence in public prosecutors, and install a new 
organisational and operational model for public prosecutors office. The total budget for this 
project (for the period 2000-03) was 14.08 million NOK. 
 
4. Strengthening the Public Criminal Defence Institute (GTM-01/220) (approved in 2002). In 
this project, three new Indigenous Legal Defence offices have been set up within the Public 
Criminal Defence Institute – in Sololá, Huehuetenango, and Totonicapán respectively (in 
addition to the seven offices that already existed). The project also promotes cooperation 
between indigenous law and the state by means of sensitivity training of public officials in the 
national justice system and training of community leaders.92 The overall objective of the 
project is to promote and improve access to justice for indigenous groups. The budget for the 
period 2000-03 was 7.5 million NOK. The total budget is 8.23 million NOK.93 
 
In addition to these Norad-supported projects, one Norwegian NGO – JURK – has also been 
involved in the justice sector in Guatemala. Through their local partner, Guatemalan Ins titute 
of Comparative Penal Studies, from 2002-2004 JURK participated in a research project on the 
arrest, custody, trial and prison conditions for women; aiming to secure women’s rights in the 
justice system. 
 
C. Assessment of Experiences 
 
Has Norwegian aid been ‘successful’? 
A review of available project documents suggests that the Norad-supported judicial reform 
projects in Guatemala have been quite successful in achieving their immediate project 
objectives. An evaluation report of two of the projects that have been completed (Plan for 
Modernising the Judicial Branch (GTM-00/216) and Public Prosecutor’s Office Project 
(Ministerio Público) (GTM-99/217)) is, by and large, postive with respect to goal 
achievement, although substantial criticism is raised against the way the project had handled 
                                                 
92 See UNDP. GUA01/028/A/01/99. The project details are also available at UNDP’s home page for Guatemala 
at http://www.pnudguatemala.org/ (accessed 25.08.04). This project was a follow-up to the UNDP administrated 
project GUA/00/L13, financed by the Spanish government. 
93 In addition to these four larger projects are smaller sums of money allocated to the financing of two 
consultancies in 2003, and a support to the National Civilian Police Force (Policia Nacional Civil) of 1.5 million 
NOK in 2002 – a continuation of the support for MINUGUA (also channelled through the UNDP). Falling 
outside this analysis is also support for the National Civilian Police (GTM-03/308 PND 2003), which has an 
allocated budget of 12 million NOK, 3 million of which has been disbursed by the end of November 2004. The 
information is taken from various project documents, budgets prepared by Norad, and information from Hilde 
Salvesen, Norwegian Embassy in Gu atemala, email correspondence of 07.12.04. See also Appendix 3, Table 1. 
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the planning and development of a new procedural code.94 The third project, Strengthening of 
the Public Criminal Defence Institute (GUA 01/028) went through an external assessment in 
2004, a few months before the project was expected to reach completion (estimated to 
September, 2004). The report indicates that most of the project objectives had been met in a 
satisfactory manner.95 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the programme is advancing quite 
well, and that Norad most likely will roll out funding for another two or three years.96 
 
Nevertheless, to assess whether concrete, small-scale project objectives have been met is a far 
more straightforward task than assessing projects in light of their overall objectives. In order 
to evaluate the larger impact of a particular kind of assistance it is, strictly speaking, 
necessary to evaluate the joint effect of the plethora of donor efforts. While this is a major 
undertaking that lies beyond the scope of this report, one step in that direction is to focus on 
the particular channel that Norway has chosen for its judicial reform efforts, and assess 
whether the use of that channel has brought Norwegian agenc ies closer to reaching the meta-
aims. As noted, in Guatemala Norway has chosen to use the multilateral agency of the UNDP. 
 
Has the UNDP been an effective channel for Norwegian aid? 
When assessing whether or not UNDP has been an ‘effective ’ channel for Norwegian aid, we 
take into account whether the UNDP has disbursed donor resources effectively, made sure 
that project objectives have been met in a timely manner, and ensured the necessary co-
operation with relevant donors and partners. The use of the UNDP as a channel for aid to 
judicial reform in Guatemala has both advantages and disadvantages to it, as demonstrated in 
the following seven points. 
 
First, the UNDP is a well-established donor. Since it first established itself in Guatemala in 
1974, it has supported more than 200 projects in support of political and economic 
development.97 Out of the six current programmes of the UNDP, ‘Security and Justice’ is the 
one that Norwegian assistance is channelled into.98 The UNDP’s long history in Guatemala 
suggests that the agency is familiar and well connected with the government, other local 
actors and with the donor community. This would in turn suggest that it likely that the UNDP 
is able to implement its aid programmes relatively efficiently. Nevertheless, sources have 
pointed out that cooperation between the UNDP and the Guatemalan government (or 
executing agencies) has at times been lacking.99   
                                                 
94 See a report prepared by Stener Ekern (ed.), Alberto Muro Castillo and Kristin Svendsen: Repaso de los 
Proyectos: Programa de apoyo al Organismo Judicial (OJ) para la agilización de proscesos judiciales en áreas no 
penales (GUA 00/004) y Fortalecimiento del Ministerio Público (MP) (GUA 00/008). Final version prepared 10 
June, 2003. Criticism of procedural code on p. 33.  
95 For instance, progress rates were reported between 30 per cent and 85 per cent, depending on the project 
component and on what stage the project was in. See Annual Administration Report for Project GUA/01/028 –  
Legal Offices for the Defence of Indigenous Human Rights, for the reporting period 1 February-31 December 
2002. For details of the evaluation, see Project GUA 01/028 – Repaso de Proyectos: Fortalecimiento al Instituto 
de Defensa Pública Penal. Evaluation report prepared by Jannicke Bain, Norad, and Kristin Svendsen, 
Consultant, 18th May 2004. 
96 Email correspondence with Rachel Sieder, 18.09.04. 
97 See UNDP webpage for Guatemala, at http://www.pnudguatemala.org/ (accessed 25.08.04). 
98 For a list of all UNDP projects in the field of Justice and democratic security, see  
http://www.pnudguatemala.org/ (accessed 25.08.04). The projects which NORAD provides funding for are also 
listed here, with projects details. 
99 See report prepared by Stener Ekern (ed.), Alberto Muro Castillo and Kristin Svendsen: Repaso de los 
Proyectos: Programa de apoyo al Organismo Judicial (OJ) para la agilización de proscesos judiciales en áreas no 
penales (GUA 00/004) y Fortalecimiento del Ministerio Público (MP) (GUA 00/008). Final version prepared 10 
June, 2003. 
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Second, UNDP is a co-ordinating agency for donor resources. It has coordinated monthly 
meetings of donors, including those that do not channel their resources through the UNDP, 
through the Petit Comité de Justicia. This committee was in the period 1997-2004 responsible 
for more than 50 reform initiatives with respect to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Public 
Criminal Defence Institute, and the Judicial Branch more broadly. UNDP was part of 18 of 
these projects, of which Norad financed three. This would seem to imply that the UNDP 
makes a concerted effort to avoid donor duplications and overlapping efforts. Nevertheless, 
the Petit Comité de Justicia as well as the UNDP specifically has still been criticised for 
initiating overlapping projects, not planning well enough in advance of starting new projects, 
and not coordinating their efforts efficiently enough.100  
 
Third, the UNDP has played a dual role that has complicated its work in Guatemala. On the 
one hand it is one of many donors; on the other hand it has had a central role to play with 
respect to the government due to its role in the peace process. This means that the  UNDP is 
not necessarily as ‘neutral’ as one may expect.101  
 
Fourth, the UNDP has experience with justice reform in a number of countries, and therefore 
should be able to draw on the lessons learned from elsewhere. But one should bear in mind 
that the UNDP is first and foremost a coordinating organ for various types of projects in a 
wide array of fields, and does not necessarily have technical expertise in the area of judicial 
reform assistance.102  
 
Fifth, the UNDP tends to recruit foreign experts rather than drawing on the technical capacity 
within the country at stake. People working on judicial reform frequently draw attention to the 
importance of reformers having a profound understanding of the legal system that they are 
trying to change, and the society within which it is anchored. This is not always the case of 
experts with different legal and cultural backgrounds.  
 
Sixth, given that it largely has been government- and donor-driven, judicial reform in 
Guatemala has been criticised for being a top-down rather than bottom-up process. The 
UNDP, along with the other large ‘donors’ such as the WB and the IDB, 103 has thus been 
reproached for not including civil society enough in the discussions on judicial reform.  
 
Finally, additional evidence on the workings of the UNDP is mixed. The UNDP was recently 
criticised in an internal report looking at the effectiveness of its coordination of aid to the 
justice sector. Basically, the report notes that coordination was poor and that there was little 
success in terms of proven results in many of the areas funded. It is unclear to what extent this 
is the fault of the UNDP itself, or whether it is a result of a wider set of factors.104  
                                                 
100 See report prepared by Stener Ekern (ed.), Alberto Muro Castillo and Kristin Svendsen (2003). Criticism 
against UNDP p. 1, 21-22, 36-37.  
101 For instance, the salaries the UNDP has offered its staff has way surpassed that of government staff, causing 
breeding ground for envy. (See report prepared by Stener Ekern (ed.), Alberto Muro Castillo and Kristin 
Svendsen (2003)). This, it should be noted, is a problem of general character, not only typical of Guatemala. 
102 As of August 2004, the UNDP office in Guatemala had no legal expert, but was awaiting the arrival of a 
programme officer with some background in legal studies. Information from Jannicke Bain, Norad, 26.08.04. 
103 To the extent that the development banks give funding as loans and not as grants, it is strictly speaking 
misleading to call them ‘donors’: in these cases, they are ‘lenders’. 
104 The report was carried out for UNDP by an external consultant from Argentina, Alberto Binder, who has 
been extensively involved in promoting judicial reform in the region. The report is not publicly available. 
Similar criticism has been raised in the project evaluation report prepared by Stener Ekern (ed.), Alberto Muro 
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In spite of the pros and cons outlined above, the Norwegian embassy in Guatemala reports 
that they are relatively satisfied with the way the UNDP has worked as a channel for 
Norwegian aid. Though reporting procedures have been slow, there has been improvement 
recently. In the opinion of the Norwegian embassy in Guatemala, the UNDP seems to be 
competent in the area of justice sector reform and applies a holistic approach to it, as indicated 
by its coordination efforts. Although the new Guatemalan government has expressed 
scepticism towards donor involvement in the justice sector, it has, apparently, gradually taken 
on a softer position. The UNDP is reported to have good relations with the relevant ministries 
and governmental partners.105  
 
Since there are mixed signals  as to the suitability of the UNDP as a vehicle for Norwegian aid 
to the judiciary in Guatemala, and since opinions on UNDP as an effective vehicle for donor 
coordination seem to diverge, an in-depth evaluation of the Norwegian experience with the 
UNDP will need to be carried out before final judgement can be passed on whether or not it is 
a suitable channel for Norwegian aid.  
 
It might be useful to explore other channels. A proper assessment of the NGOs involved in 
judicial reform would reveal whether certain NGOs could be an alternative channel to the 
UNDP. A third alternative route would be for Norad to channel its aid directly to the relevant 
legal institutions. At the moment, Norway does not give state-to-state aid to Guatemala. 
However, as the political environment in Guatemala becomes increasingly stable and 
‘normalised’, using the governmental channel for Norwegian aid to the judiciary may be 
explored. It should be taken into account that this would probably require substantially more 
administrative resources from Norad’s side than using the UNDP as a channel.  
 
How does formal judicial reform work in a pluralist legal setting? 
Beyond evaluating to what extent the UNDP has been an effective channel for Norwegian aid 
and whether or not donor coordination in Guatemala has been successful and efficient, there 
is the larger – practical as well as normative – question of what may be achieved by donor 
support to the formal judicial sector. In pluralist legal societies, like that of Guatemala, it is 
not self-evident that the most suitable way to obtaining the rule of law, democracy, respect for 
human rights, and a more democratic state lies necessarily, or exclusively, with a well-
functioning formal legal system. It is of great importance that people’s own concepts of 
justice are respected when introducing changes to the formal justice system. 
 
There is evidence of strong local legal cultures in Guatemala, such as in the Maya culture, on 
which one could successfully draw and build when carrying out judicial reform projects. In 
fact, there have been concerted efforts to include the respect for customary law and 
indigenous rights in Guatemalan legal development.106 This includes Norad’s support to the 
IDPP’s Defensorías Indigenas programme. Some central questions donors should ask are thus 
the following: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Castillo and Kristin Svendsen: Repaso de los Proyectos: Programa de apoyo al Organismo Judicial (OJ) para la 
agilización de proscesos judiciales en áreas no penales (GUA 00/004) y Fortalecimiento del Ministerio Público 
(MP) (GUA 00/008). Final version 10 June, 2003. 
105 Information provided by the Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala by Hilde Salvesen and Guri Rusten, email of 
31.08.04. 
106 For a insightful account comparing these kind of initiatives in Guatemala and Mexico, see Sieder (2002). 
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· To what extent is it useful or beneficial to focus exclusively on formal legal structures 
in multiethnic and pluralist legal societies?  
· Given that strengthening formal structures takes a long time, should one settle for 
‘good enough’ options in the meantime? That is, should one accept limitations of the 
legal system that render ‘justice’ which is not up to the standards of justice required 
and expected in a well-developed legal system? 
· What kind of justice is ‘good enough’, even where this may be in conflict with 
prevailing Western concepts of rule of law and justice? 
 
A final question that needs to be taken into account for a case such as Guatemala is how 
judicial reform should be adapted to the various phases of post-war peacebuilding. Should 
donors be more conscious of sequencing their strategies in line with the characteristics of each 
phase? In the various phases from a fragile peace to a more stable democracy, how should 
they select partners and relate to the country’s government? 
 
Concluding remarks 
In our opinion, it appears reasonable that Norway has engaged itself in the legal sector in 
Guatemala. Helping to build legal institutions and strengthen access to justice for indigenous 
people is an important part of the peace and democratisation process in the country. Human 
rights constitute a policy area in which the Norwegian government has long-standing 
expertise. It also seems strategically useful to use the UNDP as a channel for Norwegian 
assistance, for the reasons detailed above – at least until a careful assessment of alternative 
channels is carried out concluding that other options are more effective. 
 
When assessing aid to the judicial sector in Guatemala, it should be bore in mind that less 
than a decade has passed since judicial reform in earnest was placed on the political agenda. 
Given the time it takes to develop new institutional practices, implement new laws, educate 
new judges or prosecutors, or change a legal culture, it is evident that the time span for 
passing any conclusive judgement on Norway’s (and, more generally, donor) involvement in 
the judicial reform process is too brief.  
 
A very important part of judicial reform is continuity: Institutional reform takes time. Donor-
driven projects of small donors like Norway tend to be designed for a two- or three-year 
period (this in contrast to the WB or IDB, which may set up reform plans lasting for 20-30 
years). A couple of years are usually not sufficient to see any concrete results of the reform 
process, beyond having completed the stated measurable aims of the project. The long-term 
impact on processes, such as access to justice, is therefore extremely hard to evaluate.  
3.2.2 Aid to judicial reform in Ethiopia 
Like Guatemala, Ethiopia has also received extensive external assistance to its judicial reform 
efforts since the mid-1990s. But in contrast to the Guatemalan case, Norway’s assistance to 
Ethiopian justice sector reform started later, has been smaller, and has been channelled via 
non-governmental and government bodies – not multilaterally.  
 
In the following we (A) introduce the context of Norwegian efforts to support Ethiopia’s 
justice system, (B) outline the Norwegian contributions; and (C) give a brief assessment the 
way in which Norway has offered its judicial reform assistance in Ethiopia.  
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A. Context: Justice Sector Reform Efforts in Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia’s justice sector107 
In 1991 the Derg military junta, which had ruled Ethiopia since Emperor Haile Selassie was 
overthrown in 1974, was toppled by a coalition of rebel forces called the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front. The new EPRDF-dominated government, which 
subsequently won Ethiopia’s 1995 and 2000 elections, launched a major restructuring of the 
country’s centralised political system. In essence, it transformed Ethiopia into a federation of 
nine ethnically based regional states. The federal structure was entrenched in a new 
constitution adopted in 1994, which guarantees full independence of the judiciary. 108  
 
Yet in spite of the efforts to overcome the Derg heritage, post-1994 experiences suggest that it 
has continued to weigh rather heavily on the justice sector. Under military rule the police and 
prison systems became marked by brutality, while the judiciary turned into extended arm of 
the executive and saw an erosion of human and material resources. The justice system has 
since 1994 been plagued by the following problems: 
 
· Shortage of human and material resources, and lack of institutional capacity; 
· Delays and inefficiencies in law enforcement and judicial administration;  
· Discrepancy between existing laws and the new constitution; and 
· Obstacles in the promotion of human rights.109 
 
Ethiopia’s new court system is moulded to fit its federal structure, which has two levels: the 
federal level, and the regional state level. Each of the nine regions110 is composed of a number 
of zones (or provinces), which in turn contain a range of woredas (districts).111 At each of 
these administrative levels courts have been established. Within each regional state a Supreme 
Court thus serves the entire region; a High Court each zone; and a court of first instance each 
woreda. At the federal level there is also a Federal Supreme Court, a Federal High Court, and 
a Federal First Instance Court. Finally, at the bottom end a fifth judicial level can be 
identified: Within each woreda there are ‘social courts’; considered to be those that most 
Ethiopians recur to in time of need.  
 
Other relevant state actors within Ethiopia’s justice sector include the federal Ministry of 
Justice and the corresponding bodies at regional level, called the Bureaux of Justice; the 
Federal and State Police and the Federal and State Penitentiary Administration.  
 
While efforts to put the new justice system in place and make it function smoothly have been 
ongoing throughout the period since 1994, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 
2000 became a detractor of focus and resources. Not only did the fighting lead to a setback in 
Ethiopia’s democratisation process; it also fostered donor divergence and a temporary 
withdrawal of aid by some agencies. Two phases of the justice sector reform efforts can 
therefore be identified: from 1995 to 1999, and from 2000 to date. 
 
                                                 
107 Unless otherwise specified, this and ensuing sections draw on interviews with country experts. 
108 Since 1994, constitutions have also been enacted within each regional state. Ethiopians thus relate to two 
constitutions: the federal one, and the one of the region where they reside. 
109 On this point, see EHRCO (1996) for details. 
110 The terms ’region’, ’state’, and ’regional state’ are used interchangeably. 
111 While this was the original structure, recent reforms have reduced the statues of the zone to one of 
coordinating activities in the woredas.  
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External assistance to Ethiopia’s justice sector 
External assistance to Ethiopia peaked in the early 1990s, and has since levelled off to 
approximately 700m USD per year. This makes Ethiopia rank as one of the top three targets 
of overseas development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa – only Tanzania and Mozambique 
receive more. For Ethiopian authorities, the massive inflow means that aid accounts for more 
than one third of federal and state budgets (EC 2001). 
 
Fairly little, however, of the external support to Ethiopia has gone to the justice sector. True, 
three of the top five donors – which have accounted for more than 50 per cent of all 
development assistance to Ethiopia – have funded the justice sector. Still, the share of their 
aid that has gone to this sector is quite tiny. The three main donors are the World Bank, the 
EU, and the USA. Apart from the US, bilateral state donors of note include Canada, France, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. Out of the multilaterals supporting justice reform, only 
the UNDP features alongside the EU and the World Bank (EC 2001).  
 
Appendix 13 gives a tabular overview of the major donors to Ethiopia’s justice sector beyond 
Norway; of what Ethiopian partners they have worked through; and what areas of the justice 
sector or judicial reform they have supported. Finally, it gives a rough indication of the 
average level of funding that each donor has contributed to this area. It shows that over recent 
years, annual commitments of France, Sweden, the USA and the UNDP to judicial reform in 
Ethiopia have amounted to plus/minus two million NOK. The aid of the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) fits an intermediary category, ranging between 5-
10m NOK a year; while the EU and World Bank are estimated to have given an annual 20m 
NOK, roughly. In terms of type of aid; court administration is the most commonly supported 
area. Law reform, court reform and legal community building are assisted less. As for 
partners, virtually all donors support state structures, while Sweden and the EU most clearly 
assist civil society as well. 
 
How does Norway’s aid to judicial reform efforts in Ethiopia compare with that of the other 
donors? Before we assess Norway’s role, we will take a brief look at how the relationship of 
development cooperation between Norway with Ethiopia was initiated. 
 
Norwegian aid to Ethiopia 
While Norwegian presence in Ethiopia dates back more than half a century, the history of 
bilateral development cooperation is relatively short. Norwegian missionaries first arrived in 
Ethiopia in 1948,112 and in the early 1970s Norwegian humanitarian agencies followed. Direct 
transfers from the Norwegian state to Ethiopia started in the 1980s; mainly in the form of 
humanitarian aid through NGOs and multilateral bodies. Only in 1994 did Norway sign an 
agreement with Ethiopian authorities on long-term bilateral development assistance.113  
 
Since then, however, Norway’s commitment to Ethiopia has been significant. Already in 1995 
Ethiopia became one of Norad’s less-than-a-dozen priority countries. This status was lost 
after the war with Eritrea, as a result of which Norway temporarily withdrew its support. In 
spite of this ‘fall from grace’, and of the absence of a re-negotiated agreement with Ethiopia 
on long-term assistance, over recent years the level of Norwegian aid has remained high and 
rising. From 2001 to 2003, Norad’s bilateral aid grew by more than 30 percent, from 113 
million to 148 million NOK. If we add the sum channelled via the multilateral system, 
Norway’s total support to Ethiopia reached 263 million NOK in 2003. Unlike Guatemala, 
                                                 
112 See Tvedt (1995). 
113 See Ashenafi, Mariam, and Helland (2001).  
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Ethiopia was thus one of the top ten recipients of total Norwegian development assistance, 
receiving 3% of all Norwegian aid in 2002 and 2003.114 
 
B. Norwegian Aid to Judicial Reform in Ethiopia 
 
In 2003, ‘democratic development, human rights and good governance’ as well as ‘peace, 
reconciliation and stability’ were considered top priorities of Norad’s development 
cooperation with Ethiopia. Nevertheless, these areas did not capture much of Norad’s 
spending in the country. ‘Good governance’ was only the third largest component of the 
bilateral aid package, absorbing less than 20% of the budget. In fact, almost two thirds of the 
finance went to health, education, economic development and trade. While political reform is 
a key stated aim it is, in other words, social and economic issues that are most strongly 
supported in practice. What reasons may explain this apparent divergence between rhetoric 
and reality? We identify four likely dynamics. 
 
One, there appears to be a need in policy quarters in Oslo to project a holistic image of 
Norway’s foreign policy, and in this vein, to make development cooperation agendas fit 
overall foreign policy agendas more consistently. This need is reflected in the recent 
organisational transfer of most development cooperation decision-making from Norad to the 
MFA. It is also exemplified in a recent MFA report on how development and peacebuilding 
issues and policies are intertwined.115 This perceived need to create a more uniform foreign 
policy may thus result in the declaration of priorities – as with regard to Norway’s policy in 
Ethiopia – that may be indicative of overall policy agendas, but that are more misleading as 
reflections of the content of the actual country programme.  
 
If the gap between declared aims and actual spending partly reflects Norway’s wish to project 
itself as a ‘peacebuilder’, it not only carries a message to the international community. It also 
entails a message, which is different, to the Ethiopian government. In light of the fact that the 
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea triggered Norwegian sanctions against Ethiopia – Norway’s 
aid was withheld, and the agreement on bilateral aid and the status as priority country were 
left behind – the declaration of peace as an overall aim may be seen as a signal that such 
‘sticks’ may still be applied if Ethiopia recurs to a military strategy. 116  
 
Third, the fact that less resources are allocated to governance purposes than one would expect 
from the declaration of good governance as a policy objective also needs to be understood in 
the Ethiopian framework of a still relatively weak state capacity, which limits the level of aid 
to this area that the public institutions are able to absorb. Norwegian reluctance to provide 
more aid to good governance purposes may thus be rooted in a concern to ‘make haste 
slowly’ and make sure that the state is able to make reasonable  use of the governance funds 
before fuelling them in on a larger scale.  
 
Finally, the apparent gap between key ends (peace, human rights, governance) and means 
(social and economic development projects) of Norway’s aid to Ethiopia may be rooted in the 
fact that the focus on political development is new, and thus is yet to bear more fruit at the 
                                                 
114 See MFA (2003a; 2003b) and Norad (2004). 
115 See MFA (2004). 
116 It also suggests that the projects that Norway supports may be meant to consolidate peace, even when they do 
not fall into the ‘peace’ or ‘governance’ category. However, this argument requires that a consistent 
methodology be developed and applied to ensure that the projects Norway supports are, if not peace-promoting, 
at least conflict-sensitive. We are not aware of such mechanisms within Norwegian assistance.  
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budget level. While Norway started supporting Ethiopian human rights and democracy NGOs 
already in 1997, it was only after the border war that the focus on governance – and on 
judicial reform more specifically – started to get institutionalised.  
 
Channels, types, and magnitude 117 
According to interviews, the main purpose of Norway’s emerging engagement in Ethiopia’s 
justice sector has been the wish to contribute to reforming the sector, mainly in view of 
promoting (a) respect for human rights, and (b) judicial independence.  
 
Beyond isolated projects, such as the support to the set-up of a Special Prosecutor’s Office 
with the assistance of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights in 1993-94, Norway’s aid to 
the justice sector in Ethiopia started as aid to civil society. Even if Norway had used the 
multilateral channel in other areas of its Ethiopia programme, it was the non-governmental 
agencies that it first started supporting in the ‘political’ field. Norwegian aid to Ethiopian 
NGOs grew from a scope of three organisations and 710 000 NOK in 1998, to 16 
organisations and five million NOK in 2002. While it is difficult to ascertain whether one 
organisation’s work falls within the realm of the ‘justice sector’ or not, of the 16 NGOs 
supported in 2002 at least four did so, as they ran activities to promote access to justice, law 
reform, and prison reform. 118  
 
Norway only started focusing on Ethiopia’s justice sector more explicitly, however, after the 
war with Eritrea. On the basis of contacts dating back to 1998 with Ethiopian research 
institutions and its Ministry of Justice, from 2001 onwards Norway started cooperating more 
systematically with Ethiopian authorities – mainly the Ministry of Justice – on these issues.  
 
The first project that Norway implemented with the Ministry was a relatively minor initiative, 
involving a Norwegian contribution of 145 000 NOK in 2002, in support of court 
administration and the legal community. The project enabled the production and distribution 
of a book outlining the code of conduct for lawyers.119 As a pioneer project it is likely to have 
functioned as a ‘test case’ for the further initiatives with the Ministry – which, in turn, have 
been far bigger. The later Norad- and/or embassy-funded projects have primarily focused on 
training, more specifically, on the training of legal professionals in human rights. The 
Norwegian training programme has included the following initiatives: 
 
· In 2002 and 2003: Three ‘training of trainers’ courses, one in Oslo and two in 
Ethiopia, with a total budget of 1.6m NOK; and 
· From 2003 to 2006: A bigger programme of training of judges and prosecutors, as 
well as some police staff, implemented in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and 
with Mekelle University, with a total budget of 7.7m NOK. 
 
In terms of partners, Norway started its engagement via the non-governmental channel and 
continued by opening a government-to-government channel. No Norwegian support to the 
justice sector has been channelled through multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, 
EU, or UNDP. 
                                                 
117 Unless otherwise specified, or in addition to the specified source, this section draws on interview data – as 
well as the overview given in Appendix 14. 
118 The four organisations were: Action Professionals Association for the People (APAP), the Ethiopian Human 
Rights Council (EHRCO), the Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association (EWLA), and Prison Fellowship 
Ethiopia (PFE).  
119 See Norad (2002). 
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Beyond the Norwegian state, one Norwegian NGO has also been involved in justice sector 
reform in Ethiopia, namely Redd Barna. Partly funded by Norad, Redd Barna has supported 
the following work:  
 
· On law reform: studies and advice on the need for legal reform and to facilitate the 
integration of the 1989 Convention of the Rights of the Child in Ethiopian legislation, 
e.g. in family law and penal law. This has been done in cooperation with the Save the 
Children alliance;  
· On police reform: the set-up of ‘child protection units’ in police stations, a project run 
in cooperation with police commissions in two localities and with the Ethiopian NGO 
Forum for Street Children. This project has also been supported by Save the Children 
Sweden; and 
· On access to justice: the ‘justice juvenile reform’ project, aimed at making the justice 
system more accommodating to children and youth. This project has been 
implemented with the Federal Supreme Court and Save the Children Sweden, and also 
supported by the British Embassy. 
 
In terms of types of aid, therefore, Norway has supported law reform, access to justice, prison 
and police reform via Ethiopian and Norwegian NGOs. The other main type of assistance has 
been training, channelled via Ethiopian research and state institutions.  
 
How, finally, to assess the size of Norwegian efforts? Two initiatives rank above the others in 
financial terms: the aggregate NGO support (5m NOK in 2002) and the latest training project 
(7.7m from 2003-2006). Drawing on Appendix 14 we find that beyond these two posts, in 
2002 and 2003 Norway gave almost 2.7m NOK to judicial reform projects in Ethiopia, or an 
average of some 1.3m per year. If we estimate that one quarter of the supported NGOs 
worked for judicial reform, Norwegian 2002 support amounted to some 2.5m NOK. In 2003, 
with the training programme starting (and for which we have no evidence of aggregate NGO 
support) Norwegian aid is likely to have risen to roughly 3.2m NOK. Estimating that Norway 
has contributed an annual three million NOK to Ethiopia’s justice sector in recent years 
should therefore not be too far off the point.  
 
Of Norway’s total aid to Ethiopia, three million NOK is little. In 2003, it only made up two 
percent of Norway’s bilateral aid and one percent of Norway’s total aid to Ethiopia. 
 
Comparison with other donors  
Compared with other bilateral donors in Ethiopia, Norway has so far played a minor role in 
the area of justice reform assistance. In financial terms, Norway’s contribution is close to the 
annual averages of the USA, France and Sweden; while Canada’s aid has been far bigger. 
Compared to the NOK 20m-level grants of the World Bank and the EU to judicial reform 
though, Norway’s contribution remains small.  
 
While training has been core to Norwegian aid over recent years, this emphasis does not make 
Norway’s role particularly outstanding either. Legal and human rights training has been 
supported by a range of other donors as well, including the World Bank, the EU, France, the 
US, the British Council and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.  
 
Nonetheless, Norway’s approach to Ethiopia’s justice sector is special in one way: in the 
choice of partners. First, Norway stands out as a keen supporter of civil society, paralleling 
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donor approaches of the EU and Sweden. Second, and more importantly, Norway has avoided 
the multilateral channel. By contrast, Sida and CIDA for instance – which have, it should be 
said, also worked closely with Ethiopian authorities in the past – now channel large sums 
through the World Bank’s project in support of Ethiopia’s Justice Sector Reform 
Programme.120 While Norway has not used the multilateral system to channel its justice sector 
aid, it has nevertheless coordinated its contributions with other donors such as Sweden.  
 
C. Assessment of Experiences 
 
Given that only a few years have passed since Norway started supporting Ethiopia’s justice 
sector systematically, statements on experiences so far can only be tentative. Moreover, our 
evidence is very limited with regard to experiences made by non-Norwegian agents on 
Ethiopia’s judicial reform scene. Our material does, however, suggest two main lessons that 
can be learned at the general level.  
 
Lesson one: Efforts must be coordinated 
A consensus seems to prevail among donors, government representatives, and country experts 
that until recently, efforts to support the Ethiopian justice sector have been far too fragmented. 
In the first post-Derg, pre-war phase, there was an unprecedented and massive inflow of 
money as well as new foreign actors, including in the area of justice sector assistance. At the 
same time, Ethiopia faced probably the biggest administrative transformation project ever 
undertaken in the country, including the establishment of a two-tier court system with a total 
of five levels of courts, in a country with a grave deficit in legal competence. Combined, these 
trends led to a difficult balance between donor agendas and the need for Ethiopian ownership, 
not least given the fact that public institutions in place to absorb the flows of aid were weak at 
the outset.  
 
With the advent of the Ethio-Eritrean war and the related slowing down of support 
programmes, scope was opened to reflect on this first phase. It is worth remembering that 
Norway never made this experience of the first phase within justice sector assistance. Norway 
thus did not ‘learn by doing’ back then that in Ethiopian justice sector aid, ‘doing it alone’ 
was not a particularly good idea. The World Bank on the other hand, which was central also 
in the first phase, is clear on the problems that arose: poor coordination and the consequent 
lack of effective and sustainable institution-building (WB 2004). Another result of the 
piecemeal approach was that the fact that Ethiopian authorities; whose new political structures 
were still being built, would get problems managing and providing direction to the various 
efforts. Combined, donor interventions in the first phase hence seem to have undermined 
rather than promoted local ownership.  
 
Lesson two: Efforts must be evaluated 
A second lesson emerging from the first post-Derg decade is that greater attention must be 
given to the experiences drawn from judicial reform support in Ethiopia so fa r, if current or 
new aid is to contribute to solve the problems that continue to plague Ethiopia’s justice sector.  
 
In this sector, the above-mentioned plethora of criss-crossing efforts has made it quite 
difficult to evaluate the effects of single projects on the overall reform process. Put 
differently, a reason why lessons from previous projects only to a small extent seem to have 
                                                 
120 Many other donors are likely to follow suit. Commitments to support the Bank’s project to back the JSRP 
have been expressed by the EC, the African Development Bank, and the UNDP at the multilateral level, as well 
as the state donors of Ireland, the UK, Holland, France, Germany, Italy, and the USA World Bank (2004: 8). 
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been learned relates to the fact that such lessons have been difficult to draw. Even more than 
in a ‘normal’ setting of development assistance, in the post-1994 world of justice sector aid in 
Ethiopia it has been hard to ascertain the extent to which A – the project – led to B – the 
project objectives, since B might as well result from a broad range of other factors beyond the 
supported project.  
 
However, methodological difficulties alone do not explain why few lessons so far seem to 
have been learned. It is also a matter of political priority and willingness of each donor 
agency. It seems to us that this political will has been weak, and that far too few efforts have 
been made at all to promote evaluation-based better practices. While getting an overview of 
evaluation and reviews has been beyond the scope of this case study, it remains noteworthy 
that we only found evidence among the bilateral agencies of one evaluation having been 
undertaken – that of the USAID.  
 
What do these lessons imply for Norway’s contribution to Ethiopia’s justice sector?  
 
Norway and lesson two: The need to learn from experience 
 
‘The area has been new to the embassy and to Norad, especially the direct support to a public 
institution such as the Ministry of Justice. Much time and resources have been given to 
preparing material etc. It has also been a challenge that Ethiopia is a complex country when it 
comes to democratic development.’121   
 
This statement by a representative which has been involved in Norway’s efforts in Ethiopia 
points to a need to learn from other donors’ experiences within judicial reform in the country. 
True, Norway did have some experience within one aspect of judicial reform, namely the area 
of human rights support and training. This experience had, however, mostly been 
accumulated outside of Ethiopia. Moreover, as noted earlier, Norway had little experience 
from other ways of supporting judicial reform, such as aid to law reform, court reform, court 
administration reform, and legal community building.  
 
But this shortage of experience needs not be a drawback. As a newcomer, Norway has had the 
benefit of being in a position to learn from mistakes already made in justice sector support, 
and thus minimising the chances of repeating them. In Ethiopia, for instance, it has been 
entirely possible for Norwegian agencies going into judicial reform to learn from the 
experiences that other donors have made in this field. If doing so, Norway can adjust its 
interventions and thus increase chances that they will have the desired effects.  
 
It seems, however, that Norwegian agencies in Ethiopia have not fully capitalised on this 
learning opportunity. Allow us to elaborate with reference to the now-running project to train 
judges and prosecutors in human rights.  
 
As argued in the appraisal of the plans for this project,122 donors – including Norway – may 
want to take greater care to make sure that they understand how previous efforts have worked, 
in order to increase the likelihood that past mistakes not be repeated – and to reassess whether 
the activities suggested within the project will enable the donor to reach its overall aims. As 
for the training project, a key overall aim is to improve the human rights situation in Ethiopia. 
Even though we have no evidence on the results of this project so far, in light of the fact that 
                                                 
121 Email correspondence from Gunnar A. Holm, MFA, 09.12.2003. 
122 See Ashenafi, Mariam, and Helland (2001). 
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the human rights situation in Ethiopia as of 2004 remains serious, there is a need to restate the 
following questions, as food for thought and discussion:  
 
· On what basis can it be assumed that another training project, of which there have 
been many already in Ethiopia, is the most effective means to reach the end of greater 
respect for human rights? 
· Given the fact that few training projects have been evaluated, and that even trained 
Ethiopian staff have reportedly continued to be responsible for flagrant human rights 
violations; what makes it likely that one particular project, like the one that is now 
running with support from Norway, will make a difference for the better with regard 
to the overall aim of human rights compliance? 
 
Norway and lesson one: The need to rethink partners and channels 
Even if Norway has coordinated its justice sector efforts in Ethiopia with other donors, it has 
focused quite exclusively on the bilateral channel. Instead of pooling funds into the 
consortium to support Ethiopia’s Justice Sector Reform Programme, for instance, Norway has 
consolidated its bilateral relationship with the Ministry of Justice, circling around smaller 
justice sector projects. This stands in stark contrast to other bilateral donors in Ethiopia, as 
well as to Norway’s approach to judicial reform aid in Guatemala; which to a large extent 
have been geared towards the multilateral channel.  
 
In parallel to the assessment of Norway’s aid to Guatemala in the preceding section, we will 
round off this case study with a similar discussion of the channel choice in the case of 
Ethiopia. The question is: To what extent has the partnership with the Ministry of Justice 
helped Norway to get closer to its aims of supporting Ethiopia’s justice sector? Two 
advantages and two drawbacks related to channelling aid via the justice ministry can be 
identified. On the positive side, by choosing to partner government structures Norway can 
stimulate local ownership and capacity building. 
 
Ownership. Support to the government agencies in general, and the ministry responsible for 
justice issues in particular, is likely to foster a sense of ownership on the recipient side to the 
projects at stake. In a government-to-government relationship a relative balance is easier to 
achieve and a mutually constructive dialogue may be easier to maintain, than in the cases 
where a government faces a coordinated, and by implication more powerful, consortium of 
donor agencies. While a lack of donor coordination may complicate government ownership, 
an experience made in the first phase of justice sector assistance to Ethiopia; the same effect 
can materialise as a result of perfectly successful donor coordination. If the donors are ‘too’ 
united the balance of influence over policies may tip in favour of the donors, and thus make 
policies more donor- than government-driven. By engaging in a bilateral relationship of 
cooperation with the Ethiopian government, Norway may thus arguably be seen as fostering 
Ethiopian ownership, and thereby greater sustainability, of judicial reform processes. 
 
Capacity building. Direct, bilateral support to government agencies also means a very 
concrete contribution to building capacity within the state institutions. Instead of hiring in 
foreign experts, or making projects depend on imported ideas and solutions, the choice of the 
government – and also, other non-state local bodies – as prime partners is likely to make the 
value of the human capital in the country grow. Given that post-Derg Ethiopia had very little 
such human capacity in the area of judicial reform; there is a great need for such capacity-
building. The channelling of resources through local – state and non-state – agencies is most 
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likely to build such capacity: if channelled via multilateral agencies, a larger share of the aid 
will be absorbed by non-Ethiopian actors. 
 
On the negative side, however, supporting the government can represent a missed opportunity 
to draw on multilateral experience, expertise, and coordination. More seriously, it may be 
counterproductive in view of promoting judicial independence.  
 
Missed opportunity. In Ethiopia, Norway as a bilateral agency has chosen to partner the 
government in judicial reform, an area of assistance in which (a) donor coordination is 
beginning to function well, (b) other bilateral donors support major multilateral initiatives to 
assist public programmes, and (c) Norway has little experience at country level. Given its 
shortage of experience in all judicial reform areas except human rights training, Norway 
would have a lot to learn from cooperating more closely with the other bilateral and 
multilateral donors. Lessons would be learned not only by being represented in donor 
coordination meetings, but especially by working together on building and implementing 
major judicial reform projects. The fact that Ethiopia continues to be plagued by a shortage of 
relevant human resources suggests that the shortage of Norwegian experience is not likely to 
be fully compensated by the experience of its partner, the Ethiopian government. Moreover, 
regardless of what experience Norway’s government partners may have, the experiences of 
other donors within judicial reform aid are probably far more relevant for Norway than the 
experience of the Ethiopian state. Therefore, the fact that Norway has not pooled its resources 
into multilateral channels represents a missed opportunity to learn and improve Norwegian 
interventions to aid Ethiopia. By following the bilateral route only, Norway runs a greater risk 
of repeating mistakes that others have made before it. 
 
Undermining judicial independence? As noted earlier, in Ethiopia  a key challenge for judicial 
reform remains undue interference by the executive branch of power into the affairs of the 
judiciary. Therefore, if donors choose to cooperate with state institutions in justice sector 
assistance it is of great importance what branch of power they partner: the executive branch, 
or the judiciary branch. In Ethiopia, Norway has chosen to support the former, the Ministry of 
Justice, and not the federal or regional courts.  
 
The human rights training project illustrates how this choice may work against the rationale of 
support, namely the promotion of judicial independence. Before Norad made the decision to 
implement this project, Ashefani, Mariam, and Helland (2001) in their appraisal of the plans 
suggested that to avoid executive interference, ‘the training of judges at all levels in the 
Ethiopian justice system should be left in charge of the courts’ – and not of the Ministry of 
Justice. But this advice was not followed, mainly because the administrative capacity of the 
Supreme Court was considered too weak to coordinate the project.123 As a result, the key 
initiative within Norway’s justice sector portfolio in Ethiopia is a project in which the 
Ministry of Justice – the executive – is responsible for training the judiciary branch of 
power.124 This responsibility can be abused and turned into an opportunity for the executive to 
                                                 
123 Also, the Supreme Court would not be in a position to train the prosecutors; that task would have to remain 
with the Ministry of Justice. However, a two-pronged project design could have had certain advantages. If 
prosecutors were trained by the Ministry and the judges by the Supreme Court, executive interference in the 
training of judges would have been avoided – and the apparently strongly needed human capacity in the Supreme 
Court would have been strengthened.  
124 The power of the executive over this project is attempted checked, however, by the setting up of an advisory 
committee including representatives of Ethiopia’s courts; tasked with contributing to the development of 
teaching material for the training.   
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instil loyalty within the judiciary. It therefore risks working counter to the aim of fostering 
independent judicial thinking and action that would check the power of the executive.  
 
While these are the main disadvantages of avoiding the multilateral channel of support, it is 
important to note that Norway not only supports the Ethiopian government, but also local 
research institutions and non-governmental organisations. This may to some extent run 
against the possibly counterproductive support to the executive branch that Norway may 
stimulate. However, it remains questionable whether it will help to support independent-
minded research and civil society with the one hand, if the other hand supports an executive 
branch of state power which is not well known for tolerating independent thinking. 
 
Concluding remarks 
We are of the view that the main advantages of the bilateral avenue, namely the promotion of 
local ownership and capacity-building, are possible to realise also via the multilateral channel. 
Indeed, both the World Bank and the EU have aimed at building capacity in the local systems. 
They have even supported the set-up of a Ministry to that effect, and contributed with their 
judicial reform expertise to build that capacity. It is our impression too that in spite of an 
increasingly well-coordinated collective of donors in Ethiopia within judicial reform, this 
growing uniformity has not greatly affected the sense of Ethiopian ownership. Various 
sources highlight that it was not primarily the donors, but rather the Ethiopian authorities that 
sought to get away from the fragmented and piecemeal approach of the first phase of support, 
and to build a comprehensive programme, rooted in the Ethiopian federation’s own priorities, 
that most donor resources in turn could be pooled into. The multilateral way, in other words, 
clearly seems to meet both the ownership and capacity-building concern. 
 
Adding to this argument is the fact that in Guatemala, where far more Norwegian funds have 
been channelled for a longer period, the experience of using the multilateral system appears to 
have been predominantly positive – even though an evaluation report gives some reasons to 
doubt this conclusion.  
 
With regard to Ethiopia, we still find it commendable that a comprehensive Justice Sector 
Reform Programme currently is underway. Donors, including Norway, should try to support 
this overall programme – while balancing their donor coordination with the need to make sure 
that ownership rests with Ethiopian state and civil society actors. In light of the experience of 
too little evaluation moreover, all donors should ‘make haste slowly’ in order to ensure that 
their interventions are based on a sound analysis of the situation, enabling them to see more 
clearly how most constructively to intervene to support the justice sector. Only such an 
approach, in our view, is likely to enable the Ethiopian people to benefit in the long haul from 
the rule of law and their constitutional rights and freedoms.  
3.2.3 Judicial reform aid in Guatemala and Ethiopia: A comparative note 
Having reviewed Norwegian aid to judicial reform in the contexts of Guatemala and Ethiopia, 
we will round off with a discussion of the two sets of experiences. As noted when introducing 
the case studies, Norway’s judicial reform assistance to Guatemala started earlier and has 
been far bigger in financial terms than the corresponding effort in Ethiopia. Yet, in spite of the 
shorter history and smaller magnitude of the latter, lessons can surely be learned from both 
cases.  
 
At the general level, experiences in both countries point to the need for donor coordination. In 
Guatemala such coordination has functioned relatively well, partly due to its anchorage in one 
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particular institution. Ethiopia, by contrast, went through a chaotic first phase of support 
where the lesson was learned, ‘by doing’, that coordination is needed – primarily to foster 
local ownership and to avoid duplication of efforts. In particular due to the complexity of the 
field of judicial reform, it was seen as essential that all the stakeholders are on board a 
comprehensive justice sector programme that is established and managed by the government, 
in close cooperation with the donor community. The Ethiopian experience suggests that all 
major donors, including Norway, should support a sector-wide approach – while making sure 
that the improved donor coordination thus achieved does not undermine local ownership.  
 
The other main common finding across the two cases is that efforts made so far need to be 
evaluated and understood more in depth, in order to improve the efficiency and results of 
future projects. Little evaluation has been done, and the repetition of certain kinds of justice 
reform assistance despite indications that some of the aims of that assistance remain distant, 
suggest that a more critical approach will be needed to the efforts made so far. Essentially, we 
need to understand how the interventions can become more efficient in reaching not only the 
immediate aims (such has reaching a certain number of people with legal aid or training), but 
also the overall objectives (such as the improvement of the human rights situation, or a more 
independent judiciary). Also, it is crucial that evaluation reports are made widely available, 
and acted upon.  
 
These are, however, fairly general lessons from the two case studies. We have, though, 
suggested that Norway has its particular set of motivations for going into judicial reform – 
and that Guatemala and Ethiopia clearly exemplify two main, and different, motives. In the 
Guatemalan case, Norway started supporting judicial reform largely as a result of its 
engagement in the country’s peace process; whereas in Ethiopia, jud icial reform assistance 
was first and foremost driven by a wish to support a country in a transition from military rule 
to democracy. True, Ethiopia also experienced armed conflicts in the early and the late 1990s, 
but Norway played no major role in resolving those. Preceded by decades of Norwegian 
presence in the country, Norway’s state engagement in Ethiopia instead started as the country 
began its road to democracy. The support, which soon turned significant, focused on 
traditional social and economic development issues. These two divergent reasons for getting 
involved in justice sector aid clearly gave rise to a divergent choice of channels for the 
judicial reform assistance. In Guatemala, where Norway had few prior links, it relied almost 
exclusively on the multilateral channel while in Ethiopia the bilateral channel was chosen, 
combined with substantial civil society support. How have these divergences, both in channel 
selection and in the history of Norway’s relations with the two countries, influenced 
Norwegian experiences in aiding the two justice systems?  
 
At this point, Norway’s experience in Ethiopia appears somewhat too short to conclude on 
lessons learned – combined with the fact that the interventions made so far have hardly 
reached the stage of evaluation. However, we do suggest that the advantages of the bilateral 
approach – the promotion of local ownership and capacity-building – are likely to be achieved 
also when using the multilateral channel, which has the additional benefit that would likely be 
crucial for a ‘newcomer’ like Norway, namely the opportunity to learn from other donors’ 
judicial reform experiences. Does this mean, however, that the use of the multilateral channel 
is the one and only solution? The Guatemalan experience suggests that the answer is no. Even 
if significant successes were achieved by using the multilateral channel there, there is 
evidence that major stumbling blocks prevented rule of law from taking root. For instance, the 
process was for long seen as too donor-driven, and evidence suggests that the court system, as 
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a result of the efforts, did not rise in esteem among the local population – rather, in fact, on 
the contrary.  
 
Therefore, our preliminary conclusion is that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution with 
regard to channel selection for judicial reform assistance: Each country will have to find its 
own way. Donors, however, should take note of that country’s wishes – both at the level of 
the executive and judiciary branches of government, and at the level of local civil society 
bodies and research communities – and make sure that their efforts are geared towards 
responding to those needs in a comprehensive manner.  
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Part IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Aid to judicial reform has become an increasingly important component of international 
development assistance since the beginning of the 1990s. This growing worldwide concern 
with support to judiciaries as an institution begs important questions regarding the usefulness 
and effectiveness of channelling huge amounts of resources into judicial systems. What have 
we learned so far?  
 
The main aim of this report has been to offer some reflections on the lessons learned from 
almost two decades of international support to judicial reform, with an eye to what Norway 
can learn from the experience of other donors as well as from its own experiences. In this 
final part of the report we point out some main obstacles to ‘successful’ judicial reform; and 
offer some suggestions as to where and how future efforts in donor assistance to judicial 
reform could be directed.  
4.1 Findings and lessons learned  
4.1.1 International experience with judicial reform 
Comparing donor assistance to judicial reform in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa in 
the 1990s to the present, we noted three interesting differences. 
 
Firstly, the most recent wave of international assistance to judicial reform started earlier in 
Latin America than in Africa, leaving the two regions with different experiences of judicial 
reform in terms of scope and experience. This, in turn, influences the potential for 
comparative evaluations of the two areas’ experiences. 
 
Secondly, the profile of international actors involved in judicial reform differs in the two 
regions. Most importantly, the World Bank has been an important actor on the judicial reform 
scene in Latin America (currently involved in projects in at least nine countries) whereas it 
has been largely absent in African judicial reform processes (currently running projects in 
only two countries). In Africa, by contrast, much assistance to judicial reform has been 
channelled through governmental donors. In many cases, it is the former colonial powers that 
have been particularly involved in the countries they formally controlled. The regional banks 
have had very different levels of involvement. Whereas the Inter-American Development 
Bank has actively been pushing legal reform and offering technical assistance to a number of 
Latin American countries since the early 1990s, the African Development Bank has hardly set 
judicial reform in sub-Saharan Africa on its agenda.  
 
Thirdly, Latin American jurists and legal scholars seem to have been much more active in 
promoting judicial reform in other countries in their own region than have African jurists in 
Africa. This may be due the fact that legal studies and the legal profession have a longer and 
much more institutionalised history in Latin America than in Africa.  
4.1.2 The Norwegian experience with aid to judicial reform 
How does Norwegian aid to judicial reform fit into this larger world context? Norway has 
since the mid-1990s offered assistance to judiciaries in countries across the world, but with a 
relatively larger concentration in parts of Africa and Europe. Norway is a relative newcomer 
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among donors. Though it has supported training of police125 in a number of countries since 
the end of the Cold War, it only became engaged in judicial reform strictly speaking from the 
mid-1990s onwards. Interestingly, aid from Norwegian state agencies to legal and judicial 
development tripled between 1999 and 2003. In total over this five-year period, Norad and the 
Norwegian MFA disbursed 400m NOK for this purpose.  
 
In spite of this growing Norwegian interest in promoting the rule of law through judicial 
reform, it is important to bear in mind that Norwegian efforts in this area remain modest. 
First, Norway is only one among a plethora of inter-governmental, governmental and non-
governmental donors on the aid to judicial reform scene – and, in comparative terms, it is a 
relatively minor player. Second, the share of the Norwegian foreign aid budget devoted to 
judicial reform is also small. In 2003, when Norad and MFA assistance to legal and judicial 
development reached a peak of 120m NOK, it still made up less than one percent of the total 
state budget for development assistance.126 When adding that Norwegian support to judicial 
reform has been spread across more than sixty countries, targeted a multitude of projects and 
gone through a number of different channels, it is self-evident that its usefulness in 
contributing to the larger aims of democratisation, rule of law, and respect for human rights 
must be seen as part of a wider context. 
 
To get a better grasp of how Norwegian assistance to judicial reform has worked in practice, 
we took a closer look at the cases of Guatemala and Ethiopia. From our analysis we can draw 
the following lessons: 
 
· The aid strategy adopted seems to depend on the background to the Norwegian 
judicial reform engagement – whether it grows from a longer-term involvement 
focussed on development, or is part of a peacebuilding initiative.  
· Donor coordination is essential, as there may be contradictions between different 
reform initiatives. However, coordination should be designed in a way to enable the 
recipient agencies to retain ownership and enhance their own institutional capacities. 
· Both inter-governmental, government-to-government, and non-governmental channels 
have their pros and cons. Each needs to be duly considered in every country context.  
· Thorough evaluations are crucial, especially independent evaluations. 
 
It should be noted, however, that it is difficult to evaluate overall change, as opposed to 
assessing the meeting of project objectives. If we are to pass judgment on the larger aims of 
judicial reform, there is a need to develop suitable benchmarks. Given that institutional 
change is a slow process, it may still be too soon to tell conclusively, as the net effects are 
reported as a mix of positive and negative trends for both Latin America and Africa. 
4.2 How to ensure efficient and effective judicial reform?  
Reform efforts have not always been successful. Indeed, there is evidence – especially from 
Latin America – that judiciaries are less trusted and enjoy lower levels of legitimacy now than 
they did before the reform efforts started. Though this may have several explanations, it is 
clear that aid to judicial reform has not been exclusively positive. There is still plenty of room 
for improvement. In order to make a step further in the right direction,  it is important to try to 
answer: What has gone wrong? Why have not the desired results always been achieved? Why 
                                                 
125 Police reform falls outside our narrow definition of judicial reform, but fits into the larger category of justice 
sector reform. See Fig. 1 and 2 in Part I. 
126 Norad (2004). 
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have not the reform efforts in many countries been more effective, and brought about more 
positive results sooner? Alternatively, one may ask: What has gone right? Why have some 
reform efforts worked well? What are the chief elements in bringing about ‘success’ in the 
meaning of both achieving project objectives as well as the larger, societal aims?  
 
Let us first take a look at the individual project level. For judicial reform projects or 
programmes to be viable attention must be paid to all stages of the process: (A) the design 
stage; (B) the implementation stage; and (C) the evaluation stage.127 
 
(A) At the design stage, when a project is conceptua lly formed, the different parts are 
outlined, and goals are stated, eventual success will require that designers: 
(i) Have a proper diagnostics or analysis of the situation;  
(ii) Are cautious about importing an institutional design. Already in the first phase of 
international assistance to judicial reform in the 1960s it became clear that what 
works in one area not necessarily works in another, but this continues to be of 
major concern; 
(iii) Have on board the relevant stakeholders – within the judiciary, the legislature, the 
public, and civil society. This will make the project more likely to enjoy the 
legitimacy necessary for successful implementation; 128 
(iv)  Design the project to make it fit the larger context of judicial and justice sector 
reform. Failure to know what others are doing in the field may lead to overlap, 
duplication of efforts, and conflicting reform agendas; and  
(v) Avoid presenting judicial reforms as a panacea that will resolve multiple problems 
in one sweep, as this may create unrealistic expectations – and hence 
disappointment and loss of legitimacy in turn.  
 
(B) At the implementation stage, success will require that attention be paid to the 
following:  
(i) Coordination. Motives behind reforms differ, and there are multiple agendas 
among donors that risk pitting different policy objectives and domains against 
each other. Success of an individual project will thus be enhanced if the project 
implementers try to coordinate their efforts with other donors. 
(ii) Comprehensiveness. Lack of coordination, coherence and transparency in the 
implementation of reform initiatives tends to lead to duplication of efforts, and 
undermines the effectiveness of judicial reform. Focusing narrowly on reforming 
one specific institution at a time may undermine a more holistic approach. Project 
implementers may therefore benefit from trying to make their project part of larger 
and more comprehensive judicial reform or justice sector programmes, preferably 
with strong local or national roots. 
 
(C) At the final evaluation stage, project success requires that attention be paid to: 
(i) Method: Developing and applying relevant indicators or measurements to assess 
the project;   
(ii) Finance: Allocating sufficient resources to enable a proper evaluation;  
(iii) Transparency: Making sure that the evaluation, regardless of its results, be 
available to stakeholders and other donors, to ensure mutual learning and trust. 
Here, it is important to avoid the temptation of not reporting negative findings as 
donors have a stake in selling the project as ‘successful’, even if it was not. 
                                                 
127 The following points are assembled from a wide array of sources. 
128 See Dakolias (2001). 
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From our case studies, we see that judicial reformers both in Ethiopia and Guatemala may 
want to use the above ‘checklist’.  
 
In the case of Guatemala, the first wave of US-driven aid to judicial reform in the 1980s 
violated many of the above guiding principles: it failed to carry out proper diagnostics; it 
failed to involve the government sufficiently (resulting in a lack of national ownership), and it 
tried to import features from the American legal system without taking the local legal 
environment into account. Though the official explanation for stopping aid to the judicial 
sector was the failure of the Guatemalan government to ensure respect for human rights, it 
remains open how efficient or effective these reform efforts would have been, had they 
continued. 
 
In the second period of aid to judicial reform – the 1990s – where the involvement of foreign 
donors has increased dramatically both in terms of numbers and scope – some important 
lessons seem to have been learned (at last partially): First, it seems like donors have become 
better at carrying out proper assessments of the legal situation prior to starting new projects in 
the sense that many more areas of justice reform have been targeted for assistance. Second, 
there seems to be an increased sens itivity towards local legal culture – as reflected in some of 
the projects that Norad has supported. Third, in spite of reported initial reluctance to engage 
in judicial reform, the Guatemalan government now seems to be ‘on board’ in the reform 
efforts, as it has tried to map out a holistic approach to judicial reform in collaboration with a 
number of donors. Fourth, the attempt to coordinate judicial reform through two main 
coordinating bodies is reassuring, though it is not clear how effective this coordination has in 
fact been. 
 
In Ethiopia, by contrast, a major and comprehensive analysis of the situation in the justice 
sector, underlying the sector-wide approach to justice reform now undertaken, was only 
carried out ten years after the reform period started. For a decade, therefore, many of the 
attempts to reform the legal system risk having failed in part due to an inadequate 
understanding of the depth, character, and complexity of the challenges faced by the country’s 
justice sector. Further, to avoid importing foreign institutional designs was particularly 
important in this country, since Ethiopia in fact established its own ‘brand’ of federalism with 
which no foreign model made a perfect fit. But given the weak Ethiopian public capacity as 
the judicial reform aid period started, it is likely that some of the first failures were due to an 
exaggerated belief among donors that ‘their’ justice system experiences would help; and too 
little understanding of the need design local solutions to local problems. Third, appropriate 
stakeholder involvement also seems to have been lacking in many projects in the first phase 
of Ethiopia’s reforms; yet this lessons appears to be learned currently as both civil society and 
state structures are taken on board more systematically. Finally, judicial reform agents in 
Ethiopia, both local and international, now seem to realise that projects must be coordinated 
and form part of a comprehensive programme with a strong root in local state- and non-state 
structures. It did, however, take Ethiopia nearly ten years to learn that lesson.  
 
With regard to the project evaluation stage, finally, both Guatemala’s and Ethiopia’s judicial 
reformers share a need to improve their performance. It is our impression that evaluations that 
have been made are few, come late, often are difficult to access for outsiders, and also appear 
to have weakly developed methodologies. To learn from experience, both in international and 
Norwegian assistance to judicial reform, our two case studies thus suggest that improving the 
evaluation stage of the project process will be a very useful place to start. 
  67 
We do acknowledge, however, that reliable evaluations are quite difficult to conduct in this 
complex area. Judicial reform involves a wide range of actors, objectives, and interventions; 
and since a profound dualism between its focus on efficiency on the one hand and normative 
concerns on the other, objectives may internally contradict one another. Certain interventions 
lead to improvements on some dimensions and regression on others, leaving in dispute the net 
balance of the overall change. One example is where reform of the penal code has improved 
the protection of accused persons, but also reduced the conviction rate – with rising crime 
rates as a result.  
 
The nature of the legal system, with its complex inter- linkages between various institutions, 
hence renders the effects of reforms difficult to anticipate – and assess. A judicial reform 
intervention will have systemic effects beyond its immediate focus, and the effect of each 
intervention in turn depends on a combination of factors throughout the legal system. This 
does not mean that it is not possible to assess achievements or plan projects in this field. But it 
does require a broad perspective on the chain of institutions that make up the legal system. 
Narrow assessments of one single aspect of the legal system is of limited value – as are 
limited interventions that do not take into account the broader effects on and interactions with 
other parts of the legal system. 
 
In our opinion, two key steps to help donors avoid some of the pitfalls detailed above remain: 
 
(1) to know what others are doing in the field and improve coordination of activities; and 
(2) to learn from own as well as others’ current and historical experiences. 
 
With respect to the first point, it is evident that ensuring better donor coordination is of utmost 
importance – at all stages of the project. Our two case studies illustrate that this point has been 
taken seriously in Guatemala, but only been systematised more recently in Ethiopia.  
 
With respect to the second point, careful and honest reporting on completed or in-progress 
projects is essential. If lessons are to be really learned, we need to look at both positive and 
negative experiences. Ideally, reporting should be carried out by external agents given the 
tendency of both donors and recipients to create a favourable picture of results. It is also 
important that findings from the evaluations be disseminated to relevant actors so that the 
lessons from the particular project are passed on and benefit others.  
 
A key lesson to be drawn from this analysis is therefore that we need to know more about 
what has already been done in the area of judicial reform before we go further. There is 
already a large number of donors on the judicial reform scene, but they seen not always to be 
aware of the effects of their efforts in a larger context. To facilitate useful evaluations, we 
need to improve our understanding of what judicial reform is and should be, and to develop 
appropriate indicators. 
4.3 Measuring judicial reform: The need for indicators  
There is little comparative material systematically evaluating judicial reform interventions. In 
order to maximise the benefit from the studies and evaluations that exist for purposes of 
assessment, policy planning, and further research, we need to develop indicators. Such 
indicators would relate to different aspects of the legal process, in particular:  
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· access to the legal system;  
· the responsiveness of legal institutions ;  
· their capability of effectively transforming legal claims to judgements (in terms of 
efficiency, as well as independence); and  
· the authority of legal decisions (looking at compliance, and impact).  
 
It is, however, a major undertaking to develop indicators which in a reliable yet fairly simple 
way could measure improvement on these aspects. Existing work of this type is at an early 
stage. Though the idea of developing indicators of justice performance is not new 
(performance indicators are already part of larger datasets such as the Afrobarometer and 
Latinobarometer)129, most of the work done is restricted to the development of indicators to 
evaluate one individual project. Yet recently there has been an increasing interest in the donor 
community to develop such indicators, or measures ‘that help answer the question of how 
much, or whether, progress is being made toward a certain objective’.130 There are now a 
handful of preliminary studies that may serve as points of departure for further work in this 
area. The aim must be to come up with general indicators that may serve cross-country study 
purposes, while taking into account the great variety of legal systems, laws, and practices. 
 
Let us mention two recently published interesting studies. The European Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) has developed a pilot scheme for evaluating judicial systems. 
This questionnaire consists of 108 guiding questions divided into ten thematic areas, focusing 
on structures as well as actors in the lega l system, and covering the following points:131  
 
· general information about the country where the reform has taken place,  
· access to justice and to all courts (divided into questions on (a) legal aid/the cost of 
justice and (b) users of the courts and victims),  
· the functioning of the courts and efficiency of justice,  
· the use of information technology in the courts,  
· fair trial,  
· judges, public prosecutors, and lawyers,  
· mediators and mediation proceedings, 
· enforcement agents and the execution of court decisions.  
 
The point of these questions is to paint a comprehensive picture of the entire justice system. 
The questions are fairly simple and will provide answers to the breadth and scope of judicial 
reform, rather than to its intricate details and complexity. 
 
The most comprehensive guide to comparing and contrasting assistance to judicial reform is 
developed by the Vera Institute of Justice.132 Though their study concentrates on one sector of 
judicial reform only, it develops a series of indicators to capture the different aspects and 
perceptions of reform efforts. The proposed indicators are divided into three categories: 
 
 
                                                 
129 See http://www.afrobarometer.org and http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/da/index/techinfo/M8091.HTM 
130 Cited in (Vera Institute of Justice 2003: 2). The World Bank organized a workshop on Justice performance 
indicators in March 2004. The papers presented at the workshop and the reading list for the workshop may be 
accessed at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/evaluatinglegal.htm. This webpage also contains 
important information on various performance measures 
131 See CEPEJ (2003). 
132 See its universal guide for Measuring Progress toward Safety and Justice Vera Institute of Justice (2003). 
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· strategic indicators for measuring safety, security, and access to justice; 
· institutional indicators for policing, prosecution and defence, judicial performance, 
non-custodial sentencing, prisons, and accountability mechanisms; and 
· indicators for non-state institutions to capture the importance and challenges of 
measuring outcomes in the safety and justice sector. 
 
The central point of the study is that evaluating performance in the field of justice requires 
composite approaches, preferably by developing so-called baskets of indicators (3-5 selected 
measures) that captures some of the complexity that one tries to measure. Since any given 
indicator tends to be a proxy of the outcome that it measures, it should rarely be used on its 
own. While the Vera Institute’s guide seems a useful model to follow, other models may also 
be envisioned. What matters is that we develop better tools for evaluating the effectiveness 
and impact of aid to judicial reform before we continue to channel resources into this area of 
development assistance. 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
‘Success can be found more in the overall reform strategy than in its content.’ 133 
 
As this statement by a Latin American scholar suggests, successful judicial reform requires 
that both short-term strategies and long-term commitments have the ‘overall reform strategy’ 
in mind. Our report leaves no doubt that both comprehensiveness and coordination, in 
thinking and action, are key if judicial reformers are to contribute to building the rule of law. 
And as the UN Secretary General has said, the need to do so is no less urgent now than when 
judicial reform efforts started some decades ago:  
‘Today the rule of law is at risk around the world. Again and again, we see fundamental laws 
shamelessly disregarded. (…) We must start from the principle that no one is above the law, 
and no one should be denied its protection. (…) I believe we can restore and extend the rule of 
law throughout the world. But ultimately, that will depend on the hold that the law has on our 
consciences. (…) Each generation has its part to play in the age-old struggle to strengthen the 
rule of law for all – which alone can guarantee freedom for all. Let our generation not be 
found wanting.’134  
 
                                                 
133 Vargas (2000: 120) Vargas draws this lesson from an in-depth analysis of the various aspects of the judicial 
reform process in the Basque country and clearly shows how it may be relevant to Latin American countries. The 
central point, however, is generally true. 
134 Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, to the UN General Assembly, 21 September 2004. 
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8. Repaso de los Proyectos: Programa de apoyo al Organismo Judicial (OJ) para la 
agilización de proscesos judiciales en áreas no penales (GUA 00/004) y 
Fortalecimiento del Ministerio Público (MP) (GUA 00/008). Evaluation report 
prepared by Stener Ekern (ed.), Alberto Muro Castillo and Kristin Svendsen,  10th  
June, 2003.  
 
 
 
Web References on Aid to Judicial Reform in Guatemala 
 
Bibliography on Guatemala: Rule of Law and Judicial Reform 
http://larcdma.sdsu.edu/humanrights/rr/Guatemala/JJR.html#GuJJRGovWebsites 
 
CEJA-JSCA: Judicial reform projects underway 
http://www.cejamericas.org/reporte/muestra_pais.php?idioma=ingles&pais=GUATEMAL&tipreport=RE
PORTE0&seccion=PROYREFO 
 
IADB  
http://www.iadb.org/exr/PRENSA/1998/cp19198e.htm 
 
ODIN 
http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/development/032111-220004/index-hov002-b-n-a.html#hov2.0.4 
 
UNDP 
http://www.pnudguatemala.org 
 
The World Bank Group: Legal and judicial reform – Bilateral donors in Guatemala 
http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/donor_bd.html 
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Appendix 1: List of Informants 
 
Last name First name Institution 
Abdi Ismail Noor Norad 
Andersen Tor-Henrik MFA 
Ayalew Fassikawit RB 
Bain Jannicke Norad 
Barth Magne NRX 
Beck Marianne JURK 
Brunsell Tom MJP 
Cappelen Endresen Tormod  MFA 
Christiansen Knut NCA 
Eikaas  Vibeke AIN 
Ekern Stener NCHR 
Endresen Gunvor Alida Emb Angola 
Feo Claudio NPA 
Frigaard Iver NPD 
Frøholm Anne Kjersti  MFA 
Gjedrem  Elin Norad/MFA 
Gram-Johannessen Haakon Norad 
Grøsland Anne Margrete RB 
Hansen Alf-Åge Emb Ethiopia 
Helland Johan CMI 
Hellum  Anne IWL 
Hermansen Anne Kristin Emb Uganda 
Hillestad Thune Gro NCHR 
Holm  Gunnar MFA 
Horjen Stein Erik NCA 
Høgdahl Kristin NCHR 
Indreberg Hilde MJP 
Kajoba Samuel Emb Uganda 
Kazi Jamshed UNDP, Ethiopia 
Knudsen Berit RB 
Kvalsøren Anne Heidi Norad 
Lillejordet Karlsen Marit  Emb Zambia 
Nesse Pål NRC 
Osland Kari M.  NUPI 
Pausewang Siegfried CMI 
Raugland Vidar DNA 
Salvesen Hilde Norad 
Schulerud Ingrid MFA 
Sieder Rachel ILAS 
Tanke Holm  Tor NPD 
Thomassen Stine Norad 
Thorsrud Fæste Tora MFA 
Vetlejord Asgerd NPA 
Vikøren Ragna NRC 
Vogt Andreas NUPI 
Wilsgård Sissel MJP 
Øen Marianne NPA 
Aalborg Eivind NCA 
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Appendix 2:  Interview Guide 
På oppdrag frå NORAD foretar Chr. Michelsens Institutt (CMI) no ein gjennomgang av 
bistand til rettssystem. I tillegg til støtte til ulike lands rettsapparat – domstolar, 
justisdepartement, juridiske opplæringsinstitusjonar, etc. – ser vi på støtte til 
fengselsvesen, politi og ikkje-statlege organisasjonar på rettsområdet. Vi samlar no inn 
informasjon om korleis norske aktørar tenkjer og handlar innan dette feltet, og tar derfor 
kontakt med deg i … 
 
På grunnlag av dei tiltaka for å styrke rettssystem som du har jobba med, kunne du 
tenkje deg å dele nokre erfaringar frå dette arbeidet?  
 
For å kartleggje det norske terrenget, søker vi svar på følgjande spørsmål:   
 
1. Kva for prosjekt, prosessar og/eller institusjonar innafor andre lands 
rettssystem støttar din avdeling/organisasjon?  
2. Om lag kor stor er denne støtta, i personell- og/eller budsjettmessig forstand? 
3. I kva for land gir de denne støtta, og kvifor har de vald akkurat desse landa? 
4. Kor lenge har de arbeidd innan dette feltet? 
5. Den gongen de byrja med å kanalisere midlar til dette arbeidet, kva var 
motivasjonen? 
6. Kva for formål har de no med desse tiltaka? 
7. Kva har vore dei viktigaste utfordringane og lærdommane så langt?  
 
Di tilbakemelding vil hjelpe oss å plassere dykkar støtte til rettssystem i landskapet av 
norske aktørar og tiltak. Svar gjerne per e-post, per telefon, eller mail eit telefonnummer 
og tidspunkt du kan bli nådd på så kan vi ta kontakt. Om du kan vise til skriftleg 
materiale som gir meir informasjon om den relevante støtta vil det og vere av interesse.  
 
På førehand mange takk! 
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Appendix 3: Norwegian Aid to Legal and Judicial Development, 1999-2003 
Note. The table is an excerpt of a larger overview, kindly forwarded by Norad, based on the OECD DAC 
category ‘legal and judicial development’ (code no. 150.30) that Norad started applying in 1999. As much 
of the information in this larger overview was in Norwegian, and given the amount of data at stake, we 
alert the reader that some of the information in this Table 1 as well remains in Norwegian language. 
Year Donor  Region Country   Name of agreement_ Name of agreement partner  
1999 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   12th Commonwealth Law Conference The Law Society of Zimbabwe 
1999 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Civic education National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) 
1999 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Agreement  UNDP 
1999 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Committee on Community Service Committee on Community Service 
1999 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Study tour Judiciary  Anderson & Anderson International 
1999 NORAD Afrika Zambia   review of equipment  Interconsult International AS 
1999 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Evaluation Den Norske Advokatforening 
1999 NORAD Afrika Zambia   wfamiliarise court magistrats Pharmaceutical Society of Zambia 
1999 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Implementation of Constitution Ministry of Finance, Plannning and Economic Dev (UGA) 
1999 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
1999 NORAD Afrika Mosambik   Supply of equipment & stationery  The Supreme Court (MOZ) 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Civic education National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Workstudy to assist Adm of Parliam Parliament of Zimbabwe 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Capacitybuilding in Parliament  Public Affairs & Parliament Support 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Technical support tot the Constituti UNDP 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Provision of Legal Aid Law Association of Zambia 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Planning Magistrates Courts The Judiciary (ZAM) 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Institutional support The Judiciary (ZAM) 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Evaluation Den Norske Advokatforening 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zambia   JUDICIARY Pre-planning AAI 
2000 NORAD Afrika Zambia   providing free legal aid Legal Resource Foundation 
2000 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Implementation of Constitution Ministry of Finance, Plannning and Economic Dev (UGA) 
2000 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
2000 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Conference of Women Judges  Honourable Lady Justice Bossa 
2000 NORAD Afrika Sør-Afrika   Gun Free South Africa, Advocacy  Kirkens Noedhjelp 
2000 NORAD Afrika Malawi   Women & Law in Southern Africa Women & Law in Southern Afr (WLSA) 
2000 NORAD Afrika Malawi   Ombudsman Office of Ombudsman 
2000 NORAD Afrika Mosambik   Supply of equipment & stationery  The Supreme Court (MOZ) 
2000 NORAD Afrika Mosambik   Establish Legal and Judical Centre UNDP 
2000 NORAD Af rika Etiopia   Department of Justice Agderforskning 
2000 NORAD Afrika Etiopia   EWLA. Donor's Consortium Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association 
2000 Utenriksdep. Afrika Sudan   Workshop Intern Criminal Court Misc. 
2001 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Constitutional Process National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) 
2001 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Civic education National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) 
2001 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   
AWEPA Capacitybuilding in 
Parliament  European Parliamentarians for S Afr 
2001 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Capacitybuilding in Parliament  Public Affairs & Parliament Support 
2001 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Planning Magistrates Courts The Judiciary (ZAM) 
2001 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Institutional support The Judiciary (ZAM) 
2001 NORAD Afrika Zambia   providing free legal aid Legal Resource Foundation 
2001 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
2001 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Review Justice Law Ergodialog 
2001 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Implem. of Constitution-Addendum Ministry of Finance, Plannning and Economic Dev (UGA) 
2001 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Dev. of St rategic Plan Ministry of Finance, Plannning and Economic Dev (UGA) 
2001 NORAD Afrika Malawi   Women & Law in Southern Africa Women & Law in Southern Afr (WLSA) 
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2001 NORAD Afrika Malawi   Ombudsman Office of Ombudsman 
2001 NORAD Afrika Mosambik   Establish Legal and Judical Centre UNDP 
2001 Utenriksdep. Afrika Zimbabwe   Financing of UNDP expert UNDP 
2001 Utenriksdep. Afrika Etiopia   Analysis of Derg trials Universitetet i Oslo 
2002 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Constitutional Process National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) 
2002 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Capacitybuilding in Parliament  Public Affairs & Parliament Support 
2002 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Magistrates Courts Complex  The Judiciary (ZAM) 
2002 NORAD Afrika Zambia   providing free legal aid Legal Resource Foundation 
2002 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
2002 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Internat.Law Inst. (ILI) 2002-2004 International Law Institute-ILI  
2002 NORAD Afrika Tanzania   Legal Reform - Quick Start Project Ministry of Finance (TAN) 
2002 NORAD Afrika Tanzania   Women Legal Aid Centre WLAC 
2002 NORAD Afrika Rwanda   Support to justice and human rights Norsk folkehjelp 
2002 NORAD Afrika Nigeria   Democracy Building Nigeria IDEA 
2002 NORAD Afrika Malawi   Ombudman Bridge Ph 1 to 2 Office of Ombudsman 
2002 NORAD Afrika Malawi   Women & Law in Southern Africa Women & Law in Southern Afr (WLSA) 
2002 NORAD Afrika Malawi   Ombudsman Office of Ombudsman 
2002 NORAD Afrika Mosambik   Establish Legal and Judical Centre UNDP 
2002 NORAD Afrika Mosambik   Participation in UN neg on corruptio Min of Foreign Affairs and Dev Coop (MOZ) 
2002 NORAD Afrika Mosambik   Participation in UN neg on corruptio Utenriksdep 
2002 NORAD Afrika Etiopia   Basic Education Redd Barna 
2002 NORAD Afrika Etiopia   Juvenile Justice Reform Redd Barna 
2002 NORAD Afrika Etiopia   Capacity Building Training Prison Fellowship Ethiopia (PFE) 
2002 Utenriksdep. Afrika Sør-Afrika   Envirolaw 2002 AMB Pretoria 
2003 NORAD Af rika Zimbabwe   Addendum PAPST Public Affairs & Parliament Support 
2003 NORAD Afrika Zimbabwe   Capacitybuilding in Parliament  Public Affairs & Parliament Support 
2003 NORAD Afrika Zambia   EQUIPMENT MAG COURT The Judiciary (ZAM) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Zambia   Magistrates Courts Complex  The Judiciary (ZAM) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Commercial Justice Ministry of Finance, Plannning and Economic Dev (UGA) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
2003 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Study, Legal Framework, Registers Misc Consultants 
2003 NORAD Afrika Uganda   Internat.Law Inst. (ILI) 2002-2004 International Law Institute-ILI  
2003 NORAD Afrika Uganda   IDP return facilitation - Uganda Det norske flyktningeraad 
2003 NORAD Afrika Tanzania   de soto, Planning phase Ministry of Finance (TAN) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Tanzania   Seminar de Soto Ministry of Finance (TAN) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Tanzania   Workshop de Soto Ministry of Finance (TAN) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Tanzania   EALA/AWEPA European Parliamentarians for S Afr 
2003 NORAD Afrika Tanzania   Legal Reform - Quick Start Project Ministry of Finance (TAN) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Tanzania   Women Legal Aid Centre WLAC 
2003 NORAD Afrika Rwanda   Support to justice and human rights Norsk folkehjelp 
2003 NORAD Afrika Afrika Uspesifisert Work to Com bat Violence - New Initia Kirkens Noedhjelp 
2003 NORAD Afrika Malawi   (S)Women & Law in Southern Africa Women & Law in Southern Afr (WLSA) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Malawi   (S)Ombudman Ph 2 Office of Ombudsman 
2003 NORAD Afrika Mosambik   Participation Paris Declarationagain Anti Corruption Unit 
2003 NORAD Afrika Mosambik   Participation in UN neg on Anti Corr Min of Foreign Affairs and Dev Coop (MOZ) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Etiopia   Juvenile Justice Reform Redd Barna 
2003 NORAD Afrika Etiopia   Faculty of Law Consultant  David Mcquiod 
2003 NORAD Afrika Etiopia   Summer Judical Training Mekelle University (ETH) 
2003 NORAD Afrika Etiopia   Travel Support AAAIL Sinidu Alemu 
2003 Utenriksdep. Afrika Rwanda   Rwanda Law reform commission Utenriksdep 
2003 Utenriksdep. Afrika Kenya   Legar sector reform in Kenya World bank (IBRD) 
       
1999 NORAD Asia Pakistan   AGHS Women and children's rights AGHS Legal Aid Cell 
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1999 NORAD Asia Nepal   Women's Legal Service/SUSS Serv for Unprivileged Sect of Soci (SUSS) 
1999 NORAD Asia Nepal   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
1999 NORAD Asia Sri Lanka   9thAnticorruption Conference in Durb Sarath Amunugama foundation 
1999 NORAD Asia Sri Lanka   
Law Library,Vavuniya-purchase of 
Boo Bar Association Vavuniya 
1999 NORAD Asia Sri Lanka   Children's Juridical Desk Redd Barna 
2000 NORAD Asia Pakistan   AGHS Women and children's rights AGHS Legal Aid Cell 
2000 NORAD Asia Nepal   Women's Legal Service/ SUSS Serv for Unprivileged Sect of Soci (SUSS) 
2000 NORAD Asia Nepal   Women's Legal Service/SUSS Serv for Unprivileged Sect of Soci (SUSS) 
2000 NORAD Asia Nepal   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
2000 NORAD Asia Sri Lanka   Children's Juridical Desk Redd Barna 
2000 NORAD Asia Kambodsja   Judicial Counselling UNDP 
2000 NORAD Asia Bangladesh   Financial Management Review PRIP TRUST 
2000 Utenriksdep. Asia Øst-Timor   Legal Adviser to UN Transitional Adm Det norske flyktningeraad 
2000 Utenriksdep. Asia Kina   Urgent Appeals and Legal Consultatio Asian Human Rights Commission 
2001 NORAD Asia Pakistan   AGHS Women and children's rights AGHS Legal Aid Cell 
2001 NORAD Asia Nepal   Women's Legal Service/SUSS Serv for Unprivileged Sect of Soci (SUSS) 
2001 NORAD Asia Nepal   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
2001 NORAD Asia Sri Lanka   Children's Juridical Desk Redd Barna 
2001 NORAD Asia Kambodsja   Judicial Counselling UNDP 
2001 NORAD Asia Kambodsja   Law Enforcement Sex Abuse 6713 Redd Barna 
2001 Utenriksdep. Asia Asia Uspesifisert ICRC appeal- Bankok reg prog Norges Roede Kors 
2001 Utenriksdep. Asia Mongolia   Establish of  lawyer union Den Norske Advokatforening 
2001 Utenriksdep. Asia Sri Lanka   Forum on women, law and Dev  AMB Colombo 
2001 Utenriksdep. Asia Georgia   Return of unregistered weapons OSCE 
2001 Utenriksdep. Asia Burma   Visiting prison in Burma Norges Roede Kors 
2002 NORAD Asia Vietnam   Artikler Stein Tonneson 
2002 NORAD Asia Pakistan   AGHS Women and children's rights AGHS Legal Aid Cell 
2002 NORAD Asia Pakistan   AGHS Women and children's rights AGHS Legal Aid Cell 
2002 NORAD Asia Nepal   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
2002 NORAD Asia Nepal   UN Corruption Con,Travel Grant  CIAA 
2002 NORAD Asia Sri Lanka   Children's Desk Redd Barna 
2002 NORAD Asia Bangladesh   Village Court MLAA 
2002 Utenriksdep. Asia Øst-Timor   Ad Hoc Tribunal, East-Timor Misc Consultants 
2002 Utenriksdep. Asia Øst-Timor   Commission for Reception, Truth and CFA, COMM. FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECO 
2002 Utenriksdep. Asia Øst-Timor   Serious Crimes Unit - capasity build UNDP 
2002 Utenriksdep. Asia Asia Uspesifisert Corruption in  Central Asia Wilton Park Executive Agency  
2002 Utenriksdep. Asia Nepal   Emergency assistance, protection Norges Roede Kors 
2002 Utenriksdep. Asia Kirgisistan   Police assistance Progme OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR 
2002 Utenriksdep. Asia Aserbajdsjan   HR education Det norske flyktningeraad 
2003 NORAD Asia Øst-Timor   Parlamentarians visit Government. of East Timor 
2003 NORAD Asia Øst-Timor   Enhancing the justice system UNDP 
2003 NORAD Asia Vietnam   Legal assistance in connection with Wikborg & Rein 
2003 NORAD Asia Filippinene   Determination of sea liaes  Dep of Environmental and Natural Resources (PHI) 
2003 NORAD Asia Pakistan   AGHS Women and children's rights AGHS Legal Aid Cell 
2003 NORAD Asia Nepal   Women's Legal Service/SUSS Serv for Unprivileged Sect of Soci (SUSS) 
2003 NORAD Asia Nepal   Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening 
2003 NORAD Asia Nepal   UN Corr Conv. 2003, Travel grant  CIAA 
2003 NORAD Asia Nepal   UN Corr Conv. 2003, Travel grant  CIAA 
2003 NORAD Asia Nepal   Child Friendly Legal requirement  Redd Barna 
2003 NORAD Asia Sri Lanka   Children's Desk Redd Barna 
2003 NORAD Asia Bangladesh   Legal Aid and Advocasy  BLAST BGD Legal Aid and Service Trust 
2003 NORAD Asia Bangladesh   Village Court MLAA 
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2003 Utenriksdep. Asia 
Sør Asia 
Uspesifiser Interpol - off ices in Armenia, Georg OIPC - INTERPOL 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Asia Uspesifisert Afghan Border Police in Kabul BUNDESANSTALT TECHNISCHES HILFSWERK (THW 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Asia Uspesifisert ODIHR Legalislation Alert and Assist OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Asia Uspesifisert 
OCEEA/OSCE-Booklet on Combating 
Corr OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Kirgisistan   OSCE Police Assistance Programme OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Georgia   Information, counselling, legal aid Det norske flyktningeraad 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Afghanistan   Law and Order TF Afghanistan UNDP 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Afghanistan   Voter Registration UNDP 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Afghanistan   The Constitution-Making process UNDP 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Afghanistan   
Human Rights Defenders - Int. 
Human Misc. 
2003 Utenriksdep. Asia Afghanistan   Legal Reform Project Harvard University  
      
1999 NORAD Europa Makedonia(Fyrom) Register for bygninger og annen fast ZPP Makedonia 
1999 NORAD Europa Makedonia(Fyrom) Nasjonale Juridiske Registre ZPP Makedonia 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Free legal aid Det norske flyktningeraad 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Institute for Strengthening Democrac  Universitetet i Bergen 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Albanian prosecution system AMB Tirana 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Seminar prosecutors AMB Tirana 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Course in conversation technique for Albanian Police 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Secondment lawyer UD/OSSE-enheten 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   MAPE seminar Justisdep 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Secondment  Justisdep 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Micellanous AMB Tirana 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Public Prosecutor office OSCE Secretariat presence in Alba 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Exams albanian judges OSCE Secretariat presence in Alba 
1999 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Heads of Conflict Council to Albania Justisdep 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert Stability Pact - police meeting.  AMB Sarejevo 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa Kroatia   OSCE Croatia & East Slavonia Justisdep 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa Kroatia   Civil Rights Project Det norske flyktningeraad 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi Civil rights projects Krajlevo Det norske flyktningeraad 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi Civil Rights Project Det norske flyktningeraad 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi Civil Rights Project Det norske flyktningeraad 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
UN Interim Police Task Force 
(UNIPTF Justisdep 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Civil Rights Project Det norske flyktningeraad 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Free legal aid to Bosnian refugees  Stiftelsen Bosnisk Post AS 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Secondment to State Attorney's Offic OSCE Secretariat presence in Alba 
2000 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Albanian prosecution system AMB Tirana 
2001 NORAD Europa Makedonia(Fyrom) Juridiske Reg Foretak Fase III Norway Registers Development A/S (NRD) 
2001 NORAD Europa Makedonia(Fyrom) BL. Kr. Verdipapirsentral MAK Norway Registers Development A/S (NRD) 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert Small arms light weapons BICC Bonn Int Ctr for Conversion 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert SP WT III Wepon distruction AMB Tirana 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert Politcecooperation training SEE Norwegian Foreign Policy Inst (NUPI) 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert SP - chiefpolicemeetings  Holm, Tor Tanke 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa Kroatia   Legal Ass project in Dalmatia Dalmatian Solidarity Comitee 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi Quick Build Prison KOS UN Interim Adm in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi Civil Rights Project Det norske flyktningeraad 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina OHR - Anti Fraud AFD NORWEGIAN 
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2001 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Impr efficiency of the courts IJC 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Sec-paymaster Haver til MAPE Det norske flyktningeraad 
2001 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   General Prosecutors office-sec Gabrielsen, Randi Lucie 
2002 NORAD Europa Albania   Solidaritetsprosjekt Forum for konfliktrådsledere 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Tidl.Jugoslavia 
Uspe Police College Refurbishment Project International Management Group (IMG) 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Tidl.Jugoslavia 
Uspe Dep. of justice - missing persons  UN Interim Adm in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Tidl.Jugoslavia 
Uspe Police Service Instit. capacity buil UNDP 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Tidl.Jugoslavia 
Uspe School for Security Sector Refo G17 Institute 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Tidl.Jugoslavia 
Uspe Pilotproject reform proc police Politidirektoratet  
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Tidl.Jugoslavia 
Uspe Civil Rights Proj free legal assis Det norske flyktningeraad 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspes ifisert Sofia-conferance SEE Resource Ctr Foundation 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert Media legislation in SEE Europaraadet  
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert Workshop reg policetraining Holm, Tor Tanke 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert Customs Border control World Bank 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa Moldova   Cooperation border and customs Forsvarsdep Forsvarets overkommando 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa Makedonia(Fyrom) Lgal aid for IDPsand Refuge Det norske flyktningeraad 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa Kroatia   Community reinforcement  Dalmatian Solidarity Comitee 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Secondment/salary  UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Salary Rakel Surlien UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Rakel Surlien secondment  UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Court Adm and Management Reform UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   Judicial project - Aron Pipafor AMB Tirana 
2002 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   General Prosecutors office Gabrielsen, Randi Lucie 
2003 NORAD Europa Albania   Solidaritetsprosjekt Forum for konfliktrådsledere 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Tidl.Jugoslavia 
Uspe Kosovo High Level Initiative European Centre for Minority Issues  
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Tidl.Jugoslavia 
Uspe UNMIK- Prolongation Office on Missin Det norske flyktningeraad 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert IWPR-Balkan Investigate reporting an Institute of War and Peace Reporting 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert From crisis to Integration? Energy Saving Int (ENSI) 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert ICG Balkans Program International Crisis Group 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert ICMP-contribution 2003 Norwegian Helsinki Committee 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert 
AEPC Police Ethics & Smuggling 
stole LSOP/IPO 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert 
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights -
Tra Norsk folkehjelp 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert Trafficking in light weapons and sma LSOP/IPO 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Europa 
Uspesifisert Community Respones to Corruption Senter for konfl.håndt. og fredsbygging 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa Makedonia(Fyrom) Capacity building on Counter traffic  Int Org for Migration (IOM) 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa Makedonia(Fyrom) Counter trafficking, prenevntion ass Int Org for Migration (IOM) 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa Kroatia   
HCNM JCM Legal Aid H 12 2003 
East-Sl OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa Kroatia   
HCNM Knin Legal Aid  H 11 2003 
Dalma OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa Kroatia   Constitutional Court - public awarem OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi Judicial system. Public awarness cam MINISTRY OF INT. ECONOMIC RELATIONS REP 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi Police College Refurbishment - addit International Management Group (IMG) 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi POD Organised crime seminar Politidirektoratet  
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi 
Organised crime capacity 
development  OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina SIPA - Equipment for the Protection PARLIAMENT. ASSEMBLY OF BOSNIA AND HERZ. 
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2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Secondment IJC - S.M. Urke IJC NORWEGIAN SECONDEE FUND 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Prolongation secondment IJC IJC NORWEGIAN SECONDEE FUND 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina IJC - Judicial Reform Process BHZ Office of the High Representative 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina EUPM - financial contribution THIRD STATE EUPM CONTRIBUTIONS 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Impr efficiency of the courts IJC 
2003 Utenriksdep. Europa Albania   The Albanian Foundation CRRD FOUND. FOR CONFLICT RESOL.  AND RECONS.O 
2000 NORAD 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Participation in Beijing + 5 FOKUS 
2000 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert International Criminal Court Asian Forum for Human Rights 
2000 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert 
Globalt uspesifisertbal Education 
Campaign Coalition for an Int Criminal Court 
2000 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Int'L Criminal Court LDCs UN Secretariat  
2001 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Com build  in Women´s Law Norges Forskningsråd 
2001 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert UN conf on small arms - IANSA International Alert 
2002 NORAD 
Globalt 
uspes ifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert ISFL World Conference UiO, Institutt for privatrett 
2002 NORAD 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Frame agreement CMI 2002 Chr Michelsen Institute (CMI) 
2002 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Translator Services Judge Garzons vi Hanne Mørk 
2002 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesif isert Field based research Medecins Sans Frontieres  
2002 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Competence build. in Women´s Law Norges Forskningsråd 
2002 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert 
Human security network Policy, 
Advoc  Harvard University  
2002 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert CSR in zones of conflicts Int Peace Research Inst PRIO 
2003 NORAD 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Sponsor attendance IAP conference IAP 
2003 NORAD 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Forundersøkelse ILD/NRD Norway Registers Development A/S (NRD) 
2003 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Against corruption UN Centre for Int Crime Prevention 
2003 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Com build  in Women´s Law Norges Forskningsråd 
2003 Utenriksdep. 
Globalt 
uspesifisert 
Globalt 
uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Cooperation between Courts CONSEIL DE L EUROPE 
       
1999 NORAD Latin-Amerika El Salvador   Strength. Rule of Law III  FESPAD 
1999 NORAD Latin-Amerika El Salvador   Strength. Rule of Law II FESPAD 
1999 NORAD Latin-Amerika Honduras   Legal aid office 3901 Redd Barna 
1999 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Agr. UNDP Justisreform I UNDP 
1999 NORAD Latin-Amerika Ecuador   Constitutional indigenous rights(157 Norsk folkehjelp 
1999 NORAD Latin-Amerika Dominikanske Rep Land registration project Com Presidencial para la Reforma y Mod 
2000 NORAD Latin-Amerika El Salvador   Strength. Rule of Law III  FESPAD 
2000 NORAD Latin-Amerika Honduras   Legal aid office 3901 Redd Barna 
2000 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice Reform UNDP 
2000 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Agr. UNDP Justisreform I UNDP 
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2000 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice OJ 2000 - 2004 UNDP 
2000 NORAD Latin-Amerika Ecuador   Constitutional indigenous rights(157 Norsk folkehjelp 
2001 NORAD Latin-Amerika El Salvador   Strength. Rule of  Law III  FESPAD 
2001 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice Reform UNDP 
2001 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice IDPP 2002 - 2004 UNDP 
2001 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice OJ 2000 - 2004 UNDP 
2001 NORAD Latin-Amerika Ecuador   Sudan Relief and Rehab Assoc  Norsk folkehjelp 
2001 NORAD Latin-Amerika Ecuador   Constitutional indigenous rights(157 Norsk folkehjelp 
2001 Utenriksdep. Latin-Amerika Haiti   Strengt - rule of law prog UN UNDP 
2002 NORAD Latin-Amerika El Salvador   Rule of Law IV 2002 - 2003 FESPAD 
2002 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice Reform UNDP 
2002 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice PNC 2002 UNDP 
2002 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice IDPP 2002 - 2004 UNDP 
2002 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice OJ 2000 - 2004 UNDP 
2002 NORAD Latin-Amerika Ecuador   Constitutional indigenous rights(157 Norsk folkehjelp 
2002 Utenriksdep. Latin-Amerika Colombia   Legal assistance ALDHU, Filanbanco ORANS,ELSEN AND LUPERT LLP ATTORNEYS 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika El Salvador   Rule of Law IV 2002 - 2003 FESPAD 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Nicaragua   
SEMINAR ON JUDICIARY SYSTEM 
REFORM Misc Consultants 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Nicaragua   new Criminal Code Dr. Sergio Cuarezma 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice Reform UNDP 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   
Consultancy Marthe Heggstad 
Hotvedt  Misc Consultants 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Consultancy Kristin Svendsen Misc Consultants 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice IDPP 2002 - 2004 UNDP 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Justice OJ 2000 - 2004 UNDP 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Guatemala   Penal justice and gender FOKUS 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Ecuador   Constitutional indigenous rights(157 Norsk folkehjelp 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Colombia   The Colombian Law Commission Det norske flyktningeraad 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika Colombia   Capacity building local NGOs - Colom Det norske flyktningeraad 
2003 NORAD Latin-Amerika 
Mellom-Amerika 
Uspes  
Observatory of the Democracy in 
Cent  Flacso 
      
1999 NORAD Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. Jerusalem Legal Aid Center Kvekerhjelpen 
1999 Utenriksdep. Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. Support negotiations  Pal Negotiation Affairs Department (NAD) 
2000 NORAD Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. Forens ic Laboratorium Oslo Krim 
2000 Utenriksdep. Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. Support negotiations  Pal Negotiation Affairs Department (NAD) 
2000 Utenriksdep. Midtøsten Jordan   Legal Studies Refugees  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JOR) 
2001 NORAD Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. Forensic Lab., prep. training progr. Min of Planning and Int Coop (MOPIC) (PAL) 
2001 Utenriksdep. Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. Security of legislative office Abdel Karim Abu Taha 
2002 NORAD Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. Ombudsmann PICCR (PAL) 
2003 NORAD Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. Ombudsmann PICCR (PAL) 
2003 Utenriksdep. Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. HR: Support to MUSAWA The Representative Office of Norway  
2003 Utenriksdep. Midtøsten 
Det Palestinske 
Omr. Juridical Assistance Pal HR monitoring group 
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Appendix 4: Norwegian Aid to the Justice Sector: Partners and Channels 
 
Norwegian agency involved Type of channel Name of partner 
State Research  NGO 
UN (e.g. Secretariat, UNDP, 
UNHCR) 
MFA, MJP, NPD, Norad 
Emb in Angola,  Guatemala, 
Mozambique 
NCHR NCA 
OSCE (e.g. Secretariat, Office for 
Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights) 
MFA, MJP, NPD NCHR  
EU (e.g. European Commission) MFA, MJP, NPD NCHR  
Inter-governmental 
World Bank (International Bank 
for Reconstruction and 
Development) 
MFA   
Ministry of Justice, other 
ministries  
MFA 
Emb in Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
Uganda 
NCHR NCA, NPA 
Judiciary Emb in Zambia, 
Mozambique 
 RB 
Police MFA, MJP, NPD  NCA, NPA, RB 
Governmental 
Penal institutions MJP  NCA, NPA 
Various, e.g. Asian Forum for 
Human Rights, Asian Human 
Rights Commission, Institute of 
War and Peace Reporting, 
International Alert, International 
Crisis Group, International Police 
Association, Médécins sans 
frontières … 
MFA   
Trócaire Emb in Angola   
Amnesty International, local 
chapters 
  AIN 
International Committee of the 
Red Cross 
  NRX 
The Lutheran World Federation   NCA 
Inter-
national 
Save the Children, national 
chapters 
  RB 
NGOs 
 
MFA, Norad 
Emb in Angola, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique 
NUPI, 
NCHR 
DNA, JURK, NCA, NPA, NRC, RB
Non-
govern-
mental 
National 
or local 
Universities and research 
institutes 
Norad 
Emb in Ethiopia 
NUPI, 
NCHR, 
IWL 
JURK, NPA, RB 
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Appendix 5: Norwegian Aid to Legal and Judicial Development, 1999-2003 
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Appendix 6: The Geography of Norwegian Aid to the Justice Sector 
 
Table a. The Geography of Norwegian Aid to the Justice Sector: Africa 
 
Norwegian agency involved Country or area 
State Research NGO 
Angola Emb in Angola  NPA 
Burundi   NRC 
DRC   NRC 
Ethiopia Norad, Emb in Ethiopia NCHR RB 
Kenya MFA   
Malawi Norad  NCA 
Mauritania   NCA 
Morocco   AIN 
Mozambique Norad, Emb in Mozambique  RB 
Rwanda Norad  NPA, NCA 
SADC  NUPI  
South Africa MFA, Norad, Emb in SA NCHR AIN, NCA 
Tanzania Norad  JURK 
Uganda Norad, Emb in Uganda  DNA, NRC 
Zambia Emb in Zambia  DNA 
Zimbabwe Norad IWL RB 
 
 
Table b. The Geography of Norwegian Aid to the Justice Sector: Asia 
 
Norwegian agency involved Country or area 
State Research NGO 
Afghanistan MFA  NRC 
Azerbaijan MFA  NRC 
Bangladesh Norad   
Burma MFA  NRX 
Cambodia Norad  RB 
Caucasus MFA, NPD   
China MFA, NPD NCHR  
East Timor MFA, Norad  NRC 
Georgia MFA  NRC 
India   AIN 
Indonesia  NCHR  
Kirgisistan MFA   
Laos   RB 
Mongolia MFA  DNA, RB 
Nepal MFA, Norad  DNA, NRX, RB 
Pakistan Norad IWL NRC 
Philippines Norad   
Sri Lanka MFA, Norad  RB 
Thailand   AIN, RB 
Ukraine MJP   
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Table c. The Geography of Norwegian Aid to the Justice Sector: Europe 
 
Norwegian agency involved Country or area 
State Research NGO 
Albania MFA, Norad  NRC 
Bosnia and Herzegovina MFA, NPD NUPI, NCHR NCA, NRC, RB 
Bulgaria MFA, MJP, NPD   
Croatia MFA  NPA, NRC 
Cyprus MFA, MJP, NPD   
Czech Republic MFA, MJP, NPD   
Estonia MFA, MJP, NPD   
Hungary MFA, MJP, NPD   
Kosovo  NUPI NRC 
Latvia MFA, MJP, NPD   
Lithuania MFA, MJP, NPD  JURK 
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav 
Rep. of (FYROM) 
MFA, Norad  NRC 
Malta MFA, MJP, NPD   
Poland MFA, MJP, NPD  AIN 
Romania MFA, MJP, NPD   
Serbia and Montenegro (or: 
Federal Rep. of Yugoslavia) 
MFA, NPD NUPI NPA, NRC, RB 
Slovakia MFA, MJP, NPD   
Slovenia MFA, MJP, NPD   
Turkey MFA, MJP, NPD   
 
 
Table d. The Geography of Norwegian Aid to the Justice Sector: Latin America 
 
Norwegian agency involved Country or area 
State Research NGO 
Brazil   NCA 
Colombia Norad  NRC 
Ecuador Norad  NPA 
El Salvador Norad   
Guatemala Norad, Emb in Guatemala   JURK, RB 
Haiti MFA   
Honduras Norad  RB 
Mexico   AIN 
Nicaragua   RB 
 
 
Table e. The Geography of Norwegian Aid to the Justice Sector: The Middle East 
 
Norwegian agency involved Country or area 
State Research NGO 
Palestine MFA, Norad  NRX 
Jordan MFA   
 
 
  89 
Appendix 7: Norwegian Aid to the Justice Sector: Distribution across Types 
 
Note: The information of the table is not exhaustive, but rather indicative of main trends.  
 
Norwegian agency involved Part of 
justice sector  
If courts: type of 
judicial reform 
supported 
Name or type of project 
State Research NGO 
Education/training of police, including on human rights MFA, NPD NUPI, NCHR NCA, NPA, NRX, 
RB 
Reconstruction and/or reform of police forces, including reduction of staff, 
establishment of internal audits and border police 
MFA, NPD   
Material assistance to the police MFA, NPD   
Police  
Improve protection of children and youth brought to the police Norad  RB 
Visits to prisoners of war MFA  NRX 
Human rights training of prison staff MFA  AIN, NRX 
Ensure respect of female prisoners’ rights Norad  JURK 
Building of prisons Norad  NPA 
Material support to prisons MFA, MJP  NCA, NRX 
Skills development and training of prisoners MFA, MJP  NCA 
Prisons 
Community reintegration of former prisoners   NCA 
Reform of customary law, including property laws   JURK 
Development of human rights legislation   NCA 
Make states ratify human rights conventions and integrate them in national 
legislation 
MFA  NRX, RB 
Reform of laws on prison conditions MFA  NRX 
Development and implementation of laws on religious freedom   NCA 
Law reform 
Develop anti-corruption laws, such as code of conduct for public servants 
and laws on conflict of interest, auditing, and procurement 
Norad, Emb in 
Mozambique 
  
Building of courts Norad, Emb in 
Zambia 
 NPA 
Material assistance to courts Norad, Emb in 
Zambia 
 NPA 
Courts 
Courts reform 
Establishment of Special Prosecutors’ Office MFA NCHR  
  90 
 Support to local courts MFA  NPA, NCA 
Legal community Project and material support to national bar associations Norad  DNA 
Education of judges and lawyers Norad, Emb in 
Zambia, Ethiopia 
IWL  
(Re-)training of judges and prosecutors MFA NCHR NPA 
Training of judges, including on human rights MJP, Norad, 
Emb in Ethiopia 
NCHR AIN, NPA, RB 
Human rights training of university lecturers and civil servants MFA NCHR, IWL  
Legal 
education/training 
Training of judiciary staff Emb in Angola  NPA 
Strengthening contact between courts and civil society Emb in Angola   
Legal aid  MFA, Norad, 
Emb in Angola, 
Ethiopia , South 
Africa 
NCHR DNA, JURK, 
NPA, NRC, RB 
Legal awareness  Norad, Emb in 
Ethiopia 
 DNA 
Human rights training, information, monitoring MFA, Norad, 
Emb in Angola, 
Ethiopia , South 
Africa 
NCHR AIN, JURK, 
NCA, NPA 
Access to justice 
Make courts more friendly to victims of sexual abuse   RB 
Foster cooperation between national courts  MFA   
NORDEM: Roster of experts on electoral legislation, investigation of 
human rights violations, and legal reform 
MFA NCHR  
 
Cross-cutting, courts  
General judicial reform Norad, Emb in 
Uganda, Tanzania 
  
“Styrkebrønnen”: Roster of judges, prosecutors, police lawyers, and prison 
experts 
MJP   
Security sector reform  NUPI  
Promotion of women’s rights in justice sector   JURK 
Cross-cutting, justice sector  
Revision/overhaul of national justice sector Norad, Emb in 
Angola, Uganda 
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Appendix 8: Norwegian Aid to Legal and Judicial Development, 1999-2003 
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Appendix 9: Top Ten Partners 
 
Norad and MFA Justice Sector Aid, 1999-2003: Top Ten Partners  
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Norwegian Justice Sector Aid, 1999-2003: Details on the Top Ten Partners  
 
Partner Country Name of project Norw. aid 
UNDP Afghanistan Law and Order TF Afghanistan 10 000 
    The Constitution-Making process 3 000 
    Voter Registration 5 600 
  Afghanistan Total 18 600 
  Guatemala Agr. UNDP Justisreform I 11 427 
    Justice IDPP 2002 - 2004 7 500 
    Justice OJ 2000 - 2004 12 320 
    Justice PNC 2002 1 500 
    Justice Reform 14 080 
  Guatemala Total   46 827 
  Haiti Strengt- rule of law prog UN 1 000 
  Haiti Total   1 000 
  Kambodsja Judicial Counselling 4 000 
  Kambodsja Total   4 000 
  Mosambik Establish Legal and Judical Centre 14 500 
  Mosambik Total   14 500 
  Tidl.Jugoslavia Uspe Police Service Instit. capacity buil 1 000 
  Tidl.Jugoslavia Uspe Total 1 000 
  Zimbabwe Agreement 1 521 
    Financing of UNDP expert 108 
    Technical support tot the Constituti 936 
  93 
  Zimbabwe Total   2 565 
  Øst-Timor Enhancing the justice system 2 850 
    Serious Crimes Unit - capasity build 606 
  Øst-Timor Total   3 456 
UNDP Total     91 948 
Det norske flyktningeraad Albania Sec-paymaster Haver til MAPE 352 
  Albania Total   352 
  Aserbajdsjan HR education 762 
  Aserbajdsjan Total 762 
  Bosnia-Herzegovina Civil Rights Project 2 285 
    Free legal aid 2 070 
  Bosnia-Herzegovina Total 4 354 
  Colombia Capacity building local NGOs - Colom 2 095 
    The Colombian Law Commission 996 
  Colombia Total   3 091 
  Fed Rep Of Yugoslavi Civil Rights Project 13 349 
    Civil rights projects Krajlevo 1 031 
  Fed Rep Of Yugoslavi Total 14 380 
  Georgia Information, counselling, legal aid 2 085 
  Georgia Total   2 085 
  Kroatia Civil Rights Project 5 000 
  Kroatia Total   5 000 
  Makedonia(Fyrom) Lgal aid for IDPsand Refuge 181 
  Makedonia(Fyrom) Total 181 
  Tidl.Jugoslavia Uspe Civil Rights Proj free legal assis  2 944 
    UNMIK- Prolongation Office on Missin 448 
  Tidl.Jugoslavia Uspe Total 3 392 
  Uganda IDP return facilitation - Uganda 2 500 
  Uganda Total   2 500 
  Øst-Timor Legal Adviser to UN Transitional Adm 146 
  Øst-Timor Total   146 
Det norske flyktningeraad Total 36 243 
The Judiciary (ZAM) Zambia EQUIPMENT MAG COURT 4 000 
    Institutional support 5 000 
    Magistrates Courts Complex 19 000 
    Planning Magistrates Courts  2 148 
  Zambia Total   30 148 
The Judiciary (ZAM) Total   30 148 
Justisdep Albania Heads of Conflict Council to Albania 800 
    MAPE seminar 236 
    Secondment 0 
  Albania Total   1 036 
  Bosnia-Herzegovina UN Interim Police Task Force (UNIPTF 13 038 
  Bosnia-Herzegovina Total 13 038 
  Kroatia OSCE Croatia & East Slavonia 6 577 
  Kroatia Total   6 577 
Justisdep Total   20 651 
Den Norske Advokatforening Mongolia Establish of  lawyer union 600 
  Mongolia Total   600 
  Nepal Legal Aid Project 4 025 
  Nepal Total   4 025 
  Uganda Legal Aid Project 9 567 
  Uganda Total   9 567 
  94 
  Zambia Evaluation 32 
  Zambia Total   32 
Den Norske Advokatforening Total 14 225 
ZPP Makedonia Makedonia(Fyrom) Nasjonale Juridiske Registre 6 597 
    Register for bygninger og annen fast 7 035 
  Makedonia(Fyrom) Total 13 633 
ZPP Makedonia Total   13 633 
Norway Registers Development A/S 
(NRD) 
Globalt uspesifisertbalt 
Uspesifisert Forundersøkelse ILD/NRD 435 
  Globalt uspesifisertbalt Uspesifisert Total 435 
  Makedonia(Fyrom) BL. Kr. Verdipapirsentral MAK 10 832 
    Juridiske Reg Foretak Fase III 107 
  Makedonia(Fyrom) Total 10 939 
Norway Registers Development A/S (NRD) Total 11 374 
OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR Asia Uspesifisert 
OCEEA/OSCE-Booklet on Combating 
Corr 157 
    ODIHR Legalislation Alert and Assist 242 
  Asia Uspesifisert Total 399 
  Fed Rep Of Yugoslavi Organised crime capacity development 1 200 
  Fed Rep Of Yugoslavi Total 1 200 
  Kirgisistan OSCE Police Assistance Programme 7 235 
    Police assistance Progme 1 239 
  Kirgisistan Total   8 474 
  Kroatia Constitutional Court - public awarem 234 
    HCNM JCM Legal Aid H 12 2003 East-Sl 325 
    HCNM Knin Legal Aid  H 11 2003 Dalma 300 
  Kroatia Total   859 
OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR Total 10 932 
Norsk folkehjelp Ecuador Constitutional indigenous rights(157 2 297 
    Sudan Relief and Rehab Assoc  566 
  Ecuador Total   2 863 
  Europa Uspesifisert Belgrade Centre for Human Rights-Tra 1 500 
  Europa Uspesifisert Total 1 500 
  Rwanda Support to justice and human rights 6 496 
  Rwanda Total   6 496 
Norsk folkehjelp Total   10 859 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JOR) Jordan Legal Studies Refugees  8 100 
  Jordan Total   8 100 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JOR) Total 8 100 
 
Total, top ten partners: 248 112 NOK 
Total, all partners: 399 395 NOK 
Top ten’s share of all partners: 62.1% 
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Appendix 10: Top Ten Countries 
 
Norad and MFA Justice Sector Aid, 1999-2003: Top Ten Countries 
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Norwegian Justice Sector Aid, 1999-2003: Details on the Top Ten Countries 
 
Country Agreement partner Name of project Norw.aid 
Guatemala FOKUS Penal justice and gender 480 
  FOKUS Total   480 
  Misc Consultants Consultancy Kristin Svendsen 57 
    Consultancy Marthe Heggstad Hotvedt 24 
  Misc Consultants Total   81 
  UNDP Agr. UNDP Justisreform I 11 427 
    Justice IDPP 2002 - 2004 7 500 
    Justice OJ 2000 - 2004 12 320 
    Justice PNC 2002 1 500 
    Justice Reform 14 080 
  UNDP Total   46 827 
Guatemala Total   47 388 
Zambia Anderson & Anderson International Study tour Judiciary 31 
  Anderson & Anderson International Total   31 
  Den Norske Advokatforening Evaluation 32 
  Den Norske Advokatforening Total   32 
  Interconsult International AS review of equipment 36 
  Interconsult International AS Total   36 
  Law Association of Zambia Provision of Legal Aid 1 160 
  Law Association of Zambia Total   1 160 
  Legal Resource Foundation providing free legal aid 3 000 
  Legal Resource Foundation Total   3 000 
  Pharmaceutical Society of Zambia wfamiliarise court magistrats 84 
  Pharmaceutical Society of Zambia Total   84 
  96 
  The Judiciary (ZAM) EQUIPMENT MAG COURT 4 000 
    Institutional support 5 000 
    Magistrates Courts Complex 19 000 
    Planning Magistrates Courts  2 148 
  The Judiciary (ZAM) Total   30 148 
  AAI JUDICIARY Pre-planning 40 
  AAI Total   40 
Zambia Total   34 531 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina AFD NORWEGIAN OHR - Anti Fraud 2 000 
  AFD NORWEGIAN Total   2 000 
  Det norske flyktningeraad Civil Rights Project 2 285 
    Free legal aid 2 070 
  Det norske flyktningeraad Total   4 354 
  IJC Impr efficiency of the courts  990 
  IJC Total   990 
  IJC NORWEGIAN SECONDEE FUND Prolongation secondment IJC 367 
    Secondment IJC - S.M. Urke 951 
  IJC NORWEGIAN SECONDEE FUND Total   1 318 
  Justisdep UN Interim Police Task Force (UNIPTF 13 038 
  Justisdep Total   13 038 
  Office of the High Representative IJC - Judicial Reform Process BHZ 515 
  Office of the High Representative Total   515 
  PARLIAMENT. ASSEMBLY OF BOSNIA AND HERZ. SIPA - Equipment for the Protection 1 207 
  PARLIAMENT. ASSEMBLY OF BOSNIA AND HERZ. Total 1 207 
  Stiftelsen Bosnisk Post AS Free legal aid to Bosnian refugees 152 
  Stiftelsen Bosnisk Post AS Total   152 
  THIRD STATE EUPM CONTRIBUTIONS EUPM - financial contribution 208 
  THIRD STATE EUPM CONTRIBUTIONS Total 208 
  UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Court Adm and Management Reform 2 250 
    Rakel Surlien secondment 1 021 
    Salary Rakel Surlien 118 
    Secondment/salary 1 014 
  UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Total 4 403 
  Universitetet i Bergen Institute for Strengthening Democrac 148 
  Universitetet i Bergen Total   148 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Total   28 334 
Makedonia(Fyrom) Det norske flyktningeraad Lgal aid for IDPsand Refuge 181 
  Det norske flyktningeraad Total   181 
  Int Org for Migration (IOM) Capacity building on Counter traffic 1 232 
    Counter trafficking, prenevntion ass 649 
  Int Org for Migration (IOM) Total   1 881 
  Norway Registers Development A/S (NRD) BL. Kr. Verdipapirsentral MAK 10 832 
    Juridiske Reg Foretak Fase III 107 
  Norway Registers Development A/S (NRD) Total 10 939 
  ZPP Makedonia Nasjonale Juridiske Registre 6 597 
    Register for bygninger og annen fast 7 035 
  ZPP Makedonia Total   13 633 
Makedonia(Fyrom) Total   26 633 
Fed Rep Of 
Yugoslavi Det norske flyktningeraad Civil Rights Project 13 349 
    Civil rights projects Krajlevo 1 031 
  Det norske flyktningeraad Total   14 380 
  International Management Group (IMG) Police College Refurbishment - addit 164 
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  International Management Group (IMG) Total 164 
  MINISTRY OF INT. ECONOMIC RELATIONS REP Judicial system. Public awarness cam 1 989 
  MINISTRY OF INT. ECONOMIC RELATIONS REP Total 1 989 
  OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR Organised crime capacity development 1 200 
  OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR Total 1 200 
  Politidirektoratet POD Organised crime seminar 156 
  Politidirektoratet Total   156 
  UN Interim Adm in Kosovo (UNMIK) Quick Build Prison KOS 5 000 
  UN Interim Adm in Kosovo (UNMIK) Total   5 000 
Fed Rep Of Yugoslavi Total   22 889 
Uganda Den Norske Advokatforening Legal Aid Project 9 567 
  Den Norske Advokatforening Total   9 567 
  Det norske flyktningeraad IDP return facilitation - Uganda 2 500 
  Det norske flyktningeraad Total   2 500 
  Ergodialog Review Justice Law  172 
  Ergodialog Total   172 
  Honourable Lady Justice Bossa Conference of Women Judges 50 
  Honourable Lady Justice Bossa Total   50 
  International Law Institute-ILI Internat.Law Inst. (ILI) 2002-2004 3 500 
  International Law Institute-ILI Total   3 500 
  
Ministry of Finance, Plannning and Economic Dev 
(UGA) Commercial Justice 5 000 
    Dev. of Strategic Plan 500 
    Implem. of Constitution-Addendum 620 
    Implementation of Constitution 650 
  Ministry of Finance, Plannning and Economic Dev (UGA) Total 6 770 
  Misc Consultants Study, Legal Framework, Registers 84 
  Misc Consultants Total   84 
Uganda Total   22 643 
Afghanistan Harvard University Legal Reform Project 400 
  Harvard University Total   400 
  Misc. Human Rights Defenders - Int. Human 0 
  Misc. Total   0 
  UNDP Law and Order TF Afghanistan 10 000 
    The Constitution-Making process 3 000 
    Voter Registration 5 600 
  UNDP Total   18 600 
Afghanistan Total   19 000 
Mosambik Anti Corruption Unit Participation Paris Declarationagain 99 
  Anti Corruption Unit Total   99 
  Min of Foreign Affairs and Dev Coop (MOZ) Participation in UN neg on Anti Corr 243 
    Participation in UN neg on corruptio 32 
  Min of Foreign Affairs and Dev Coop (MOZ) Total 274 
  The Supreme Court (MOZ) Supply of equipment & stationery 251 
  The Supreme Court (MOZ) Total   251 
  UNDP Establish Legal and Judical Centre 14 500 
  UNDP Total   14 500 
  Utenriksdep Participation in UN neg on corruptio 36 
  Utenriksdep Total   36 
Mosambik Total   15 161 
Kroatia Dalmatian Solidarity Comitee Community reinforcement 500 
    Legal Ass project in Dalmatia 500 
  Dalmatian Solidarity Comitee Total   1 000 
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  Det norske flyktningeraad Civil Rights Project 5 000 
  Det norske flyktningeraad Total   5 000 
  Justisdep OSCE Croatia & East Slavonia 6 577 
  Justisdep Total   6 577 
  OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR Constitutional Court - public awarem 234 
    
HCNM JCM Legal Aid H 12 2003 East-
Sl 325 
    
HCNM Knin Legal Aid  H 11 2003 
Dalma 300 
  OSCE Office for Democratic Inst & HR Total 859 
Kroatia Total   13 435 
Tidl.Jugoslavia 
Uspe Det norske flyktningeraad Civil Rights Proj free legal assis  2 944 
    UNMIK- Prolongation Office on Missin 448 
  Det norske flyktningeraad Total   3 392 
  European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo High Level Initiative 821 
  European Centre for Minority Issues Total 821 
  G17 Institute School for Security Sector Refo 349 
  G17 Institute Total   349 
  International Management Group (IMG) Police College Refurbishment Project 712 
  International Management Group (IMG) Total 712 
  Politidirektoratet Pilotproject reform proc police 4 935 
  Politidirektoratet Total   4 935 
  UN Interim Adm in Kosovo (UNMIK) Dep. of justice - missing persons  367 
  UN Interim Adm in Kosovo (UNMIK) Total   367 
  UNDP Police Service Instit. capacity buil 1 000 
  UNDP Total   1 000 
Tidl.Jugoslavia Uspe Total   11 577 
 
Total, top ten countries: NOK 241 591 
Total, all countries: NOK 399 395 
Top ten’s share of all countries: 60.5% 
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Appendix 11: Top Ten Projects 
 
Norad and MFA Justice Sector Aid, 1999-2003: Top Ten Projects 
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Norwegian Justice Sector Aid, 1999-2003: Details on the Top Ten Projects 
 
Project no. Name of project Partner Country Norw. aid 
ZAM-01/368 Magistrates Courts Complex The Judiciary (ZAM) Zambia 19 000 
    The Judiciary (ZAM) Total 19 000 
  Magistrates Courts Complex Total   19 000 
ZAM-01/368 Total     19 000 
MOZ-99/362 Establish Legal and Judical Centre UNDP Mosambik 14 500 
    UNDP Total   14 500 
  Establish Legal and Judical Centre Total   14 500 
MOZ-99/362 Total     14 500 
GTM-99/217 Justice Reform UNDP Guatemala 14 080 
    UNDP Total   14 080 
  Justice Reform Total     14 080 
GTM-99/217 Total     14 080 
3006588100 
UN Interim Police Task Force 
(UNIPTF Justisdep 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 13 038 
    Justisdep Total   13 038 
  UN Interim Police Task Force (UNIPTF Total   13 038 
3006588100 Total     13 038 
GTM-00/216 Justice OJ 2000 - 2004 UNDP Guatemala 12 320 
    UNDP Total   12 320 
  Justice OJ 2000 - 2004 Total     12 320 
GTM-00/216 Total     12 320 
  100 
GTM-98/006 Agr. UNDP Justisreform I UNDP Guatemala 11 427 
    UNDP Total   11 427 
  Agr. UNDP Justisreform I Total   11 427 
GTM-98/006 Total     11 427 
MAK-00/008 BL. Kr. Verdipapirsentral MAK 
Norway Registers Development A/S 
(NRD) Makedonia(Fyrom) 10 832 
    Norway Registers Development A/S (NRD) Total 10 832 
  BL. Kr. Verdipapirsentral MAK Total   10 832 
MAK-00/008 Total     10 832 
6030102 Law and Order TF Afghanistan UNDP Afghanistan 10 000 
    UNDP Total   10 000 
  Law and Order TF Afghanistan Total   10 000 
6030102 Total       10 000 
UGA-97/032 Legal Aid Project Den Norske Advokatforening Uganda 9 567 
    Den Norske Advokatforening Total 9 567 
  Legal Aid Project Total     9 567 
UGA-97/032 Total     9 567 
2006519100 Legal Studies Refugees  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JOR) Jordan 8 100 
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JOR) Total 8 100 
  Legal Studies Refugees Total     8 100 
2006519100 Total     8 100 
 
Total, top ten projects: NOK 122 865 
Total, all projects: 399 395 
Top ten’s share of all projects: 30.8% 
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Appendix 12: Norad and MFA Justice Sector Aid via Norwegian 
NGOs, 1999-2003 
 
Norwegian NGO Partner    Name of project  Aid 
Det norske flyktningeraad Det norske flyktningeraad Civil Rights Proj free legal assis  2 944 
    Civil Rights Project 20 634 
    Civil rights projects Krajlevo 1 031 
    Free legal aid 2 070 
    HR education 762 
    Information, counselling, legal aid 2 085 
    Legal Adviser to UN Transitional Adm 146 
    Lgal aid for IDPsand Refuge 181 
    Sec-paymaster Haver til MAPE 352 
    UNMIK- Prolongation Office on Missin 448 
  Det norske flyktningeraad Total 30 652 
  HURIFO IDP return facilitation - Uganda 2 500 
  HURIFO Total   2 500 
  PCS Capacity building local NGOs - Colom 2 095 
    The Colombian Law Commission 996 
  PCS Total   3 091 
Det norske flyktningeraad Total   36 243 
Den Norske 
Advokatforening Den Norske Advokatforening Establish of  lawyer union 600 
    Evaluation 32 
  Den Norske Advokatforening Total 632 
  Nepal Bar Association Legal Aid Project 4 025 
  Nepal Bar Association Total   4 025 
  Uganda Law Society Legal Aid Project 9 567 
  Uganda Law Society Total   9 567 
Den Norske Advokatforening Total   14 225 
Norsk folkehjelp CONAIE Constitutional indigenous rights(157 2 297 
  CONAIE Total   2 297 
  Ministry of Justice (RWA) Support to justice and human rights 6 496 
  Ministry of Justice (RWA) Total 6 496 
  Norsk folkehjelp Belgrade Centre for Human Rights-Tra 1 500 
  Norsk folkehjelp Total   1 500 
  SRRA Sudan Relief and Rehab Assoc  566 
  SRRA Total   566 
Norsk folkehjelp Total   10 859 
Norges Roede Kors Norges Roede Kors Emergency assistance, protection 1 000 
    ICRC appeal- Bankok reg prog 2 080 
    Visiting prison in Burma 2 700 
  Norges Roede Kors Total   5 780 
Norges Roede Kors Total   5 780 
Redd Barna CAP-CRON Child Friendly Legal requirement 178 
  CAP-CRON Total   178 
  Federal Supreme Court (ETH) Juvenile Justice Reform 383 
  Federal Supreme Court (ETH) Total 383 
  Gonder College Basic Education 650 
  Gonder College Total   650 
  Lawyers for Human Rights and Dev Children's Desk 557 
    Children's Juridical Desk 1 285 
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  Lawyers for Human Rights and Dev Total 1 842 
  Ministry of the Interior Law Enforcement Sex Abuse 6713 33 
  Ministry of the Interior Total   33 
  OFALAM Legal aid office 3901 192 
  OFALAM Total   192 
Redd Barna Total   3 279 
FOKUS FOKUS Participation in Beijing + 5 500 
  FOKUS Total   500 
  
JURK - Juridisk rådgivning for 
kvinner Penal justice and gender 480 
  JURK - Juridisk rådgivning for kvinner Total 480 
FOKUS Total     980 
Kirkens Noedhjelp Gun Free South Africa Gun Free South Africa, Advocacy 85 
  Gun Free South Africa Total   85 
  Kirkens Noedhjelp Work to Combat Violence - New Initia 146 
  Kirkens Noedhjelp Total   146 
Kirkens Noedhjelp Total   231 
Grand Total     71 595 
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Appendix 13: External Assistance to Judicial Reform in Ethiopia 
 
Main recipient Type of aid  Size of aid (if available), 
annual averages 
State 
Type of 
donor 
Name of donor 
(if bilateral: 
name of country 
between 
parantheses)  
Executive: 
ministries 
Judiciary:  
courts 
Research 
inst. 
NGOs Law 
reform 
Courts 
reform 
Judicial 
adm. 
Legal 
com-
munity 
Training
and edu-
cation 
Access 
to justice 
Cross-
cutting, 
judicial 
reform 
Origi-
nal cur-
rency 
NOK Period 
World Bank 
(grant only) 
X    X  X  X X X 3.3m 
USD  
22.7m  2003-
2007 
EU X X X X   X  X   2m euro 16.7m 2004-
2006 
Inter-
govern-
mental 
UNDP X X         X 375 000 
USD 
2.5m 2003-
2006 
USAID (USA) X X     X  X   300 000 
USD 
2.0m 2002 
X X     X     0.83 
CAD 
4.4m 1999-
2004 
CIDA (Canada) 
           1.29m 
USD 
8.8m 2004-
2008 
SCAC, French 
embassy 
(France) 
X X X  X  X  X   200.000 
euro 
1.7m 2002-
2004 
X X  X  X X   X X 2m SEK 1.8m 2001 Sida/Swedish 
embassy 
(Sweden) 
           0.286m 
USD 
2.0m 2004-
2008 
British Council 
(UK) 
X X     X  X   - - - 
Govern-
mental 
Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation 
(Germany) 
X X       X X  - - - 
 
Note 1: Conversion is based on currency rates as of 14 September 2004. 
Note 2: For the contribution of Norway, see separate table. 
 
Sources: AFE (2004a, 2004b), British Council (2004), CIDA (2004), EC (2004), EC and GDFRE (2001), Embassy of Sweden (2000), FEF (2004), Sida (2004a, 2004b), USAID (2004a, 2004b), 
World Bank (2004e). 
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Appendix 14: Norwegian Aid to the Justice Sector in Ethiopia 
 
Note 1: Only projects that involve a documented annual Norwegian contribution of 100 000 NOK or more are included. 
Note 2: If projects implied funding from the Norwegian state, these originated in Norad, not the MFA.  
 
Amount (NOK) Period Ethiopian partner Norwegia
n partner 
(if any) 
Name of project Type of project 
Total Average per 
year 
1998 3 Ethiopian NGOs - Strengthening civil society work on human 
rights and democracy 
Access to justice 
Law reform 
710 000 710 000 
1999 5 Ethiopian NGOs - Strengthening civil society work on human 
rights and democracy 
Access to justice 
Law reform 
1 395 000 1 395 000 
2000-2001 12 Ethiopian NGOs - Strengthening civil society work on human 
rights and democracy 
Access to justice 
Law reform 
6 000 000 3 000 000 
2002 16 Ethiopian NGOs - Strengthening civil society work on human 
rights and democracy 
Access to justice 
Law reform 
5 000 000 5 000 000 
2002 Ministry of Justice - Book on Code of Conduct Court administration/ 
Legal community support  
145 000 145 000 
2002 Ministry of Justice NCHR Training of trainers: Summer course in Oslo Legal training 1 100 000 1 100 000 
2002-2003 Mekelle University - Training course of lower-level judges Legal training 500 000 250 000 
2002-2004 Federal Supreme Court RB Juvenile justice reform Access to justice 
Police reform 
Legal training 
471 000 157 000 
 
2004-2006 Two regional police 
commissions, and the NGO  
Forum for Street Children 
RB Child protection units Police support  
Training 
Access to justice 
700 000 230 000 
2003-2005 Ethiopian Human Rights 
Council (EHRCO) 
- Human rights monitoring Access to justice 1 200 000 400 000 
2003-2006 Ministry of Justice NCHR Human rights training of judges and 
prosecutors  
Legal training 7 659 000 1 915 000 
 
Sources (beyond interview data): Norad (2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d).  
 
Summary 
 
Creating a viable judiciary and strengthening its democratic 
functions has been a main concern of both national governments 
and donors over the last two decades. This report attempts to chart 
and systematise the efforts that have gone into the area of judicial 
reform. That includes various efforts at improving the functioning 
of a country’s legal system, both in terms of fairness and 
efficiency. The report places Norwegian development assistance 
to judicial reform (which is of relatively new date, but of 
increasing magnitude and importance) in a broader context by 
systematically looking at how various donors – multinational, 
governmental, and non-governmental - have operated in this field. 
The analysis covers which sectors of the judiciary have been 
targeted for reform and why; what channels have been used; and 
what the lessons learned so far are. Experiences from Latin 
America and Africa are highlighted. The case studies of 
Norwegian assistance to Guatemala and Ethiopia open up for 
more in-depth reflections on what works and what does not work 
when external donors set out to help governments reform their 
judiciaries. 
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